Whose Energy? Whose Security?

EU Policies and Member State Adaptation in Central and Eastern Europe After the 2022 Supply Crisis

Abstract

Responding to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the European Commission initiated measures to accelerate the energy transition and phase out Russian gas, prompting divergent responses among Central and Eastern European Member States historically exposed to Russian imports. Drawing on new institutionalist theory and engaging with the concept of securitisation, the article examines the dynamics of adaptation through the original and revised National Energy and Climate Plans of six regional Member States, alongside Austria as a comparator. On this empirical basis, the article develops a threefold typology. The ‘accelerationist’
states’ response to the security threat – the acceleration of their climate policy efforts – aligns with the Commission’s objective of displacing Russian gas primarily through a targeted and intensive green transition; its implementation gives rise to institutional ‘layering’ or ‘conversion’. ‘Pivoters’ acknowledge the security threat but address it through geographic diversification towards alternative suppliers while preserving natural gas in a transitional role, a pattern best understood as institutional ‘conversion’. ‘The unwavering’, by contrast, do not regard Russian imports as a security matter – or, where they do, consider them manageable within existing supply arrangements – and consequently seek to preserve the status quo, giving rise to institutional ‘drift’. The article also demonstrates that the Commission’s own institutional role and latitude expanded through gradual ‘layering’ and ‘conversion’, which, after February 2022, enabled it to hold Member States to account over the manner of their energy security decisions.