Plus valent boni mores, quam bonae leges

Good Morals in Copyright Law

Abstract

The long and demanding process of establishing the rules of copyright has resulted in protection being extended to all literary, scientific and artistic
works, irrespective of their quality, quantity, value, or even moral judgement. In principle, therefore, copyright protection, which is automatic, i.e. deriving from the absence of any formality, is granted to all individual works of an original nature – which, together with the fight against censorship, is a major achievement in terms of guaranteeing freedom of creation. The question
arises, however, whether a given work can reach a level of immorality that the means of dealing with it, which are external to copyright, are no longer sufficient, i.e. whether such a circumstance (also) needs to be dealt within the copyright system
(similar to some forms of protection seen in the field of industrial property). In addition to a review of the relevant literature and case-law on the subject, this paper seeks to draw attention to the fact that copyright law cannot depart from the
standard of good morals, but that finding its place within the system of copyright is not without challenges.