Max Weber’s Critics Through the Lens of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems

Toward a Game-Theoretic Application in Political Science

Abstract

This paper examines the intersection of political epistemology and formal logic through a comparative analysis of Max Weber’s critics – primarily Leo Strauss and Michael Polanyi – via Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. It is argued that both Strauss’s critique of value-neutrality and Polanyi’s conception of personal knowledge exemplify propositions that, while epistemically valid, resist formal proof within the prevailing methodological frameworks of the social sciences. Drawing on game-theoretic logic, the study constructs a metaphorical yet structurally coherent model in which Weber’s rational-legal authority paradigm, and its critiques, are mapped onto Gödelian structures of undecidability and incompleteness. The proposed framework reveals how epistemological pluralism and moral subjectivity in political analysis can be represented through recursive decision structures and unprovable axioms. Ultimately, this synthesis challenges the rigid separation between formalist logic and normative political thought, advocating for a transdisciplinary approach that integrates logical indeterminacy into the methodology of political science.