Use of Reconnaissance Equipment to Support Nuclear Arms Control
Copyright (c) 2023 Várdai Mihail Istvanovics
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Abstract
The future control of nuclear disarmament poses different challenges. In order to support arms control tasks, the use of reconnaissance tools is extremely important, because verification tasks cannot be carried out continuously on site. In order to do this, it is necessary to be able to determine the verification methods and approaches that can be used for the capabilities of these reconnaissance tools, because each method and approach requires a different type. The previous nuclear arms limitation and disarmament agreements also contain elements relating to various, primarily satellite, reconnaissance devices, which are presented in various treaties and agreements as the so-called National Technical Means of Verification. However, the rules and principles of using these tools are not detailed. As a result of technical development, the importance of these detection systems has increased significantly, but it is important that these devices cannot completely replace on-site inspection activities due to the limitations of their application. During the development work, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification began to re-examine the application possibilities of these sensors as a result of technical development.
Keywords:
References
Aeronautical Information Publication of Hungary Aftergood, Steven (2019): “National Technical Means” Leaves the Lexicon. Federation of American Scientists, 2019. január 11. Online: https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2019/11/ntm-obe/
Бужинский, Евгений (2020): Может ли существовать система контроля над вооружениями, опирающаяся только на национальные технические средства контроля? In Зульхарнеев, А.Ф. (szerk.): Верификация контроля над ядерными вооружениями и ядерного разоружения: опыт, перспективы и новые идеи. М.: ПИР-Центр – Триалог, 17. FM 3-14 Army Space Operations (2019). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army.
Glaser Alexander – Niemeyer, Irmgard (2021): Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Without Onsite Access. In Göttsche, Malte – Glaser, Alexander (szerk.): Toward Nuclear Disarmament. Building Up Transparency and Verification. Berlin: Federal Foreign Office, Division Nuclear Disarmament, Arms Control, Non-Proliferation (OR09), 86–115.
Goldblat, Jozef (2002): Arms Control. The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. London: SAGE. Online: https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446214947
Gottemoeller, Rose – Marvin, Diana (2021): Reimagining the Open Skies Treaty: Cooperative Aerial Monitoring. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2021. június 15. Online: https://thebulletin.org/2021/06/reimagining-the-open-skies-treaty-cooperative-aerial-monitoring/
IPNDV (2020): Verification of Each of the 14 Steps of Nuclear Weapon Dismantlement. Online: https://www.ipndv.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/WG5-Deliverable_FINAL-.pdf
Lindenbaum, David – Lewis, Ryan – Bacastow, Todd M. – Flasher, Joe (2019): The Rise of Augmented Analysis: Defining Levels of Automation for Machine Learning Applied to Geospatial Intelligence. In 2019 State and Future of GEOINT Report. Herndon: The United States Geospatial Intelligence Foundation, 15–17. Online: https://spatial.usc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2019_SaFoGX.pdf
Niemeyer, Irmgard (2009): Perspectives of Satellite Imagery Analysis for Verifying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In Stein, Gotthard – Richter, Bernd – Nussbaum, Sven – Niemeyer, Irmgard – Jasani, Bhupendra (szerk.): International Safeguards and Satellite Imagery. Key Features of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Computer-Based Analysis. Berlin–Heidelberg: Springer, 35–44. Online: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79132-4
Nussbaum, Sven – Niemeyer, Irmgard (2009): Detection of Changes in Images. In Stein, Gotthard – Richter, Bernd – Nussbaum, Sven – Niemeyer, Irmgard – Jasani, Bhupendra (szerk.): International Safeguards and Satellite Imagery. Key Features of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Computer-Based Analysis. Berlin–Heidelberg: Springer, 147–167. Online: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79132-4
Савельев, Александр (2020): Как СССР и США подходили к верификации контроля на вооружениями в годи холодной войны. In Зульхарнеев, А.Ф. (szerk.): Верификация контроля над ядерными вооружениями и ядерного разоружения: опыт, перспективы и новые идеи. М.: ПИР-Центр – Триалог, 7–9.
Ulrich, Pia – Bidwell, Chris – Lauder, John – Rishikof, Harvey – Lincy, Valerie (2019): Public and National Technical Means in the Digital Age. In 2019 State and Future of GEOINT Report. Herndon: The United States Geospatial Intelligence Foundation, 7–9.
Várdai Mihail Istvanovics (2021a): A világűr militarizálásának kérdéseiről. Honvédségi Szemle, 149(1), 34–50. Online: https://doi.org/10.35926/HSZ.2021.1.3
Várdai Mihail Istvanovics (2021b): Possible Methods and Approaches for Verification of Undeclared and Decommissioned Sites for Verifying Nuclear Disarmament, The Reasons to Employ them, and the Dissemination of Findings. Przegląd Nauk o Obronności, (11), 89–113. Online: https://doi.org/10.37055/pno/147576
Jogi források
- 1686/2017. (IX. 22.) Korm. határozat az Európai Biztonsági és Együttműködési Szervezet által elfogadott bizalom- és biztonságerősítő intézkedések 2011. évi Bécsi Dokumentumának közléséről
- 1999. évi VI. törvény az Európai Hagyományos Fegyveres Erőkről szóló Szerződés és kiegészítő dokumentumainak együttes kihirdetéséről
- 2004. évi V. törvény az 1992. március 24-én, Helsinkiben aláírt Nyitott Égbolt Szerződés kihirdetéséről
Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I). Online: https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/strategic-arms-limitation-talks-salt-i-salt-ii
OSCC/I/Dec.1/10 December 1992
OSCC/I/Dec.5/29 June 1992
OSCC/VI/Dec.18/12 October 1994
Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms