Managing Information-Driven Threats in Critical Infrastructure Sectors

Abstract

Rather than offering a sectoral inventory, the paper starts from the recognition that deception-based communication can distort operational decision-making, producing supply-security disruptions and loss of trust. Using Hungarian case vignettes, it examines how narrative-induced risk emerges when manipulation of credibility cues (brand impersonation, cloned domains, persona-based social attacks, audiovisual falsification) combines with cross-channel amplification to raise the likelihood of incidents. The analytical frame is organized persuasive communication (OPC), with emphasis on the decision-distorting mechanisms of organized persuasion rather than the narrower category of “fake news.” Defence is conceptualized as a three-level, feedback-driven practice: user-level cue-interpretation skills (micro), organizational fast-cycle rebuttal and alerting (meso), and platform- and regulator-level cooperation protocols (macro). Findings indicate that communication threats are mitigated most effectively where service-continuity metrics are tied to measurable fact-checking and response times; this linkage enables targeted resilience gains and reduces decision-making noise.