Aiming at 5%? NATO’s Defence Spending on the Agenda of the Hague Summit

Abstract

After his inauguration, Donald Trump and the members of the new U.S. administration clearly communicated to their European allies: the era of transactionalism has returned, and European defence ‘outsourced’ to the United States is unsustainable. In this spirit, they expect greater spending and a dynamic increase in defence spending from NATO member states – up to 5% of gross national product (GDP). While a commitment of this proportion seemed unlikely at the beginning of the year, approaching the NATO summit in the Hague on 24–26 June 2025, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and the leaders of several European member states have taken up the support of this objective, while the European Commission’s ReArm Europe 2030 programme is also trying to promote an increase in resources for defence. Since the debate on the necessary increase in defence spending is not a political-economic issue related to Donald Trump, but a necessary confrontation with the fact that after thirty years of enjoying the ‘peace dividend’ that has affected the most fundamental elements of European defence capabilities, the continent is militarily vulnerable. This paper reviews the constraints and opportunities associated with the 5% objective and what such defence spending level could mean in practice.