Support to Insurgency and Counter Insurgency Operations
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Abstract
Since the end of the 20th Century the role and ultimate power of states have been diminishing. Once, states were considered untouchable no matter what happened within their borders and no matter who ruled them, but nowadays, international intervention into intra–state affairs has become quite common. Ungoverned, undergoverned, misgoverned and contested areas offer fertile ground for insurgents, extremists, organized crime and warlords to flourish and consequently endanger not only local civilian populations but also the political, security, economic or ideological interests of western powers. Consequently, two separate approaches to intra–state interventions have been developed: backing the government in their fight against the insurgency, such as in Afghanistan, and backing the insurgents in their fight against the government such as in Libya.
First, this article will analyze the changed role of the states in the New World Order and define parameters that guide international interventions into the intra–state affairs. Secondly, it will analyze western approaches to insurgency and counter insurgency operations through a case study of NATO operations in Afghanistan and Libya.