Independence or Politicization?

The Operation of the UN Human Rights Monitoring System in Practice

Abstract

In recent years, the functioning of the UN human rights monitoring system has been subject to increasing criticism and attacks. Most of these questions the impartiality and independence, and thus the suitability of so-called mandate holders established by the UN Human Rights Council (such as special rapporteurs) and of treaty bodies, whose members serve (in principle) as independent experts and are tasked to monitor the implementation of international human rights conventions and engage in legal interpretation and development.

The question arises as to how well-founded and justified these critical voices are, whether the independence of the aforementioned experts and bodies can really be questioned, and whether they can be accused of politicizing their work. Is it actually possible to politicize their work, despite the institutional safeguards built into the human rights monitoring system?

The aim of this study is to provide a comparative overview of two key players in the UN human rights monitoring system, the special rapporteurs on human rights and the treaty bodies, focusing on the circumstances surrounding their establishment and the main characteristics and differences in their institutional structures, with particular attention to the institutional guarantees designed to ensure their independent functioning. The author, a former career diplomat, will also draw on examples from own experience and specific cases to examine which external and internal factors can undermine the independence of monitoring mechanisms and might lead to their politicization or reinforce the politicization of their operation.