Emberi jogok, demokrácia – Kína árnyékában?

Absztrakt

Structural Conflicts: PR China-Taiwan relations, youth unemployment, growing Chinese influence on Taiwan, De-legitimization of the present political regime led by Kuomintang. Triggering the mechanism of protest on March 18, 2014, in Taipei, the actual conflict the KMT president, government and parliamentary fraction pushed for was ratification of a treaty with China, manipulating political decision making in the Legislative Yuan for fast (“30 second incident”) and full acceptance of Cross Strait Service and Trade Agreement (CSSTA). The opposition Democratic Progress Party and the Taiwan Solidarity Union perceived the threat of exclusion of parliamentary opposition from the decision making. NGO’s, student organizations, different forces of civil society felt excluded from the discourse and criticized the “black box” of political decision making. This injustice mobilized NGO’s and student movements for democracy and transparency against the ratification of CSSTA. Students, their supporters and allies started the occupation of the Executive Yuan building in Taipei from March 18 until April 10, 2014. The reactions of the authorities were selective and repressive tolerance, tolerating the occupation of the building of the Legislative Yuan, but not tolerating the occupation of the building of the Executive Yuan, the Prime Minister’s office. There was a police intervention with force, followed by a discussion on the police brutality and violence resulting in the criticism by the NGO’s. Political opportunities expanded for the protest by the internal division of the KMT between “hardliners” and “softliners” positions, and of the political elite between the governing and the opposition parties. The occupation of the parliament and the following legal procedures and disputes are open, but the concept of civil disobedience is used by the protesters as in the “Umbrella Movement” of Hong-Kong (2014–15).

These discourses use human rights frames against the law and order orientation of the authorities. The protest opened a new policy window, first rejection, latter acceptance of the basic demand, not to pass the CSSTA law on the fast track. Elites were more and more divided by the wide civic support of the protest movement which was supported by a wide coalition of media and professional intellectual discourse as well as solidarity campaigns and a series of protests, marches, rallies, demonstrations mainly in Taipei on Ketaglan boulevard but also in some bigger cities of Taiwan. The short term results of the protest campaign were : CSSTA was not accepted by the parliament on the fast track, a wide de-legitimization of the governing party (results of 2014 and 2016 elections), protests waves in Hong-Kong/Macau against China based authoritarian tendencies; international media coverage and support by civil society in Taiwan. Challenges for Taiwanese politics: a democratic revival with new political enterpreneurs and Agents? Rethinking the relations with PR China? A constitutional reform? – open questions for the future development of Taiwan, made conscious in wider circles by the intensive protest campaign against CSSTA in 2014 Spring Taipei.