‘Friendly Fire’ on Central and Eastern Europe: How the Russian Gas Weapon Works on the Peripheries of the Western Alliance
Copyright (c) 2024 András György Deák, Szabó John, Weiner Csaba
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Abstract
Russia deployed its “gas weapon” to coerce European states into supporting its political agenda following its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. This paper explores the Kremlin’s intentions and the responses of Central and East European countries with relatively pro-Russian politics prior to the war. Russia aimed to minimise the target country’s contribution to Ukraine’s war efforts and support of Western sanctions, while nudging them to maintain cooperation. The form and impact of Russia’s actions differed based on the socio-political contexts, which we illustrate with three case studies: Hungary, Bulgaria, and Serbia. Findings are theorised with the use of N.C. Crawford and A. Klotz’s 1999 analytical framework identifying four models of influence – compellance, normative communication, resource denial, and political fracture. Cases are not clear-cut, but broadly speaking each falls into one of three categories – Hungary into the normative communication, Serbia into the resource denial, and Bulgaria into the political fracture – based on predominant patterns, while compellance is perceivable in each country. Domestic and
international policy, energy politics, and the characteristics of energy systems in the target countries all shape sanction design in addition to which the dominant political leadership’s penetration of domestic society is especially pertinent in shaping the sanction design, its effect, and the responses of the receiver of the sanctions.