The Evolution of Risk Analysis in Aviation Safety II
Copyright (c) 2025 Beller Balázs
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Abstract
As many hazardous operations, aviation can only be carried out on the basis of acceptable and
unacceptable risks, i.e. risks that must be managed. The purpose of writing this article is to continue the presentation, possible interrelationship and usefulness of risk analysis procedures that have emerged since the 1960s. It is intended to describe risk analysis and visualisation procedures that can be applied to the analysis of complex, multi-integrated systems in addition to linear risk analysis procedures. However, understanding and applying the models that emerged after the 2000s is as complex a task as the systems they are designed to analyse. This article aims, among other things, to help in understanding this complex vision. The research method chosen was based mainly on a review of the foreign literature.
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References
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