Asymmetry, Interdependence and Strategic Calculations in Russian–Chinese Relations

Abstract

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has sharply accelerated the strategic convergence between Moscow and Beijing. Yet this deepening partnership does not neatly conform to the popular narratives of either an “authoritarian alliance” or a hierarchical client-state relationship. Drawing on economic data, defence-industrial trends, geopolitical behaviour, and patterns of military cooperation, this paper examines the structural nature of contemporary Russia–China relations and evaluates four competing analytical models: the alliance model, the client-state hypothesis, the marriage-of-convenience framework, and the covert-rivalry thesis. The findings indicate a pronounced asymmetry: China increasingly dominates the economic, technological and financial dimensions of the relationship, while Russia depends on Chinese markets, payments infrastructure (including CIPS and UnionPay), dual-use components, and yuan-denominated reserves. Yet Moscow retains significant political and military autonomy, as shown by stalled gas pipeline negotiations, selective protectionism, reluctance to accept unfavourable longterm energy pricing, and independent manoeuvring in its expanding partnership with North Korea. At the same time, geopolitical frictions in Central Asia and the Arctic constrain – but do not overturn – the strategic alignment. Overall, the evidence supports the “marriage of convenience” model: a partnership driven not by ideological unity or hierarchy, but by mutual necessity under conditions of global systemic fragmentation, in which China is clearly the stronger actor but not a hegemon over Russia.