The Afghan Taliban’s Foreign Policy and Questions of Recognition of Their Statehood

Abstract

If an isolated insurgent group seizes power, which was declared a terrorist organisation, opens up to the outside world and consolidates its rules, their state recognition is a stabilising factor that reduces security risks in Afghanistan, in its neighbourhood and the region, and even globally. During three years of their second government, the Afghan Taliban have established extensive international relations, getting experience by the Doha negotiations, although these relations are primarily focused on the economic, security and humanitarian sectors. During this time, it was proven that the Taliban’s governance essentially fulfilled the state criteria of the Montevideo Convention, they created lasting peace, a unified public administration, there is no rival who would pose a serious military challenge to their rule, their governance extends on the whole country. They have extensive international relations with or without de jure recognition. The de jure recognition was given by China on 24 January 2024, when the head of state received the ambassador’s credentials. When considering national security risks, an important question is whether the Taliban will be able to fulfil the standards of the international community with which they can earn de jure recognition that may be a stabilising factor.