AARMS – Academic and Applied Research in Military and Public Management Science https://folyoirat.ludovika.hu/index.php/aarms <p>As the name of the journal shows, its goal is to publish research results, peer-reviewed studies of high standard in English in the field of military science and military technology. Recent changes in the structure of the university have called for the renewal of the publication, allowing for publishing scientific results in other disciplines such as public administration as well as law enforcement.</p> Ludovika University Press en-US AARMS – Academic and Applied Research in Military and Public Management Science 2498-5392 <p>The copyright to this article is transferred to the University of Public Service Budapest, Hungary (for U.S. government employees: to the extent transferable) effective if and when the article is accepted for publication. The copyright transfer covers the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute the article, including reprints, translations, photographic reproductions, microform, electronic form (offline, online) or any other reproductions of similar nature.</p> <p>The author warrants that this contribution is original and that he/she has full power to make this grant. The author signs for and accepts responsibility for releasing this material on behalf of any and all co-authors.</p> <p>An author may make an article published by University of Public Service available on a personal home page provided the source of the published article is cited and University of Public Service is mentioned as copyright holder</p> Building an OT Security Microgrid Testbed https://folyoirat.ludovika.hu/index.php/aarms/article/view/7465 <p>This paper introduces the development of an Operational Technology (OT) security microgrid testbed. The testbed is aligned with the IEC 62443 standard and structured to simulate and mitigate potential security risks within OT systems. It serves as a platform for evaluating cybersecurity strategies through test scenarios and cases, aimed at enhancing the resilience and responsiveness of OT environments to cyber threats. The work described here lays the foundational framework for subsequent research, focusing on cybersecurity measures, including MITRE ATT&amp;CK-based methodologies and detection strategies using machine learning. This initial exploration emphasises the importance of creating a versatile, realistic testing environment to understand and address the unique security challenges faced by OT systems.</p> Gyebnár Gergő Copyright (c) 2025 Gyebnár Gergő https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2025-06-17 2025-06-17 23 3 5 19 10.32565/aarms.2024.3.1 Hungary’s Eastern Opening Policy and Cooperation with the Turkic States in the Fields of Trade, Transport and Energy https://folyoirat.ludovika.hu/index.php/aarms/article/view/7507 <p>The present study depicts Hungary’s eastern opening policy as to when and how it was initiated, then analyses Hungary’s increasing economic, transport and energy relations with the Turkic countries, namely, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In the first part, the reasons and expectations of the Hungarian Government in initiating the eastern opening are explained and the priorities the Hungarian Government put forward in starting this initiative are mentioned. In the second part, the development of the idea of the Organization of Turkic States and the road to institutionalisation is summarised and Hungary’s link into the system, which is a critical element of the Eastern Opening, is delved into. In the following section, the economic benefits that Hungary is seeking to reach in the relations with the Turkic states are underlined and then the increasing trade with Turkic states are put forward as part of the developing commercial relations with special reference to Hungary’s observer status in the Organization of Turkic States. In the fourth part, the increasing significance of the Middle Corridor, which is the route that links China to Europe through Central Asia, is shown and the importance attached to this corridor by the Hungarian Government is summarised. In the fifth part, the energy cooperation between Hungary and the Turkic states is mentioned, with which Hungary exerts efforts to become a hub for energy in Europe. In the conclusion part, after a summary of Hungary’s achievements from the eastern opening policy and the relations with the Turkic countries, the potential of Hungary’s opening to the Turkic world is explained.</p> Ali Kılıçarslan Topuz Copyright (c) 2025 Ali Kılıçarslan Topuz https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2025-06-17 2025-06-17 23 3 21 34 10.32565/aarms.2024.3.2 Partner or Ally? V4 Countries’ Bilateral Relations with the United States https://folyoirat.ludovika.hu/index.php/aarms/article/view/7631 <p>After its summit in Prague on 27 February 2024, the Visegrád Group suffered a breakdown of relations, mainly due to the divergent views of its member states regarding Russia’s war in Ukraine. The V4 countries split into a pro-Ukraine block (Poland and the Czech Republic) and a Ukraine-sceptic block (Hungary and Slovakia), which made it difficult for the group to present a united front on key issues and diminished its ability to influence broader European policy. In addition, the lack of unity weakens the V4’s collective security posture while the Central European region has gained strategic importance as part of NATO’s eastern flank. The deterioration of the security environment also impacted the V4 countries’ bilateral relations with the United States, as the pro-Ukraine countries intend to maintain close cooperation with Washington, while the sceptics are staunch critics of Western policies supporting Ukraine. This paper highlights the fundamental differences between the latest security strategies and foreign policies of the Visegrád Group countries towards the United States, Russia and China, looking at these countries’ latest national security strategies and the 2022 integrated country strategies of the United States Department of State. Our comparative analysis shows that Hungary can be considered an outsider among the V4 countries since the Hungarian Government intends to pursue pragmatic cooperation with Russia and China while U.S.–Hungarian relations are gradually deteriorating. In contrast, the other three member states – especially Poland and the Czech Republic, but also Slovakia regardless of Robert Fico’s return to power in 2023 – favoured closer ties with the United States and shared most of the same concerns over Moscow and Beijing.</p> Selján Péter Copyright (c) 2025 Selján Péter https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2025-06-17 2025-06-17 23 3 35 59 10.32565/aarms.2024.3.3 The Special Legal Order and the Renewed Strategies and Normative Framework of Security and Defence Policies in Hungary https://folyoirat.ludovika.hu/index.php/aarms/article/view/7320 <p>Recent years have brought challenges of arguably unprecedented number and scale to the global security and defence policy environment of states and international organisations. It is probably enough to mention, among many other crises, the Russian–Ukrainian conflict, the Covid–19 pandemic, the internationalisation of terrorism, the increased migratory pressure on Europe, as well as climate change or the emerging threats in cyberspace. Both international and national legislators are looking for new types of responses to these novel forms of challenges. Accordingly, in recent years, Hungary has started to build a new legal environment for defence and security. In our study, we will first consider the strategic framework of this new legal framework, followed by a description of the amended special legal order rules of the Fundamental Law and the new laws that implement the renewed organisation of the comprehensive defence and security system. The future of the subject at hand is unfortunately bleak; yet it may be somewhat clearer if the responses to international conflicts and other threats are underpinned by active preparation.</p> Móré Sándor Szilvásy György Péter Copyright (c) 2025 Móré Sándor, Szilvásy György Péter https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2025-06-17 2025-06-17 23 3 61 88 10.32565/aarms.2024.3.4 Institutionalised Tools for Addressing the Climate Crisis in Cape Coast, Ghana https://folyoirat.ludovika.hu/index.php/aarms/article/view/7693 <p>The climate crisis presents significant challenges for many African cities, impacting their economies, ecosystems and the livelihoods of their inhabitants. This paper explores into the various tools and techniques that local government administrations are employing to adapt to these challenges. Using Cape Coast Metropolitan Assembly in Ghana as a case study, a combination of focus group discussions and informal interviews was held with key stakeholders. The findings revealed a multifaceted narrative of vulnerability and adaptation, highlighting the importance of education and capacity building in institutionalising effective climate governance. Ongoing engagement with stakeholders is also considered crucial for refining existing strategies and discovering innovative solutions that address the unique challenges posed by climate change in the region.The paper concludes that incorporating informal practices often deeply rooted in local culture can enhance formal policy initiatives. This integration fosters a more comprehensive and effective approach to climate governance at the sub-national level.</p> Ama Kissiwah Boateng Copyright (c) 2025 Ama Kissiwah Boateng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2025-06-17 2025-06-17 23 3 89 105 10.32565/aarms.2024.3.5 Hacktivists, Proxy Groups, Cyber Volunteers https://folyoirat.ludovika.hu/index.php/aarms/article/view/7738 <p style="font-weight: 400;">This paper explores the involvement of hacktivists, cyber volunteers and proxy groups in military cyber operations, with a particular focus on their roles in the ongoing Russian–Ukrainian war. The research aims to analyse the participation of these non-state actors, their legal implications, and how their involvement could influence the strategic, operational and tactical practices of small and medium-sized NATO member states, such as Hungary. Drawing from case studies, literature review and in-depth interviews with Hungarian military intelligence and public administration leaders, the paper formulates two hypotheses: 1. Hacktivist groups, unless integrated into a state’s cyber strategy, hinder tactical objectives and raise significant international legal concerns; and 2. Such groups pose a strategic threat to small NATO countries, including Hungary. The findings emphasise the necessity for NATO states to consider how to engage and regulate cyber volunteers effectively, while minimising the risks posed by hacktivist and proxy groups. Additionally, the research underscores the lack of a unified legal framework governing the use of these non-state actors, which complicates their regulation and control in cyberspace conflicts. The paper concludes with recommendations for how NATO states can leverage the openness of civilians to participate in cyber defence while maintaining legal and operational oversight, supporting the involvement of various cyber groups within the framework of international law.</p> Krasznay Csaba Copyright (c) 2025 Krasznay Csaba https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2025-06-17 2025-06-17 23 3 107 124 10.32565/aarms.2024.3.6 Competing Forums for Global Security Dialogue: The Munich Security Conference and the Minsk Conference post 2022 https://folyoirat.ludovika.hu/index.php/aarms/article/view/7833 <p>This paper examines the evolution of competing international security dialogue platforms through a comparative analysis of the Munich Security Conference (MSC) and the Minsk Conference (MC) during 2023–2024. Using Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett’s Security Communities framework and Charles Tilly’s network configurations concept, it analyses how these forums represent distinct approaches to organising international security dialogue. The study demonstrates how the established MSC and the emerging Minsk Conference develop different institutional practices, governance structures and engagement patterns. While Munich emphasises multilateral engagement within a rules-based framework, Minsk promotes an alternative model centred on state sovereignty and Eurasian integration. This comparison reveals an emerging divide between Western and Eurasian approaches to international security dialogue, indicating a broader transformation in global security relations.</p> Lóránt Szabolcs Copyright (c) 2025 Lóránt Szabolcs https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2025-06-17 2025-06-17 23 3 125 136 10.32565/aarms.2024.3.7