The Independence of National Courts Applying EU Law

Abstract

National courts play a fundamental role in the application of EU law, which therefore requires the Member States to exercise their competence to organise the judiciary by complying with the principle of the independence of judges. The Court of Justice recently delivered judgments in two cases in which it had the occasion to examine certain aspects of the extent and the limits of the independence of national courts applying EU law. In Case C-619/18 Commission v Poland, the Court ruled that the Polish legislation concerning the lowering of the retirement age for Polish Supreme Court judges is contrary to EU law, since it breaches the principles of the irremovability of judges and judicial independence. In Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, the Court set out that the salary reductions applied to the judges of the Tribunal de Contas in Portugal as part of austerity measures aiming at reducing the Portuguese State’s excessive budget deficit, do not infringe the principle of judicial independence. Although the Court recognised that the receipt by the members of a national court of a level of remuneration commensurate with the importance of the functions they carry out constitutes a factor which is essential to judicial independence, it pointed out that the austerity measures in question indiscriminately applied to the whole public sector, were temporary in nature, pursued a legitimate objective, and, as such, could not be regarded as an attack against the judiciary. There are still a lot of cases in progress before the Court as to compliance with the principle of independence of judges, which concern Hungary, Poland and Romania. In these cases, the Court has been asked to rule in subjects such as the influence of the executive and the legislative powers on the judiciary, the nomination of presidents of courts, the adequacy of remuneration of judges, investigations into irregularities committed by judges, as well as the financial liability of judges for errors they made in the course of their judicial activity.