The Taliban’s Crisis of Governance

Abstract

The Taliban political system is not defined and its theory of the state is also undeveloped. The Islamic Emirate between 1996 and 2001 was introduced, but it is not defined on the basis of which principles and how it operates. This indeterminacy and lack of elaboration opens up opportunities for different interpretations, which gives rise of different power centers, Emir Haibatullah’s council in Kandahar, the Hakkání
network, and the group of Mullah Baradar and Mullah Yaqub’s group are hallmarks of these centres of power. The Taliban react to the suppression of the centripetal tendencies that are tearing society apart by introducing a religious dictatorship. In the areas they controlled, the Taliban successfully governed through the local communities and with their horizontal network of military-civilian councils, but by no means uniformly. In the activities of their councils, the various branches of state power were not separated. They functioned as decision-makers, courts and government bodies. The Taliban government is showing a better economic picture than what was forecasted. From secular and religious taxes (’usr, zakat), customs revenues, levies, and rule violation fines incomes, the state obtained significant revenues. A significant source of income is the opium economy and the smuggling of weapons and artifacts. With the strengthening of centripetal forces, radicalism, terrorist organizations, organized crime syndicates, they face unpredictable and uncontrollable processes. When dealing with them, the Taliban groups use different approaches and different practices, which sooner or later will cause a break in their ranks. However, they have no viable alternative. The key to their survival is if the moderates emerge victorious during their infighting for power and co-opt the various groups of society into governance.