Maintaining the „Fog of War” and Increasing Uncertainty

Abstract

This study revisits Carl von Clausewitz’s theory of the “fog of war” in light of recent conflicts – in particular the Second Nagorno−Karabakh War and the ongoing Russo−Ukrainian War – and the author’s own field experiment. Technological advances and their democratization, including commercially available drones, sensors and the use of open-source intelligence (OSINT), have created an increasingly transparent battlefield in which commanders operate amid an abundance of information. Drawing on a practical drone-based thermal imaging experiment, the article explores options for concealing heat signatures. It then, based on the literature and field experience, systematizes a set of passive (fortification, camouflage, hardening and protection, new tactical procedures) and active (electronic warfare and jamming, precision strikes, raids, counter‑drone “hunt” units, information operations) measures designed to degrade adversary situational awareness. The analysis argues that the “fog of war” has not disappeared in the digital battlespace; rather, it has taken new forms, including information overload and the ambiguous effects of integrating artificial intelligence into command and control. The article concludes with concrete recommendations for Hungarian Defence Forces units on how to reduce battlefield transparency and increase adversary uncertainty.