Operational Capability Enhancement of NATO Rotary-Wing Forces
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Abstract
Operational experiences of the recent past have revealed the significance of the helicopters and their combat and combat support capabilities in the asymmetric warfare environment. Recognizing the importance of the helicopters, the commanders of operations required an increasing number of rotary-wing assets onto the battlefield which has been traced back for various reasons by the participating nations. The situation becomes more complicated by the serious capability disparities among the rotary-wing forces already on the battlefield.
The gaps in combat support lead consequently to the overall operational capability reduction in NATO forces. In my study, I look for solutions on how to increase the number of helicopters on the operational theatre, and how to enhance the operational capability of NATO rotary-wing forces.