The Crisis Management of the “Dieselgate” – Transboundary (and) Crisis Driven Evolution of EU Executive Governance with or without Agencies?

Abstract

The so-called “Dieselgate” was one of the major scandals of recent years, in which it has been revealed that several car manufacturers (and primarily the Volkswagen Group) manipulated with computers certain diesel-engine models. As a result, the software of the cars could detect when the models concerned were being tested and adjust the car’s emissions to minimum requirements under laboratory circumstances. The starting point of the scandal was the notice of the US Environmental Protection Agency issued in September 2015, which obviously leads us to the dilemma, whether the EU would also need such supranational level watchdog instead of the current system of mainly national level-enforcement and supervision. The European Parliament’s Inquiry Report and some MEP revealed several shortcomings and the need for an EU Road Transport Agency, though this option has not been followed by the Commission in related amendments. The article focuses on the different ways of EU “agencification” with emphasis on the relevant factors such as major crisis events or transboundary effects (standardisation requirements) which clearly resulted in creating EU agencies. This has been the relevant factors in establishing the three (other) EU transport agencies just like in case of the EU’s environmental agency. Therefore, it is the question of the future, whether the reluctance mentioned, combined with the partly reformed enforcement framework with some increased powers given to the Commission (also to the newly created Forum inside the Commission), and the new requirements towards national authorities could adequately address the concerns revealed by the Dieselgate.