A nemzetiségek parlamenti képviseletének elmélete és gyakorlata
A nemzetiségi képviselet szempontjából előnyös választási rendszerek általánosságban
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As a starting point it could be stated that theoretically (among the basic models of electoral systems—listed, individual, mixed) the listed systems are suitable for the minority’s numerical representation—opposed to the individual system in which frame the “winner takes it all”. The minorities can represent themselves in merit and get a mandate in the listed system, which is suitable to proportion. Since the nationalities are numerical minorities in a given State, in the absence of deeper analysis we could think: the listing system favors nationalities. The solution is not so simple because of the following reasons. A majority list system can be proportional too (and the individual system as well). The fact is that the electoral system is not necessarily proportional just because it is a listed system. Changing the boundaries of electoral districts is fundamentally affecting the outcome of the election. The electoral threshold is also a very important question in the listed systems. The electoral
threshold is the factor, which prevents the fragmentation of the parliamentary mandates, and also the disproportion of the system. We should not ignore if the minorities are concentrated geographically in a State, or they are living dispersed. Below is an overview of some of the special electoral systems in general, taking into account all of the above mentioned criteria.