



NEMZETBIZTONSÁGI SZEMLE

**NOÉMI ZALAI-GÖBÖLÖS: *Generational Challenges
in National Security Education***

**FERENC HORVÁTH: *“From Top-to-Toe”:
Choosing the Appropriate Training
Method***

**MIKLÓS KUND REGÉNYI: *A Good
Practice – Situational Training in
Civilian National Security Education***

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Noémi Zalai-Göbölös¹

Generational Challenges in National Security Education

In recent years, increasingly far-reaching findings and researches on different generations appear, and parallel to this, the challenges related to the topic keep emerging in almost every area of life. The latter is particularly strong in the field of employment and education, the main reason for which is that the completely different attitudes of the younger generations have catalysed serious changes in both segments. In addition, in recent years, the global technological and IT development have accelerated tremendously, and the generations of the digital age are socialising in a completely different environment than their predecessors. Thus, their vision on the world, their values and their future prospects are also fundamentally different.

Keywords: national security, generational challenges, national security education

1. Brief generational characteristics

There is an extensive international and domestic literature on generational researches. Based on the findings of the researchers, the characteristics of each generation became identifiable and known. Analyses also include a number of specific aspects and approaches, such as generational characteristics related to private life, social and cultural conditions, education, consumer habits or the field of work. In this study, I do not intend to present the characteristics of each generation in detail, but I would like to give an overview of the most important criteria related to the topic.

First, it is worth reviewing the criteria by which generations can be grouped and why this is important at all. Overall, it can be stated that individuals belonging to the same generations were born in a certain time interval (approximately 15–20 years), have a similar childhood socialisation experience, and their values and habits show many similarities. At the same time, the characteristics of each generation are culture-specific in certain elements, because in addition to global trends, the regional, local, social, political, economic environment and historical background also influence them.

¹ Assistant Lecturer, University of Public Service, Department of Counterterrorism, e-mail: zalai.gobolos.noemi@uni-nke.hu

The common basic generational features, habits and characteristics derive from the similar experience of the members. However, these experiences are constantly supplemented by additional ones due to the constant development that have an impact on social attitudes and thinking.²

As a result of the rapid progress that has taken place in recent decades, a number of such conditions are affecting the socialisation of generations which previously have not occurred. For example, online societies provide a different set of values, possibility of assertion, or behavioural models which inevitably influence generations' visions and attitudes toward different areas of life.

2. Generational challenges in employment and education

Changing generational characteristics are forcing new approaches in all areas of life, but perhaps the greatest challenges are being generated in the field of employment and education. In Hungary, the labour market is less segmented, which means that all civil and state actors compete for the same human resources during recruiting. Profit-oriented organisations constantly strive to monitor current trends and adjust their recruitment strategies and certain elements connected to the organisational culture and benefits, because the resulting competitive advantage can ensure their survival. Public actors are in a much more difficult position because they are also aware of changes, but the adaptation to the current situation may be much slower due to their specific operational characteristics, which are significantly reducing their competitiveness compared to other market players. Members of the Z and later the Alpha generations entering the labour market, already consider completely different aspects when choosing a job or profession. As a result, previously used recruiting and retaining strategies require strong rethinking by employers.

The challenges in the field of education are based on somewhat different considerations. In this field, finding the answers to the “what and how to teach?” questions mean the biggest challenge. Thanks to technical and IT developments, there will be professions in the future that will cease to exist or become robotic, or there are some that already do not exist. The latter poses a particular challenge because it is not possible to prepare for a non-existing profession. At the same time, thanks to the spread of the Internet and digitisation, there is an almost unlimited amount of information which is immediately accessible and searchable. Therefore, the legitimacy of traditional educational practices partly aimed at memorising numbers and facts as much as possible becomes questionable. In addition, due to the changed environment and the different socialisation circumstances, the learning and information processing skills of the younger generations have also changed significantly. Numerous studies confirm that the average concentration capacity has been radically reduced by now, even according to conservative estimates. One of the reasons for this is to be found in generational characteristics. As a native digital, Generation Z is accustomed to simultaneous multidirectional communication, a constant online presence, and being

² Krisztián Steigervald: *Generációk harca. Hogyan értsük meg egymást?* Budapest, Partvonal Kiadó, 2021. 24–35.

a part of several digital micro-communities. Therefore, their information processing method is non-linear, and their mode of expression is dominated by short, concise messages, abbreviations and visual representations. Due to the digital environment and changes in the ability to concentrate, fast information retrieval is preferred, and contents that promote practical knowledge have become a priority. It is enough to think that there is almost no topic without a practical video guide. The above-mentioned features seem to be not compatible or only to a very small extent with the previously preferred teaching methods.

3. Career characteristics of the field of national security

Before turning to the challenges of national security training, I would like to briefly introduce the career characteristics of the national security field. In recent decades, not only global development has accelerated, but political, social, economic and other changes have taken place in the world that have generated new security policy challenges. Of course, these also affected the functioning of the organisations responsible for security. The Hungarian national security services have undergone significant transformations since the change of regime, due to, among other things, technical and IT developments, the changed security policy environment and socio-cultural changes. The services, of course, strive to meet current professional and security requirements, but due to their operational characteristics and legal environment, their development is slower and more limited. National security services are highly hierarchical, traditional organisations, and their operation is regulated by law, including certain segments of human resource management. At the same time, environmental and social changes and the forthcoming expectations have had an impact on their internal development processes.

National security organisations are in a special position in the labour market, because the open sharing of information on certain jobs is limited due to its nature. Changes in the external environment, however, require opening up to society, especially in the field of recruitment. Nowadays, the national security services are increasingly using the opportunities provided by various Internet forums and social interfaces; however, they are at a disadvantage in terms of reaching, recruiting and retaining the younger generations. In order to remain competitive, they have relatively little room for changing in the present regulatory environment, especially in terms of career planning, payment and recruitment procedures. These areas are regulated by law, therefore their change does not primarily fall within the competence of the organisations. Although the fundamental interest of the services is to successfully select the most suitable candidates for the specific tasks, but the lengthy recruitment process often leads to counterproductive results. In addition, national security organisations have such specific set of requirements and expectations which further limit their possibilities for finding the appropriate candidate.

If we look at the issue in terms of generational differences, the challenges considering human resource management processes become visible. First, let us look at the expectations that the organisations have for their prospective and

existing employees. Perhaps the most important criteria are reliability and regulatory compliance, which are clearly given prominence because of the nature of national security systems. Besides loyalty, professionalism, responsibility, moral strength and impeccable lifestyle are also important. However, due to the nature of the work, a high level of stress tolerance and workload are also expected. In addition, the ideal candidate is well-suited to specific working conditions and tasks, is able to collaborate, and last but not least, is developable.

The expectations presented above did not pose a particular challenge for the Baby Boomers (1946–1964) and Generation X (1965–1979), which are more accepting of the hierarchical organisational systems, authoritarianism and regulations. In Generation Y (1980–1994), the questioning of rules and authoritarianism was more pronounced, especially for those born after 1990. However, Z (1995–2010) and presumably the following generations are already putting the frame of work on a different base, so their preferred expectations require significant changes and different approaches on the part of the organisations. For Generation Z, the organisational culture and a strong brand they can be attached to, are fundamentally important.³ In addition, a modern work environment, an innovative, digital and creative workplace, competitive payment, fast career opportunities, flexibility in the place and duration of work, training opportunities, caring leadership attitude, attention and frequent feedback are also expected.

Based on the above, there seems to be a significant discrepancy between expectations, which in any case will cause difficulties for the national security services in the long run. At the same time, some of the expectations are fully compatible with the functioning of those organisations without compromising the fundamental interest and purpose. These include the modern and innovative working environment, creativity, leadership behaviour and, last but not least, training opportunities.

3.1. The scenes of national security education

In Hungary, unlike in other professions, preparation for the national security career can only take place after being recruited, either in or outside the school system. The scene of school-based education is the University of Public Service, which was established by the government on 1 January 2012 with the integration of the Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University, the College of Police Officers and the Faculty of Public Administration of the Corvinus University of Budapest. One of the basic goals of the establishment of the University of Public Service was to strengthen the professionalism and expertise of the personnel of the civil administration, law enforcement, national defence and national security services within the civil service through coordinated and planned organisational supply training.⁴

³ Klára Kissné András: *Kettős kockázat*. s. a.

⁴ András Patyi: "E pluribus Unum" – A Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem előtt álló kihívások. *Magyar Közigazgatás, Új Folyam*, 61, no. 3 (2011). 24–31.

The national security specialisation was established in 2004, and the education started in the autumn of 2005. The education at the Master's Degree in National Security (MSc) in the former ZMNE Kossuth Lajos Faculty of Military Sciences started in September 2009, thus the new system of training has become complete. The University established the national security program in 2006 based on the needs of its customers, and it received the specialisation permit in 2008. The relevant personnel of the services operating in the civil sphere were formed at other universities, and a certain proportion in the various basic courses of the former Zrínyi Miklós University of National Defence. The Institute of National Security was established in 2012 with the aim of providing an opportunity to recruit specialists from organisations authorised to use intelligence tools and to support human resource development. The two departments of the institute, the Department of National Security in Military Field and the Department of National Security in Civilian Field, carry out the teaching and research according to uniform educational principles, but taking full account of the specifics of the clients. Training is provided in the form of correspondence, depending on the needs of the services concerned, on both undergraduate (B.Sc.) and master's (M.Sc.) courses.

Considering the nature of the education, the basic conditions for admission are professional skills in active service, support from the head of the given national security organisation and a valid "C" type national security clearance, thus enrolment into this type of education is possible only after joining one of the national security services. Currently, there are three majors: specialisation on human intelligence, on technical intelligence and counterterrorism. All these majors are taught on the undergraduate and master's courses within national security in civilian field. The mission of the B.Sc. course, based on the statement of the University, is to educate national security experts for national security services and bodies authorised to collect information by covert methods. It is supposed that the graduates must have state-of-the-art knowledge in general terms, in scientific, theoretical and practical studies, and in technical, legal, criminological, psychological fields, as well as in information technology (IT), in security policy and foreign languages. The primary objective of the master's program is to train national security professionals who are suitable for managerial and expert positions in the administrative, military, law-enforcement and scientific sectors. They also must be able to assess, analyse and solve national security problems based on their professional knowledge and practical skills. They are prepared to understand the functioning of political institutions, security processes, public policies and their interrelations and interaction depending on the situation in the global security policy affairs, to support the preparation of government responses.⁵

Although there are courses at the University of Public Service which themes on national security services and their activities are part of the subject, there are no open courses with special knowledge reserved for security organisations. This is why, the national security services do not have the pre-requisite of having any special qualifications before the enrolment of their candidates. Nevertheless, there may be some exceptions in cases of positions of experts where a special degree from

⁵ See <https://felveteli.uni-nke.hu/rtk/>

beyond the national security realm may be required for the job. Due to the fact that the employees entering the national security services have different experience, qualifications and professional background, their training may be carried out through internal training systems and courses.

The system of internal trainings differs from organisation to organisation due to the different tasks, but in general, it is clear that all services have basic and special trainings and a corresponding internal educational system. Although the basic trainings vary in terms of its duration, but are similar in terms of its purpose, namely the transfer of unified approach and knowledge that contributes to the most efficient preparation for the future tasks. In addition, each service has a special, internal advanced training system, the main task of which is to prepare for a specific job or activity, and to maintain or deepen the previously acquired knowledge. The courses held within this advanced system can also vary in duration, from one- or two-days skills developing trainings up to several weeks-long special courses. Furthermore, it is common that employees enrol in various external domestic or even international courses, which are aimed to develop certain language or other targeted skills. Moreover, the services must comply with the Ministry of the Interior's unified further training system, which includes the completion of additional organisationally–institutionally accredited online and in-presence courses. Within this framework, certain amount of training scores must be obtained within a 4-year training cycle.

Examining the different training options from a methodological point of view, it seems that the services have sought to improve their tools in recent years. Accordingly, in addition to traditional forms of education, more innovative methods such as trainings through exercises, table-top exercises situation games, and online or blended learning classes are often used.

4. New generation challenges in national security education

Based on the above, it can be stated that the training systems of the national security services contain the elements which provide the opportunity to prepare the staff from the basics to the advanced levels. The teaching methodology is partly based on decades of tradition, but training systems are increasingly incorporating elements which integrate modern educational opportunities according to current organisational needs and expectations. However, due to the characteristics of the younger generations presented earlier, it will be necessary to rethink the methods used so far and to introduce forms of training that are able to meet the expectations and interests of both parties involved at the same time.

First, let us examine which forms and methods of education can produce the desired results for the Z and later the Alpha generation based on their characteristics. As I have mentioned earlier, the job expectations of younger generations are strongly tied to the digital environment and the stimuli that come with it, which they consider natural. It affects not only the teaching methodology itself and the tools used during the education, but the attitude and abilities of the instructors as well. Young people have similar expectations towards teachers as they do towards their future leaders.

In case of the younger generations, the “I do” experience has a key role to play, which means that they do not want to be passive participants in an educational process only, but they want to have an active role instead. Therefore, there is an explicit need for them to be involved in decision-making processes. Of course, this does not mean that they should be given the right to decide on the content, frequency or other characteristics of their education, but the education should provide them with decision-making opportunities that make them feel an integral part of the process. This could be, for example, the invention of group or individual projects related to the subject, which may be implemented within the framework of the certain course. It can meet several criteria at the same time, as it gives them the opportunity to make decisions, the experience of creativity and autonomy, and the sense of practical usefulness. The need for practical examples is also a defining element of the expectations, which definitely overrules the theoretical knowledge and is highly important to youngsters.

Because young people are exposed to multiple visual stimuli, a traditional lesson may be boring and untraceable for them. The latter is a consequence of the fact that their ability to concentrate has dropped sharply, so the fewer are the new stimuli, the more certain is that young people lose interest very quickly and are unwilling or unable to pay attention in the long run. Accordingly, the emergence of diversity, visuality and interactivity in education and examination is also an essential criterion. This means not only the use of various modern infocommunication tools in education, but also the introduction of creative and cooperative methods that are able to maintain activity of the students.

It can also be stated that younger generations have been active users of the vast amount of digitally available information since their childhood, but the necessary skills for the effective data selection and evaluation might be learned much later. Knowing this, the task of educators is not only to teach the lessons’ content in as a diverse form as possible, but also to raise the level of proficiency in effective information processing and the ability of recognising the differences between authentic and unreliable sources. These are even more pronounced in the case of national security training, as the services main tasks are based on the information gathering, processing and evaluation. Precisely because of the large amount of easily accessible information, it is also important for moving closer to a competency-based approach in education, which means to strengthen and develop practical skills and abilities instead of lexical knowledge.

The younger generations are accustomed to micro-communities on digital platforms, and partly because of this they may require the opportunity to work in groups and exchange views with each other. During the education, numerous topics can be processed in groups, and it is worth applying these methods more often and more consciously. With regard to expectations in the field of work, the need for frequent feedback has already been mentioned, and the same is true in the education as well. It is important for the so-called “super now” generation to have immediate or frequent feedbacks in all areas, which is also a confirmation of the quality of the given activity. It is no coincidence that the cult of “like hunting” on digital platforms has developed in young people, as there is hardly a better measure of popularity and acknowledgement.

Based on the above, it can be concluded that interactive, flexible and creative forms and methods of education are the most preferred ones by young people. The non-school-based internal national security trainings already include a number of educational methods that meet the expectations of young generations. At the same time, it is very important that development concerning education should be continuous. Due to its nature, the school-based national security education system is in a more difficult position, as it has to fulfil not only the requirements of the university but of the national security services as customers, as well. According to the previously introduced institutional strategy, national security education should be of a synthesising, integrative and complex nature. On the other hand, due to its closed nature, education contains a number of knowledge that can be closely related to the activities of the national security services. However, most of the subjects are excellent for processing and learning in an interactive way, either as situational exercises or project-type activities. In addition, there are many untapped opportunities in the field of teaching methodology which can be adapted to ensure continuous improvement.

5. Opportunities for development in the field of national security training

If we want to summarise briefly what the education system for young people should look like, three aspects are worth emphasising: digital, visual and interactive. From a methodological point of view, it can be translated as infotainment, edutainment and gamification, and all three are designed to make the learning process easier, more interesting and more efficient. The complex correlation between the upcoming different teaching methods is well illustrated in the figure below.

From the above mentioned methods, I would like to highlight gamification, because in my opinion, the application of this would provide an opportunity to improve the educational methodology of national security training. There is no uniformly accepted definition of gamification, the term itself was first used in 2002 and became public in 2010.⁶ In essence, gamification is nothing more than the application of games and game elements to non-gaming areas of life.⁷ The reason that more and more civil and professional organisations are using it, from recruitment to training, is that a properly applied gamified method is suitable for increasing intrinsic motivation and organisational commitment, enhancing creativity, and even assisting certain attitude change. It is a common biological fact that the human brain processes stories more easily than dry fact data,⁸ and that gamification can provide a story-based context. In addition, it can have a very good community development effect either at workplace or in school.

⁶ See www.growthengineering.co.uk/definition-of-gamification

⁷ See www.gamify.com/what-is-gamification

⁸ See www.quantified.ai/blog/the-science-of-stories-how-stories-impact-our-brains




Figure 1: Relation between game-based-learning, gamification and edutainment (after Martens and Müller, 2017).

Source: Kristina M. Madsen: *The Gamified Museum: A Critical Literature Review and Discussion of Gamification in Museums*. In Thessa Jensen – Ole Ertlöv Hansen – Claus Andreas Foss Rosenstand (eds.): *Gamescope: The Potential for Gamification in Digital and Analogue Places*. Aalborg, Aalborg Universitetsforlag, 2020.

Of course, like all methods, gamification has its limitations as well, but with careful preparation, proper goal setting and professional implementation, it can greatly help achieve both organisational strategic and up-to-date development goals. The concept of gamification is basically tied to digital context, but it can take many other forms. Considering its definition, we can also consider memory games, quiz tasks, guessing games and situational, simulation tasks as gamified methods. In fact, it can be said with a little exaggeration that almost any topic or subject can be gamified, either in whole or in part, and national security education is no exception. The University of Public Service, which hosts the Institute of National Security, is also looking for the right tools for the increasingly generational challenges in education. Therefore, the Creative Learning Program was launched a few years ago, with the primary goal of introducing, testing and adapting creative teaching methods that can provide adequate solutions to the difficulties experienced in educating young people.

6. Conclusion

Overall, it can be stated that national security education has been constantly evolving in the past decade. Although many subjects are necessarily permanent in terms of content, but considering the teaching method, many innovations can be introduced in terms of methodology which will be able to meet current challenges. In the actual global security policy environment, law enforcement agencies and national security services have and will continue to have a greater role and importance than before, but they will only be able to maintain their effective functioning if they have a quality staff in the long term. Therefore, the more they know about the trends ahead, the better and more successful is their adaptation and preparation, and this is especially true to the organisational segments.

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József Boda¹ 

The Situation of National Security Studies A Short Overview

The author provides an overview of the national security and intelligence studies of some international organisations and some countries. The main focus of the article is on the development of national security and intelligence education in the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and China, Romania, Russia, the United State of America (USA), the United Kingdom, Singapore and Australia.

Keywords: education, intelligence, international organisations, national security studies

1. Introduction

Looking at the information available on the Internet regarding the subject, we can confidently say that there is now a wide choice available to those who wish to obtain a degree in the field of national security or who want to expand their knowledge in this field.

There are university and college-level courses supported by governments, and international organisations, and there are national security and intelligence courses available at civilian universities. There is also an international body established in the USA in 2004, called the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE). Below, without claim for completeness, those institutions dealing with national security training will be presented which I consider to be the most important.

“The academic study of national security had its beginnings in the 1940s. The Second World War had a catalytic impact in this respect. As William T. R. Fox wrote in his survey of early work in this field during the mid-1950s, ‘it was to be expected that fifteen years of world war and postwar tension, with problems of national security continually at the center of public and governmental interest, would shape the research activities of social scientists generally.’”² The term “national security” spread in our country at the same time as the regime change (1990). In my opinion,

¹ PhD. habil, Associate Professor, Honorary University Professor, University of Public Service, e-mail: boda.jozsef@uni-nke.hu

² Brendan Taylor: The Evolution of National Security Studies. *National Security College Occasional Paper*, no. 3 (2012).

the concept of national security today means the maintenance of the independence and constitutional order of a state. National security refers to a complex concept that includes political, social, economic, military, human rights, environmental, information technology and public safety aspects.

2. Intelligence education within international organisations

2.1. European Union

The EU is home to two of these institutions: the *European Intelligence Academy* (EIA) and the Intelligence College in Europe.

The European Intelligence Academy (EIA) was founded in 2013 as an international network of academics, practitioners and intelligence students dedicated to international collaboration in intelligence research and studies. The EIA views the postwar transatlantic partnership between Europe, the United States and Canada, as a foundation on which to build broader cooperative relationships among adherents of democracy in our time. One of the primary aims of the EIA network is to highlight the work of emerging post-graduate and undergraduate scholars in the intelligence studies field, while encouraging cooperation in research and scholarship between students of intelligence across continents.³

The Intelligence College in Europe (ICE) is an intergovernmental body independent of EU institutions, established on the 5th of March 2019 in Paris. The College brings together all the intelligence communities (civilian, military, internal, external and technical services) of European countries, national and European decision-makers and the academic world to stimulate strategic thinking and thus develop a common intelligence culture.⁴

2.2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

NATO has a training school in Germany called *NATO School Oberammergau* (NSO). The NSO conducts education and training in support of current and developing NATO operations, strategy, policy, doctrine and procedures, including intelligence and security. The School has an *Intelligence Department* (ID) which offers courses in the field of all-source analysis, and specialised topics that will prepare the intelligence professionals to provide support to decision-makers across units of the alliance.

The courses are designed to support intelligence and security professionals, managers, train engineers and other staff officers responsible for characterising a threat or operating environment to deliver a decisive advantage. ID courses are primarily for officers, NCOs and civilians assigned to NATO units at the operational

³ European Intelligence Academy (euintelligenceacademy.eu).

⁴ See www.intelligence-college-europe.org

and strategic level, but may also be appropriate for personnel in allied and partner nation assignments who are preparing for operations or exercises alongside NATO organisations. Most of the courses assume students already have proficiency in basic intelligence concepts and functions. The school catalogue currently contains 17 intelligence and security courses.

2.3. International Association for Intelligence Education

The *International Association for Intelligence Education* (IAFIE) was formed in June 2004, as a result of a gathering of more than 60 intelligence studies trainers and educators at the Sixth Annual International Colloquium on Intelligence at Mercyhurst College in Erie, Pennsylvania. This group, from various intelligence disciplines including national security, law enforcement and competitive intelligence, recognised the need for a professional association that would span their diverse disciplines and provides a catalyst and resources for their development and that of Intelligence Studies.

Purpose

- broaden research, knowledge and professional development in intelligence education
- providing a forum for the exchange of ideas and information for those interested in and concerned with intelligence education
- advance the intelligence profession by establishing standards, creating resources and sharing knowledge as part of intelligence studies
- foster relationships and cooperation among intelligence professionals from academia, business and government
- developing, disseminating and promoting the theory, curricula, methodologies, techniques and best practices in pure and applied intelligence
- serving as a liaison between other professional organisations and centres of excellence

3. National security and intelligence education in different countries

I would like to highlight a few higher education institutions in the United States that offer learning opportunities in the areas of intelligence and national security without claim for completeness.

3.1. The United States of America

The United States of America has governmental and civilian higher education institutions in this field such as:

- National Intelligence University (NIU)
- Angelo State University Intelligence and Analysis Programs
- Georgetown University's Master of Professional Studies in Applied Intelligence and National Security and Intelligence Academy (NSIA)
- Harvard Kennedy School (NKS)
- Johns Hopkins University Master of Arts in Strategic Program, Cybersecurity, and Intelligence
- Mercyhurst University Department of Intelligence Studies
- Pennsylvania State University Geospatial Intelligence Programs
- The Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina Master of Arts in Intelligence and Security Studies
- The University of Arizona, Intelligence and Information Operations Program

3.1.1. National Intelligence University

The Department of Defense was established in 1961 by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). DIA was responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for the integration of the Department of Defense intelligence and counterintelligence training programs and career development of intelligence personnel. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) saw the logic and economy of consolidating strategic intelligence schools, and in 1962 issued a memorandum directing the creation of a Defense Intelligence School.

The Defense Intelligence School's mission was to enhance the preparation of selected military officers and key DoD civilian personnel for important command, staff and policymaking positions in the national and international security structure, prepare DoD military and civilian personnel for duty in the military attaché system, and assist the broader career development of the Department of Defense military and civilian personnel assigned to intelligence functions. The first class graduated on 14 June 1963.

By 1973, the Director of DIA supported these recommendations and approved the degree program concept, and on the 10th of September 1973, the pilot program for the proposed Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI) degree began. In October 1980, Public Law 96-450 officially authorised the School to grant the MSSI diploma. The bill was adopted by both houses of Congress and signed by President Jimmy Carter.

Regional accreditation was obtained in 1983, the date on which the School was renamed Defense Intelligence College. It was relocated to the new Defense Intelligence Analysis Center on Bolling Air Force Base in 1984.

With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and the general desire of the country in the early 1990s to realise a peace time, budgetary cutbacks and reductions in

force were made, not only in the Department of Defense but in the whole Intelligence Community. A major impact of these cutbacks in the 1990s was the transformation of the College into an institution that was devoted solely to intelligence, education and research, with all training courses, including attaché training, shifted elsewhere in the DIA. In 1993, the College was renamed the Joint Military Intelligence College.

On December 2006, DoD Instruction 3305.1 changed its name to National Defense Intelligence College. The DoD Instruction was revised again in February 2011 to reflect the current designation – National Intelligence University – and the Director of National Intelligence formally and publicly announced that change as well as the expanded mission and vision of the NIU during August 2011. In 2007, the Board of Visitors of the National Intelligence University established the Center for Science and Technology Intelligence.

In 2021, NIU officially transitioned from the DIA to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. NIU remains a degree-granting institution, accredited by the Middle States Commission on Higher Education, retains its in-residence Joint Professional Military Education Phase I program, and continues to operate at its main campus in Bethesda, Maryland, and other regional campuses. The University has three Degree Programs:

- *The Bachelor of Science in Intelligence (BSI)* degree focuses on core intelligence concepts, issues and methods. This four-year program enables students to become true professionals on issues of national-level intelligence. The BSI is at the Main Campus as a full-time program that spans 11 months, starting in August and ending in July.
- *The Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI)* degree is designed to prepare students for the complexity of intelligence work in the 21st century. The 43-credit curriculum focuses on three main themes: globalisation, future-focused intelligence and intelligence for national security.
- The Master of Science and Technology Intelligence (MSTI) prepares students to recognise the impact of technological change on national security and intelligence. MSTI students study one of five concentrations established to focus their education in their area of thesis research. The topics are weapons of mass destruction, cyber intelligence, data science in intelligence, information and influence intelligence, and emerging technologies and geostrategic resources.⁵

3.2. National security training of some European countries

3.2.1. Romania

Romania has a National Intelligence Academy as a governmental organisation in the field of national security. The “*Mihai Viteazul*” *National Intelligence Academy* (MVNIA) is a key component of the Romanian Intelligence Service. Therefore, they approach the intelligence activity in terms of educating and training future and present

⁵ See <https://ni-u.edu/wp/about-niu/niu-history/>

intelligence officers, as well as in terms of research and thorough knowledge in the field of intelligence and security. The students benefit from both academic training and personal development.

While education in fields supporting intelligence activities – technical, logistical or administrative – can be ensured by other training units, the role of selecting and training future intelligence analysts and case officers goes exclusively to the Academy.

The high school graduate could attend one of the two bachelor's degree programmes – *Security and Intelligence Studies* and *Psychology – Intelligence* – if they want to become an intelligence analyst or a case officer. Those who have a bachelor's degree have the opportunity of attending the master's degree programmes – *Intelligence Analysis* or *Intelligence and National Security* – organised by the “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy.

The university is open to a larger public as well, through a wide range of programmes. These include research master's, doctoral and postgraduate programmes, designed for the members of the Romanian intelligence and national security community as well as for all those interested in deepening their understanding of national security. Last but not least, the Academy provides constant training programmes for the Romanian Intelligence Service (*Serviciul Român de Informații – SRI*) staff, in different areas and lines of activity.⁶

3.2.2. Russian Federation

In the Russian Federation every national security intelligence agency has its educational institute.

3.2.2.1. Academy of Federal Security Service (FSB)

The FSB Academy includes the Institute of Cryptography, Communication and Informatics, as well as seven independent faculties.⁷ The history of the Academy of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation traces back to permanent courses for the training of employees in the bodies of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Cheka), established in April 1921. In 1992, the development of the higher education institution entered a new phase. In accordance with the decree of the President of the Russian Federation on 24 August 1992, the Academy of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation was established based on the Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky High School and the Academy of Border Troops. To improve the educational process, the Academy introduced the teaching of several new disciplines, and increased the number of special and optional courses. The academy's management and faculty paid special attention to bringing the content and quality of the training into line with the needs of the practice, primarily to deepen the legal training of students: modern legislation and other regulatory acts were more actively introduced into the

⁶ See www.animv.ro/en/despre-noi/

⁷ See www.newsru.com/russia/21jun2008/fsb.html

educational process, in particular the laws of the Russian Federation on “Security”, “Federal State Security Agencies” and “Operational and Investigative Activities”.

The professional training of personnel developed towards rapprochement with the entire Russian educational process, while preserving its own peculiarities and uniqueness, bringing its organisation and content into line with the modern tasks and conditions of the activities of security agencies. Since 1996, the Academy has started training in a number of new specialties and higher education specialties. The Academy successfully develops its relations with the Education Ministry of the Russian Federation, and a number of large military and civilian universities. Representatives of the Academy are members of the Association of Law Schools (section of law enforcement agencies), under the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the Public Council for Military Education, and educational and methodological associations of universities in all specialties, which are taught at the Academy of the Russian FSB.

In 1996, based on the Institute of Cryptography, Communication and Information-kit of the Russian FSB Academy, the Federal Education and Methodological Association of the Information Security UGSN (hereinafter referred to as the UMO IB) was established, which comprises more than 200 leading educational organisations in Russia.

In 1998, the Academy was the first of the higher education institutions of Russian special services and law enforcement agencies to successfully pass state certification and accreditation. The Russian FSB Academy is now a major multidisciplinary educational and scientific centre. Today, 13 academics and corresponding members, about 100 professors and lecturers with scientific degrees, as well as 500 associate professors and academic candidates are working in its departments. This huge scientific and pedagogical staff trains personnel not only for the Russian FSB, but also for the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation and some other departments, as well as providing training, retraining and advanced training for specialists of security agencies. Academy scientists are actively involved in the preparation of comprehensive target programs, scientific expertise, as well as legislation and other acts at the federal level. On 26 April 2021, the Russian FSB Academy celebrated its 100th anniversary.⁸

3.2.2.2. Academy of Foreign Intelligence Service

Previously known as the *Yuri Andropov Red Banner Institute* and the *Red Banner Institute*) is one of the primary espionage academies of Russia, and previously the Soviet Union, serving the Committee for State Security (KGB) and its successor organisation the Foreign Intelligence Service. In the 1980s, future President Vladimir Putin was attending that academy.

An earlier iteration of the school was founded in 1938 and was first called the Special Purpose School under the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD). It was renamed the Higher Intelligence School from 1948–1968. It was alternatively

⁸ Академия Федеральной службы безопасности Российской Федерации.

known as School 1010 or the 101st School, and referred to as K1 or Gridnevka by students. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, student enrolment dropped from approximately 300 to around 50. The school is located near Moscow, with the main facility north of Chelebityevo and a secondary facility at Yurlovo.⁹

3.2.3. Germany

In 2019 the country's foreign and domestic intelligence agencies opened the *joint Centre for Intelligence Service Training* in response to German lawmakers' demands to cut costs by merging their long-separate training facilities. With space for 700 students, more than 110 of whom can live on-site, the school offers lessons in covert observation, law, interrogation and information technology.

Students will learn practical skills such as how to fend off cyberattacks, foil terrorists and shake off hostile agents on their tail. Students include recruits fresh out of high school, as well as those who already have completed first degrees and want to pursue a two-year Masters in Intelligence and Security. Known by its German acronym, ZNAF, the facility includes laboratories, workshops and video studies – all strictly off-limits to media.¹⁰

3.2.4. The United Kingdom

In the U.K. the Joint Intelligence Training Group (JITG) is the location of the headquarters of both the Defence College of Intelligence and the British Army Intelligence Corps. It is located at Chicksands, Bedfordshire, approximately 35 miles (56 km) north of London. The site was formerly known as the Defence Intelligence and Security Centre (DISC) since its move from Ashford in 1997. The site was renamed JITG on the 1st of January 2015. The Defence College of Intelligence (DCI) is responsible for delivering training in intelligence and security to members of the British Armed Forces. The Headquarters of the Intelligence Corps is located on-site, with all core training for Intelligence Corps soldiers and officers being delivered through the DCI.¹¹

On-site foreign training is provided, in particular the Joint School of Photographic Interpretation attracts students from around the world. The flagship course for overseas students, the International Intelligence Directors Course, continues to attract high-level interest from all continents and provides a significant opportunity for intelligent diplomacy at the highest levels.

The DISC is a joint service capability delivery organisation specialising in Security, Language, Intelligence and Photography. The outputs of DISC cover a range of operational and training activities that can be summarised as:

⁹ Martin Ebon: *KGB. Death and Rebirth.*, Westport, Praeger Publisher, 1994. 185–187.

¹⁰ Frank Miles: Germany Opens School for Intelligence Agencies in Berlin, Once Dubbed 'Capital of Spies'. *Fox News*, 12 November 2019.

¹¹ Defence College of Intelligence (U.K. Ministry of Defence).

- operational capability through the development of the Defence HUMINT Unit (DHU)
- operational capability in the form of the Defence De-briefing Team (DDT) and other support as required
- delivery of training to MOD service and civilian personnel in specified security, language intelligence and photographic tasks ready for the front line
- training for Other Government Departments (OGDs), NATO, European partners and other foreign governments
- the provision of advice on the formulation of concepts, policy and doctrine across the spectrum of Intelligence and Security
- the provision of support for lodger units, including Psychological Operations, and the Directorate of the Intelligence Corps

In the training sphere, DISC delivers training to both military and civilian students in the Security, Language, Intelligence and Photographic specialisations. Language and Photography trainings take place at Beaconsfield and Royal Air Force Cosford respectively. Courses vary in length from 1.5 days to 70 weeks, and in a range from basic and Phase 2 trade training to fully trained linguists. Students vary in rank from private soldier to 2 Star Officer.

3.3. Asia

In Asia, the proliferation of such institutions dedicated to the study of security issues has been equally impressive, with many genuine centres of research excellence now operating in China (e.g. the University of International Relations), India (e.g. the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses), Japan (e.g. the National Institute for Defence Studies), Singapore (e.g. the Academy of Security, Intelligence and Risk Studies) and South Korea (e.g. the Ilmin International Relations Institute, Korea University).¹²

3.3.1. China

In China, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) has its own, educational institutions, but has cooperation with civilian universities like the University of International Relations.

The Beijing-based University of International Relations (UIR) is designated at very high risk for its affiliation with the MSS, China's civilian intelligence agency. UIR was established in 1949 under the direction of then Prime Minister Zhou Enlai. In 1964 it was designated as a "national key university", and this appears to be the evidence for it is a Ministry of Education university. However, the university does not appear on the Ministry of Education's list of subordinate universities. Individuals formerly and presently affiliated with the university have also held affiliations with the MSS or the MSS-linked think tank the China Institutes of Contemporary International

¹² Brendan (2012): op. cit.

Relations. UIR gives the MSS a way to work with foreign universities and academics to shape and learn about perceptions of the PRC's views on security. It also provides a platform for the MSS to identify talents, recruit officers and collect intelligence.

The university's Hangzhou campus, also known as the Zhejiang Second People's Police School, may carry out more practical training of MSS officers and was described on a local government website as "specialising in training special talent". Some graduates of the Hangzhou campus have moved straight into MSS positions. The Hangzhou campus works closely with Zhejiang University on teaching and research.

UIR trains intelligence officers and may support intelligence operations through targeting and open-source research.

UIR exchanges students with Aalborg University in Denmark, Marietta College in the United States, Université Toulouse 1 Capitole in France, and Hiroshima University, Hiroshima City University and Ibaraki University in Japan. On its website, UIR also lists the University of Massachusetts Boston, as well as universities in Israel, Portugal, Argentina and South Africa as partners.¹³

The Beijing Institute of International Relations only teaches foreign languages and specialised professional skills, but not intelligence skills. Specialised training is provided by the Institute of Cadre Management in Suzhou. Courses include various aspects of espionage, including shooting, driving, martial arts, photography, communications, surveillance and countersurveillance. Trainees remain at the Institute for periods ranging from three months to one year, depending on their subsequent assignment.¹⁴

3.3.2. Singapore

In Singapore, the Academy of Security, Intelligence and Risk Studies (ASIRS) is an academy that specialises in providing a spectrum of security-related training. With a vision to be a premier training institution in Southeast Asia, the Academy provides a myriad of training catering to the differing needs of security professionals in the public and private domains.

The thrust is to provide individuals with enhanced skills and knowledge to augment professional and career advancement which will inevitably auger the professional standards in the security industry.

ASIRS provides platforms for security professionals to constantly upgrade their standing competency through an effective learning environment, instructional techniques and experienced trainers. Through its Alumni set-up knowledge and sound practices are constantly shared and views exchanged. Networks are also established and strengthened via the Alumni channel.¹⁵

¹³ University of International Relations – 国际关系学院 (uir.cn).

¹⁴ Suzhou Institute of Cadre Management – Ministry of State Security Organisation – Chinese Intelligence Agencies.

¹⁵ Academy of Security Intelligence and Risk Studies.

3.4. Australia

The Australian National University (ANU) offers a Bachelor of International Security Studies program. A single three-year undergraduate degree is offered by ANU College of Asia and the Pacific. The Bachelor of International Security Studies provides the practical skills and knowledge in this field and graduates from this degree can expect to find themselves working in a range of fields including business analysis, defence policy, foreign affairs, intelligence agencies, journalism and media. Graduates of security studies could work with organisations like the Attorney General's Department, United Nations, Telstra, Boeing, the Australian Federal Police and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Learning outcomes

- identify and explain the key concepts, ideas and principal actors in international security
- evaluate the major theoretical frameworks for understanding the complexities of contemporary international security challenges
- demonstrate a thorough knowledge of the historical and contemporary dimensions of international, internal and transnational security, especially in the Asia-Pacific region
- analyse the key challenges facing Australian security and defence policy in the 'Asian Century'
- reflect critically on the principal factors that determine the security policies of Australia and the major Asia-Pacific powers
- employ communication and presentation skills (oral, written and electronic)
- demonstrate teamwork and interpersonal skills
- exhibit the ability to write for both academic and professional audiences

The ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) is Australia's oldest, largest and highest ranking academic institute for strategic studies research, education and commentary. Their focus is on understanding the complexity of Asia's strategic environment, Australia's place in it, and the utility and application of the armed forces in international affairs.

Founded in 1966, the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre is proud to be counted among the earliest generation of post-World War II research institutions dedicated to the analysis of the use of the armed forces in its political context.

4. Summary

From this brief description, we can see that higher education in national security appeared during the Cold War, especially in American universities and colleges. In the states of the Soviet bloc, such training operated in a closed-form in the organisation and management of the secret services.

With the end of the bipolar world (1990), national security trainings have also appeared in the civil education system of the former socialist countries.

We can also conclude that knowledge about national security is important not only for the staff of intelligence and counterintelligence organisations, but also in civil administration, diplomacy, and even large corporations, especially multinational companies.

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Timothy Parsons¹ – Philipp Fluri²

Armenia – Police Reform as a Cooperative Effort

Lessons Learned from An International Advisory Mission 2014–2017

Reform, as opposed to revolution, is an iterative process. It is also non-linear. You may not be getting it right the first time. At least not completely right. The authors of this article had the privilege and the pleasure of being invited to advise on the police reform process in the Republic of Armenia from 2014 through 2017 (the introduction of a form of ‘community policing’ had been announced in 2012 but failed to gain traction in the interim). In close cooperation with the then OSCE Office in Yerevan (Oiy) and obviously the Armenian authorities, and at times the EU and U.S. representatives, the authors – after taking inventory of existing policies, laws, directives and regulations, and analysing them in light of internationally recognised good practice – designed and delivered instruction programs for police officers at different levels, including leadership. In parallel, and as part of a ‘two-pronged’ approach, they contributed to structuring and informing an enabling political (parliamentary) process, including civil

¹ Tim Parsons is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Centre for Advanced Policing Studies, Liverpool John Moores University. He has previously worked as a lecturer in policing at the London Metropolitan University and the University of Plymouth. From Washington, D.C. through Ouagadougou, Tbilisi and Ulan Bator, Tim has worked in twenty-five countries across the globe as a teacher, mentor, coach and researcher seeking to provide answers to the challenges of modern policing. He has led multinational project teams for the OSCE, the IOM and the UN-OHCHR. Much of his professional knowledge has been distilled into a new multi-contributor book: James J. Nolan – Frank Crispino – Timothy Parsons (eds.): *Policing in an Age of Reform. An Agenda for Research and Practice*. London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. Tim served as a police officer for thirty years with the City of London Police. He has a doctorate in education awarded by King’s College London.

² Philipp Fluri is a Professor at DIA WZU/Taiwan. Prior to that he worked in defence diplomacy and strategic intelligence in the Swiss Ministry of Defence, and later became a co-founder of the Geneva DCAF Centre and its deputy director from 1999 through 2018. In the latter capacity he was responsible for design and delivery of Security Sector Reform programs in Eurasia and Latin America. He has doctorates from the universities of Bern and Fribourg, and a ‘habilitation’ from the University of Pécs, Hungary. He is, with Anders Johnson and Hans Born, one of the editors of the seminal IPU publication *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector* (2003), translated into some 30 languages, of which also Armenian (see www.dcaf.ch). A number of publication projects he was involved in were equally translated into Armenian, inter alia *Defence Management* (with Hari Bucur-Marcu and Todor Tagarev, 2009) and *Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence* (2010).

society organisations, in close cooperation with the then chairman of the Standing Committee on Defence, National Security and Internal Affairs of the National Assembly, Mr Koryun Nahapetyan, though the police force at the time was still kept close to the presidency. The authors feel encouraged by and welcome recent steps taken by the Pashinyan Government to reanimate the police reform process in the RA. It is understood that police reform necessarily is an ongoing process of reflection and implementation on the one hand, structured by focussed phases of more intense political fact-finding and operational structuring on the other. In this article the authors share their observations from the days of their own involvement with added insights on the later evolution of police reform and practice.

Keywords: Armenia, police reform, police reform status assessment, Rule of Law, OSCE Office in Yerevan (OiY), Rights Without Borders, Police Education, Police Transparency and Accountability, Human Rights and Civic Freedoms, Community Police

After 11 days of mostly peaceful protests, Armenian Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan resigned in April 2018 – a shocking resignation in the eyes of many commentators, and yet an expression of the will of the people. Sargsyan had 20 years of public service behind him, of which 10 as the President. Now, he had apparently lost the support of the voters and taxpayers. Allegations of corruption – his, and of his entourage – and a growing inequality in Armenian society had led to his downfall. He was, however, not going to leave the political stage for long.

What preceded his resignation was a story not unsurprising in successor states of the Soviet Union. Emulating the ‘Russian model’, in 2015 constitutional change involving transfer of presidential powers to the prime minister allowed Sargsyan to sidestep the two-term limit,³ and take many of his powers with him. On 16 April Sargsyan’s (ruling) party nominated him for the position of the Prime Minister, causing immediate street protests which became massive on the following day. The police stepped in and started arresting and beating up protesters, while more and more citizens joined the protests.

Sargsyan stepped down, avoiding the bloodbath his predecessor Robert Kocharyan had caused, when 10 demonstrators were killed. The will of the people had prevailed. In the words of a prominent Armenian politician of the time Sargsyan’s resignation was “political, though not democratic”, a tribute to civil society and mass demonstrations organised by his political rival, Nikol Pashinyan.

The new authorities inherited from their predecessors a struggling economy that had led to mass emigration, corruption, problematic relations with most of the neighbours, a political order that is neither fully authoritarian nor fully democratic,⁴ with entrenched positions, but also a strong and self-confident civil society free to criticise the machinations of those in power, political and economic.

³ Paul Stronski (2021): The Shifting Geography of the South Caucasus. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 23 June 2021. 1.

⁴ Stronski (2021): op. cit.

‘Strong’ relations with the Kremlin authorities had enabled and facilitated authoritarian rule: in 2013, the Armenian authorities rejected the *Association Agreement* with the European Union and joined the *Eurasian Economic Union* – a step that carried no visible advantages for the average Armenian. This step not only forced Armenia to share many of Russia’s economic challenges, but also kept off transparency and accountability stipulations of the EU Association Agreement.

Sargsyan’s further integration into Kremlin-based structures did little to break up Armenia’s isolation which since the first Karabakh war was to a large extent due to the choice of the ruling party and – arguably – the diplomatic ineptness of its elites. It made Armenia a client state of the Kremlin, and limited its development as an independent state, culture and economy. Nationalism, and anti-turkism were the dominant ideologies.

Sargsyan had to go. And so he went, to come back, now as an organiser of an opposition party. He left to his successor a country with a compromised old elite, a largely unreformed economy, pressing unemployment, and occupied territories whose defence ate up a large percentage of the GDP without being effective and open to current developments – too close to Russia, and too far away from the EU to develop an independent economy and democratic order.

1. A time of radical political change

The old political elite of the Republic of Armenia, advised and assisted in many ways by its different diaspora groups, but rarely with advice that would have led to power sharing and transparency, had not been averse to letting civil society blossoms bloom, as long as it was clear who was in charge of the garden. This led to a somewhat hybrid regime that carefully balanced authoritarianism with civil society freedom, and a strong connection to Moscow with cooperation agreements with NATO, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the EU, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE, whose (OiY) office was closed in 2017 to be replaced with a hesitantly formulated OSCE program, slow in the making. It also allowed for direct cooperation of parliamentary committees with European INGOs such as the Geneva-based DCAF Centre (at the time the Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, in the meantime – under different management – renamed the Centre for Security Sector Governance, the commitment to democratic control discreetly dropped). Such cooperation was not only focused on parliamentary and staff capacity building but also included active involvement in the drafting and discussion of policies and laws in light of international practice, on-the-job capacity building in verification, and, with growing confidence also in police reform towards leadership training, community policing, crowd control and gender-adequacy. The present writers, personally involved in the design and delivery of such programmes, testify to the sincerity and extraordinary professional savviness and political commitment of younger and well-prepared exponents of the ‘old elite’ such as the then Chairman of the Standing Committee on Defence, National Security and Internal Affairs of the National Assembly, Koryun Nahapetyan (2012–2017 – Member of the National Assembly, Chairman of the Standing Committee on Defence, National

Security and Internal Affairs of the National Assembly, Member of the “Republican” [RPA] faction).

Protest leader Nikol Pashinyan became the new head of the Armenian Government following the 8 May 2018 elections. The fight against corruption had been advertised as a top priority and was now going to be implemented. While early actions smacked of the improvised and the partial, once the “first non-fraudulent elections in 20 years” had taken place and secured Pashinyan’s My Step bloc a solid 88 out of the 132 parliamentary seats,⁵ Pashinyan’s program called for de-bureaucratisation and reducing state regulation of the economy, and improving tax-collection (*Gov.am*, 8 February 2019). The European Union’s representatives voiced praise for the Pashinyan Government’s anti corruption efforts. New laws along the lines of the UN Convention Against Corruption and adaptations on the Constitution’s provisions for the cumulation of power (*vide* Serzh Sergyanyan’s 2015 adaptations in his own favour) were initiated.

In the foreign policy field, expectations of a new (and better) beginning were frustrated. Established memberships in the CIS, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (including its so-called peace-keeping force, last active in January 2022 in Kazakhstan, without any UN mandate), were confirmed, with a plan to make membership more efficient. No other strategic-level cooperation was planned (*EDM*, 21 March 2019, on Pashinyan’s unclear vision for Armenian foreign policy). Moscow initially did not quite know what to do with the untamed Pashinyan. Media beholden to the old elite initiated strong pro-Moscow propaganda initiatives, somehow underestimating Pashinyan’s versatility. The trial of Robert Kocharyan (former President, in office from 1998–2008) was used to voice accusations of “selling out Karabakh” and betrayal of Armenian values. The (Moscow) *Komsomolskaya Pravda* – otherwise never loath to assist in criminalising the unwanted political (figures), in a rare move of politicising adjudicated criminal conduct – even called Kocharyan the “first political prisoner in the post-Soviet space” (*KP*, 14 February 2019). Whereas press efforts to undermine Pashinyan’s position excelled in shrillness both in Armenia and the Russian Federation, the latter and his team responded with strategic patience.

2. Police Reform I – Finding facts and agreeing on a plan of action

On invitation by the Armenian authorities (the Republic of Armenia being a founding member of the DCAF Foundation and permanently on its Foundation Council since its establishment) and facilitated by the OSCE Office in Yerevan, a DCAF-IPTI senior expert team, in cooperation with the International Police Training Institute, conducted a *Status and Needs Assessments of Police Reforms* in the RA in 2014. This senior expert

⁵ Armen Grigoryan: One Year After Armenia’s ‘Velvet Revolution’: The Plans and Challenges Ahead. *Jamestown Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 16, no. 60 (2019).

report, based on both interviews and documents, served as a pivotal repository of essential insights on which a subsequent structured advisory program was based.

2.1. *From force to – service? Finding facts*

It soon became clear to the researchers tasked with compiling the report that there was a clear political will to develop and sustain the ongoing programme of police reform, which was further reflected in the conversations held with senior police leaders. Throughout their stay in Armenia experts were impressed by the level of professionalism shown by Armenian police officers of all ranks and the concomitant resolve of senior parliamentary leaders to make police reform happen.

At the time of the status assessment, the OSCE OiY's largest project, i.e. that of building capacity in community policing and enhancing public trust, had been ongoing since 2010. The programme had been started as a pilot project with 16 police officers, when in 2010 it was decided to include community policing into the police reform programme, and to include community policing as part of the national police remit. At the time of the assessment the OSCE was also working on policing in different layers of society, including on police and juveniles and gender, and police relations with local authorities. An important parallel project had been initiated on police educational reform.

One noteworthy aspect at the time of the assessment was a newly formed special regiment of police, the so-called "Angels". These officers were carefully selected, had a higher level of education, a good command of English and were trained in inter-personal skills and first aid. They were intended to provide a highly visible and reassuring presence and to cultivate public trust in the police. Tackling gender inequality issues was at the time of the assessment still a new and "sensitive issue" for the police. There was also an identified need for more work to be carried out on addressing domestic and gender-based violence. At the time of the assessment there was neither domestic violence law, nor a legal definition of domestic violence in any other law. Females in the RA police comprised around 25% of the total workforce. There were no policies or other measures aimed at retaining women police officers in the service, for example, after periods of maternity leave. Vulnerability to corruption was an essential problem, thus traffic police were given higher salaries than, for example, detectives in CID to avoid the former being vulnerable to corruption. The post of Head of Armenian Police was a presidential appointment. The post-holder also reported directly to the State President. (Apparently this system had been introduced as recently as 2006.) An Ombudsman on police complaints and issues was appointed by Parliament. There was no current provision for a police union or staff association for serving police officers.

The assessment team, Drs. Tim Parsons and Nick Ridley, came to the following conclusions:

- *Transition towards Community Policing.* Implementation of community policing was said to be progressing in accordance with the programme. Overall guidance and advice was forthcoming from U.K. police experts. The creation of community

councils, to enhance public–police representation involving ordinary citizens had led to increased linkage and bridging between police and community and increasingly raised local issues and improved crime prevention.

- *Public Perceptions.* A “main concern” from the police side: how are community policing initiatives perceived, how can public awareness as to how these could benefit the community be raised, and how can the popularity of the police be increased and their good intentions be communicated?
- *Conflict of Interest.* Upon the request of the Head of the Legal Department a precise definition of conflict of interests was furnished by Dr Parsons. It was understood that the Armenian Police would benefit from/need an international definition of conflict of interests. The Department of Juvenile Delinquency had recently been expanded to include the issues of domestic violence. Since February 2013 this department has been renamed the Directorate for Protection of Minors and Domestic Violence and has expanded its remit to cover all aspects of domestic violence. Local Community Rehabilitation Centres for victims were built with funds from the U.S. State Department. There were said to be 400 families within which violence occurs on the police register. 62 Police Inspectors had been attached to secondary schools, in co-operation and close liaison with the Armenian Ministry of Education. These initiatives were carried out in conjunction with and with the support of various international NGOs, Medecins Sans Frontieres, UNICEF, Save the Children, Protection of Rights without Borders, World Vision.
- *English Language Training.* Police officers had been given courses in English language which paid dividends in terms of rapport with foreign visitors and tourists.
- *Rule of Law–Transparency–Guidelines.* The publication and public access to legislation and directives – even for the directly concerned – is a notorious problem in emerging democracies, though much less so in the RA. The following guidelines had been formulated and made available:
 - guidelines for police officers engaged in community policing
 - guidelines for police officers on duty and engaged in policing public order events, demonstrations and assemblies
 - guidelines for police officers in the correct use of force, and use of special weapons in policing public order events in addition
 - an executive order had been issued by the Head of Armenian Police regarding carrying out of community policing, specifically for officers on duty at Community Policing Centres – 48 of these Community Policing Centres had been initiated, of which 40 in Yerevan, 8 in the provinces (with 11 actually finished and functioning in city of Yerevan)
- *Female officers.* Female police officers were found to have been deployed at demonstrations and public order events, though in dealing with those of a violent nature, not positioned in the direct front line, though they remain deployed. A special law had been passed regarding regulating and defining police officers’ role and conduct at public order events. Contradictory information was forthcoming as to the retention of female officers after pregnancies.

Whereas internationals held that no such provisions were in place, the Police HR department stated provisions in place for retention of female police officers post maternity, with arrangements in place for keeping post(s) kept open, even promotions/up-grading whilst coming into effect during maternity period are upheld. The fact that internationals working in the country did not seem to know of such provisions did not build confidence that they were universally known and/or applied.

- *Human Trafficking*. In the 2013 U.S. Department of State TIP (Trafficking in Persons) Report Armenia had been promoted from its Tier 2 status to Tier 1 status, stating that Armenia “continued to demonstrate robust trafficking prevention efforts”. Also, on 20 June 2014, the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan stated that “Armenia remains one of the most successful countries in confronting the global scourge of human trafficking”.
- *‘Internal troops’ or public order police*. Specially trained, they were found to have the same uniform as police, and to be under police command and regulation (and subject to civil not military law); however, under a separate sub-command. The Head of Public Order/Internal Troops is a Deputy Head of Armenian police, answerable to the Head of Armenian Police. Generally not armed, held in reserve at mass events and demonstrations, etc. These officers are armed when on static guard duties, such as guarding nuclear installations.
- *Public Order Legislation*. A new Law of Freedom of Assembly, to be implemented in 2016, will guarantee the right to demonstrate, provided, the meeting itself is not proscribed and if the authorities have been informed in advance in the case of participants being in excess of 100. If the subsequent event is peaceful, then police will have no right to intervene. At the time of the fact-finding, police made excessive use of an old Soviet-era Administrative Order, which permitted police at any time during the event, peaceful or violent, to remove demonstrators and take them to police stations, either because their presence could be interpreted as not being conducive to the public good, or on the grounds that the individual had refused to comply with a lawful order by a police officer.
- *The View from Civil Society*. Civil society representatives, among them the NGO *Protection of Rights without Borders*, perceived police reform as a worthwhile project, and to some extent working, especially the “Angels” police unit. But the momentum of this initiative was said to be slowing down, with no subsequent effort made to build upon or enhance the small amount of trust gained. There was said to be a need for further progress and action by engaging public awareness of the purpose of Community Outreach Centres, and their true nature and role. For instance there has been no bridging; facilities for the public to make a first approach, raise certain issues of concern without entering a police station. There was also said to be an urgent need for enhancing this public awareness of how and why the Community Outreach Centres and the whole community policing initiative can benefit the public. At the time of the fact-finding mission, according to a Helsinki Research Committee of Armenia Survey, 90% of Armenian respondents believed the police were still

engaged in beatings and the torture of suspects and/or individuals detained at police stations. A form of civilian participation or observing presence on police discipline boards was admonished. The level of trust between police and civil society organisations at the time of the Status Assessment was said by both sides to be at least ‘challenged’.

- *Police Investigations.* Community policing projects, irrespective of the results, were said to be comparatively superficial compared to the abuses and inefficiency of investigation of crimes. Delays were possible, even premature dropping of investigations, if it is discovered that the perpetrator could possibly wield powerful political influence. Prosecutors were said to become involved in investigations only at the final later stages of the investigation.
- *Police Oversight and Appeal Institutions.* Police were said to still *de facto* investigate themselves in cases of complaint or alleged misconduct or wrongdoing. The Ombudsman for police matters and irregularities was seen to be more of a lobbying and pressure function. On the other hand, there was said to exist an Independent Special Investigation Service to investigate any misconduct of public official(s), including the police. The head of this service was allegedly appointed by and answered directly to the President.
- *Community or Presidential Police?* At the time of the Status Assessment the *President still retained direct control of key figures in police management.* Thus, the Head of Armenian Police was appointed by the President and answerable directly to the President. Internal troops/public order squads were under a separate command. The Head of Public Order/internal troops was the Deputy Head of Armenian police, answerable to the Head of Armenian Police. The Special Investigation Service, an independent agency, investigating any misconduct of any public official(s), including the police, was headed by an individual appointed to and answering directly to the President.
- *Thresholds of Fear and Misinformation (in RA Parliament and Police Force).*

3. Agreeing on needs/opportunities and an action plan

Concerning the *need for enhanced public awareness of benefits of Community Police Centres* there was some convergence between police and NGOs in that both fully supported the concept of Community Police Centres, and both highlighted this shortcoming, i.e. the public were not being made suitably aware of the benefits of their rights to utilise this initiative. In addition to this, following visits by the researchers to two outreach stations in Yerevan City, it became clear that some development work needed to be conducted to effectively embed and operationalise the community policing concept. At the offices, hard-bound incident report books were being used by officers to record and report issues, concerns and minor crimes brought to their attention by visiting members of the public. Surprisingly, there seemed to be an absence of any additional forms or reports such as crime reports, statement forms or accident reports. Officers present explained that reported crimes were referred on to local police stations for follow-up enquiries and investigation. In order to

optimise the benefits accruing from a community policing model, local enquiries and minor crimes should pass the other way from a police station to community police teams for follow-up action. In addition to this anomaly, there appeared to be a lack of any appropriate ambience conducive to contact and rapport-building with the public. Undoubtedly, this was not helped by the rather threatening appearance of the Soviet-era police uniforms issued to local officers.

In order to ensure the long-term success and sustainability of community policing as a preferred police doctrine, community policing must be fully integrated into all police structures, resource allocation and budget decisions. At the time of the Status Assessment community policing in Armenia appeared to be an adjunct to operational policing and largely an ancillary activity. This is not an unusual scenario to come across in a developing programme of structural reform; nevertheless, it is a gap that will at some point need to be closed.

Protection of Rights without Borders offered to act in partnership with the police in publicising, promoting and urging the public to increase their use of Community Police Centres. It was understood that the message could be expected to be more trusted and accepted if it originated from Protection of Rights without Borders websites and publicity material etc., as opposed to originating solely from the police.

To create momentum for both the understanding and successful introduction of community policing the interlocutors agreed on a package of capacity-building and enhanced professionalism programs on Advanced Skills Training for Community Police Officers, with special attention given to the police-public interface. Community Police Training was to involve the following steps, also extended to civil society representatives.

The Status and Needs Report was discussed with stakeholders. Discussions led to a number of additional recommendations later worked into the Capacity-Building Action Plan.

An important recommendation to heed in transitional democracies concerns attitudes of both services and general populations concerning reforms. Brought up on the perception of the police as a force whose first and foremost task is to protect the state and its representatives, and not the citizen, taxpayer and voter, both representatives of the services and the general population – even the reform-minded – can be expected to have their difficulties with understanding and accepting alternative ways of organising and delivering police services. This is a statement of fact, not of value – one may see and be interested in the fruits of reform without understanding and accepting the process that may lead to such fruition, as we have seen, in many cases: *per aspera*. Liberal ways of organising a police as a service, doing away with military ranks and uniforms, replacing military-style intelligence and calibres of weapons, training a different style of customer management, may not be in everyone's interest, nor in their capacities. And this entails also the consumer of such services whose expectations need to be re-directed and adapted. Resistance to police reform from within the ranks and file had been observed and vaguely reported on without direct reference to identifiable individuals. It was therefore agreed to meet police officers on their home grounds and signalling interest in their expertise

by initiating a discourse on police professionalism, complete with fact-finding and study missions to such destinations as London Metropolitan University.

Capacity-building programs were going to be organised on aspects of professionalism, management and a series of other identified topics of concern, to be delivered at different levels of seniority, on:

- Negotiation and Communication Skills of Police Officers during Mass Events and the Protection of Public Order
- Negotiation and Communication Skills in Crisis Situations and High Risk Events
- Police Management Method and Practice
- key principles of negotiation and communication in operational settings
- identifying and quantifying risk, collating and interpreting information, record-keeping and decision logs
- briefing, de-briefing, Forward Intelligence, operational planning
- command structure, tactical options, balancing competing rights
- police priorities, identifying and quantifying risks, developing a strategy
- providing an appropriate police response (necessity, legality, proportionality)
- examining practical scenarios (case study examples)
- adapting best practice, developing a new operating procedure, assessing operational effectiveness
- Introduction: Identifying Key Themes in Management and Police Leadership
- Management and Leadership in the Republic of Armenia Police (Challenges, Dilemmas, Solutions)
- Management Structures: hierarchies, delegating authority, empowering subordinates
- Management Responsibilities: junior, middle and senior management responsibilities
- the management and development of staff
- managing police resources
- problem-solving and risk management
- next steps: identifying opportunities for modernisation and reform
- Intelligence Analysis (for intelligence handling and also Intelligence Section of Headquarters)
- Human Rights Training for Public Order Units/Internal Troops (to include the use of force within a legal framework – operating to national and international standards of Human Rights in the control of public disorder and demonstrations)

Capacity-building was to be delivered at the newly opened Centre for Police Education.

4. The two-pronged approach – policing with and for the community

In parallel, a parliamentary reflection process within the Standing Committee on Defence, National Security and Internal Affairs of the National Assembly was to be

initiated. If a functioning (parliamentary) democracy expresses itself in credible oversight by a dedicated parliamentary committee, then such committees need not only be constituted nominally, but put to work. The quality of such committee work, again, will not depend on what committee members' civilian profession was and is (e.g. military), but on the degree of intellectual penetration of concepts and notions of good practice. It was therefore agreed to invite international experts into parliamentary hearings to report on capacities built, and progress made. In addition, a limited amount of documentation on police practices and laws from recognised reform and 'good practice' states was to be collected, translated and put at the disposal of parliamentary decision-makers.

The approach chosen by the reform partners, RA police leadership, OSCE OiY and the international expert team, was thus 'two-pronged'. Reform cannot be implemented by decree, nor can it be exclusively built 'from the bottom up'. As important as NGOs and civic councils are for capacity-building and 'enculturation' of best practices, and as pleasant as it may be to agree with them on almost everything, reform, to be successful, entails head and all limbs, and in this case also the living habitat. The population needs to understand the new and better practices, demand them from the representatives of the services, and support them in their re-oriented work. As trivial as it may sound, community policing may be designed from above and on behalf of the population, but it simply does not work without interaction with, and support from, the *community*. The program was therefore also going to entail outreach to the mass media – a move welcomed by the RA police, perhaps not so much out of appreciation of the media and the freedom of expression, but on the assumption that police reputation would be greatly improved through such reporting.

5. Facts II. Police reform – Revisited and re-launched under Pashinyan in 2020

Armenia's *Law on the Police* was passed by the Armenian National Assembly on 16 April 2001. The day has henceforth been celebrated as the national "Police Day". As one of Armenia's obligations for its accession to the Council of Europe, the Law of the Republic of Armenia *On Service in Police* was subsequently passed in June 2002. In addition, the Law of the Republic of Armenia *On Adopting the Discipline Code of the Police of the Republic of Armenia* was passed on 11 May 2005. The Ministry of the Interior was reorganised into the professional Police of the Republic of Armenia in a process completed by 1 January 2003. The Penitentiary Division of the police was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. The Fire Department was incorporated into the Emergency Management Department.

The first phase on police reform, initiated during the Sargsyan Government, conceived with and advised by the OiY and the DCAF-IPTI expert team, led to a deepened reflection process on professionalism and on the objectives and opportunities of community policing. It led to, and in certain cases, accompanied several structural and procedural reforms. The influence of the international expert

team, though strategically designed and delivered, should not be overestimated, and senior police management certainly was not lacking in sincerity, nor in professionalism. The importance of such adaptations, notably in the field of crowd control and the management of expressions of public dissent, were noted and commented upon by the diplomatic community.

However, the demise of both the Sargsyan Government and the OSCE OiY had led to diminished visibility though not a stalling of the reform process.

In 2020, the Pashinyan Government relaunched the halting police reform program. On 13 April 2020, a cabinet approved *Strategy and an Action Plan* for the RA Police were made public. As explained by Minister of Justice Rustam Badasyan, the documents had been developed by a working group and had undergone comprehensive discussion with the public and international partners. Also funding for the implementation of the program was said to have been secured.

Results of the implementation of the Action Plan and legislative amendments include:

- A ministry for the development and implementation of the sector will be established (NB – previously the RA Police had been answering to the President directly) with the law enforcement agency to be converted into the Ministry of the Interior.
- A Patrol Service and an Operational Management Centre to be established.
- Effectiveness of the preliminary investigation capacities to be reviewed.
- Capacity-building to be designed and delivered on the maintenance of public order: effective tactical solutions to be introduced, capacity-building for negotiation and communication to be carried out and improvement of technical equipment to be considered.
- Community Policing to be re-interpreted and relaunched.
- Issues of preparation, on-going capacity-building and moral-psychological instruction of police personnel, integrity and anti-corruption education of officers were to be seriously reviewed. This was to include a revision of the educational, training and professional preparation programmes of the Police Educational Complex. In parallel, the social ‘guarantees’ for police officers were to be reinforced.
- Increased transparency and accountability to the public along with the promotion of international cooperation are further steps to be undertaken.

Overcoming challenged police–public relations had been one of the main reasons for initiating a first phase of police reform from 2010. In an interview in early 2020 PM Pashinyan underscored the importance of the police reform initiative, confirming it had been on his government’s agenda from the first day on. Aramays Avetisyan, in *Police as Public Servants: A New Armenian Model?* draws our attention to the justification of the strategy. In a specific section the strategy refers to the history of policing since the final days of the Soviet Union and the conditions making change necessary. As Avetisyan points out credibly a self-critical justification section would not only have found excuses for lagging reform but actually have pointed out how the police in Armenia had *contributed to a worsening of public safety*:

“Instead of ensuring public safety, the police in Armenia have a history of being the ones who disrupted the peace. While the Strategy aims to restore the public image of the police, it needs to go beyond mere public relations and address the underlying issues that have allowed police standoffs against their own tax-paying citizens. Such structural changes will inherently result in an improved public image”.

As Avetisyan notes further, the strategy may be in need of further clarification and possibly refinement. Thus one of the proposed structural changes concerns the creation of a Ministry of Internal Affairs – an institution that Armenia had before and did away with.

Article 42 of the current Law on Police stipulates that “the Prime Minister oversees the work of the Police”. Police leadership would thus be to some degree protected from direct interference from above through an additional institutional level. It has, however, not been made sufficiently clear how the nomination process for the Head of Police (not requiring the endorsement by the National Assembly) would be changed accordingly. Also – it would seem to clash with the Pashinyan Government’s otherwise proclaimed intention to streamline state institutions.

In the meantime, police reform capacity-building has been ongoing, present (at the time of writing this article) public order and safety challenges notwithstanding.

6. Conclusive remarks and lessons from Armenia’s internationally advised Police Reform 2014–2017

Putting aside the plight of Armenians in Karabakh, Armenia itself has undergone a period of political turbulence and instability in recent times. In July 2016 a group of 20 armed men loyal to the then imprisoned Armenian ultra-nationalist politician, Jirair Sefilian, took control of a police station in Yerevan shooting dead one police officer in the process. A siege lasting several days finally concluded peacefully when the armed group surrendered to security forces. In May 2018, the increasingly unpopular prime minister Serzh Sargsyan was forced to resign being replaced by the current prime minister Nikol Pashinyan, whose appointment was confirmed by a vote in parliament.

Against this fragile and at times unstable political backdrop, reform of the police and security sector in Armenia has progressed slowly. In the past five years or so (discounting the two years lost to the global pandemic), much effort has been made by intergovernmental organisations (IGO), such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to fund and deliver police reform programmes in the country. This work has at times been hampered and obstructed by the fact that Armenia’s historic enemies and neighbours, Turkey and Azerbaijan, are also members of the OSCE. Nevertheless, training and reform has taken place, with a research report compiled by the Swiss-based NGO the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in 2014 reviewing and reporting progress. In particular, the researchers found that much work had been undertaken to introduce and implement a model of community policing inspired by policies introduced in the U.K.

6.1. *Community policing in Armenia: An Introduction*

At the time of the research project the roll-out of community policing in Armenia was generally regarded as having been a success, albeit that much more work was still required to embed the system and maximise effectiveness. Beginning with a small pilot project consisting of just 16 police officers, the roll-out (supported by the OSCE), progressed with community policing being enshrined in the national policing remit in 2010. A particularly successful initiative was the introduction of a so-called “Angels” police regiment. Officers in this unit were taught English and encouraged to provide a visible and approachable presence on the streets of Yerevan to assist tourists and foreign visitors. Women made up 25% of the total strength of this unit. The introduction and implementation of community policing continued with the initial project being focused on Kotayk province and then gradually being extended to Hrazdan, Cherasavan and Yerevan provinces. There was also discussion about forming local community councils as part of the scheme. Over time, 48 community policing centres (or local police posts) were created, with hours of opening set at 09.00–22.00. Officers overseeing the roll-out clearly identified the benefits of community policing with an increase in information about crime being generated from within local communities. It was accepted that much more needed to be done to make the public aware of the change to community policing and old structures and processes clearly impeded progress.

Whilst the OSCE and other IGOs have long recognised the benefits for member states in adopting community policing, defining, describing and articulating clearly what this form of policing is and what it looks like in practice, can present challenges in and of itself. For some theoreticians and practitioners community policing is simply a policing approach that involves a level of consultation or partnership between communities (the public) and the police. Others will argue that it should provide a wide-ranging and complex system for major police reform. Of course, Armenia is not alone in claiming to commit to the principles of community policing and the implementation of community policing methods at the point of service delivery. Many countries have committed themselves to introducing community policing programmes, practices and procedures within the organisational outputs of their particular police organisations. There is now a body of evidence that indicates that the concept and philosophy of community policing has for many years become enshrined in the international policing lexicon. Casey (2010, 65) points to what in effect is an often, rather vague concept, influencing wider debates around police deployments and becoming a form of “ideological cult with more slogans than substance and more followers than leaders”. The near universal adoption of community policing as the preferred policing model can even be detected in countries with tyrannical and despotic governments such as China and Zimbabwe, which also claim to have community policing at the centre of the state policing philosophy.

Adding a further layer of complication is the fact that there is no agreed upon definition of precisely what community policing is and what it involves at an operational level. A plethora of competing definitions can lead to confusion in the minds of practitioner and citizen alike. It is often described as community-based,

community-oriented, or even neighbourhood policing. A lack of clarity in the definitions can produce a wide variety of strategic approaches and varying degrees of success in operational implementation. The OSCE (2008, 5) has defined community policing thus:

“A philosophy and organisational strategy that promotes a partnership-based, collaborative effort between the police and the community to more effectively and efficiently identify, prevent and solve problems of crime, the fear of crime, physical and social disorder, and neighbourhood decay in order to improve the quality of life for everyone.”

Whilst Fielding (2005, 460) describes community policing as: “An iconic style of policing in which the police are close to the public, know their concerns from regular everyday contacts, and act on them in accord with the community’s wishes.”

These definitions are illuminating in describing the philosophical approach to community policing as well as providing a picture of what successful delivery might look like. It is instructive to examine a more in-depth analysis of the key factors necessary for a successful community policing programme. A wide-ranging study of approaches to community policing conducted by Mackenzie and Henry (2009, 5) for the Government of Scotland analysed some 420 articles, books and research reports on the subject drawn from three major databases. The researchers distilled down the data looking both for similarities and differences across recently implemented community policing strategies in a number of different jurisdictions. This piece of research is of course not new, having been conducted more than a decade ago. Nevertheless, the main findings are as relevant today as they were back in 2009. The researchers back then identified five key features common to successful community policing initiatives:

1. Decentralisation – officers on the ground need to be able to respond to public concerns and make things happen at a local level. Centralised command structures slow down decision making with key decisions being made by senior officers remote from the context and location of any emerging problem.
2. Partnership – with other agencies, so police can act as an intermediary or facilitator when the public demand action on issues outside the immediate remit of law enforcement. (This may include local government, schools, youth workers, voluntary sector organisations or local businesses.)
3. Community Engagement – communities need to have a real voice that can be fed into police priorities and practices where appropriate.
4. Proactive and Problem-Solving – community policing marks a shift away from reactive “fire brigade” policing, this connects it with problem-oriented (POP) and intelligence-led (ILP) approaches to policing. This requires action to be initiated and directed by the engagement process, not shaped by existing, unreflective police definitions of local problems. (The problem-oriented model of policing was originally developed by Goldstein [1979] and comprised a system through which police officers develop effective strategies to prevent and reduce crime by a process of in-depth analysis of community crime problems, the crafting of a targeted response, followed by an assessment of the impact of the police intervention on the original problem.)
5. Philosophy – community policing heralds a changed understanding of real police work akin to peace officers embedded in the networks of their communities rather than as reactive law officers, although law enforcement remains important and should not be neglected.

A similar but different review carried out on behalf of the New Zealand Police, Coquilhat (2008, 8) at around the same time (and which also included a review of international literature), reached near identical conclusions. This review identified partnerships, decentralisation and problem-solving as essential requirements in any successful community policing strategy, adding flexibility and accountability as being equally important considerations.

6.2. Oversight and accountability

Other studies of community policing, particularly those used to inform a wider process of police reorganisation in emerging democracies, have highlighted the requirement for a series of further important requirements if community policing programmes are to survive and provide positive results. Groenewald and Peake (2004, 10) theorised that these include requirements for national and local oversight that include mechanisms with real and not just symbolic power together with the authority to address problems. They go on to argue that there should also be clear roles and a division of responsibilities, with public participation in oversight activities. They further argued that in addition to appropriate oversight structures, a transparent system of police accountability should also be put in place. Accountability structures, if suitably formed, provide a clear system of police accountability to government, parliament and the public.⁶ Included in this system should be methods of direct communication with the public, including the introduction of hotlines and anonymous reporting mechanisms for complaints against the police. To be effective, the public must have easy access to any system for recording complaints.

To guarantee a successful implementation of new community policing programmes, or the revision and further development of existing programmes, the role of the public is key. For community policing to work, police organisations need to inform their public of any new strategy, raising awareness and enlisting the participation of the local community to ensure successful implementation.⁷ This should include raising community awareness of legal and human rights as well as civic responsibilities. If need be, the police can assist local community groups to organise and mobilise public support.

6.3. Organisational levels of community policing

Williams (2003), argued that delivering an effective and sustainable community policing strategy required some substantial internal change and reorganisation in the police services themselves. Within central command a serious organisational change programme must be initiated to realign internal departmental structures and resources to effectively support the implementation of a community policing approach at local

⁶ Groenewald–Peake (2004): op. cit. 18.

⁷ Murray (2005, p.10).

level. Management structures also must be overhauled with decision-making delegated to neighbourhood level; empowering first and second line supervisors to respond quickly to locally identified problems and concerns by developing and implementing solutions using a problem-solving approach. Ingrained and often long-established management approaches based upon military hierarchies have to be changed, with a shift of emphasis away from discipline and compliance and towards leadership and empowerment. Systems for providing reward, recognition and promotion for officers should ideally be aligned to qualitative measures (public satisfaction, letters of appreciation, increased community participation) and not crude quantitative measures of performance such as the numbers of arrests and stops and searches carried out in any given period. Finally, budgeting and finance should also be re-configured to support community policing with control over local policing budgets being devolved down to local commanders circumventing the need for central budget and spending authorisations.

Transforming strategic objectives into tactical successes can pose some major challenges.

In Armenia and elsewhere a fundamental question remains largely unanswered. That question is: if the core components of a successful community policing strategy have been clearly identified, comprehensively described and widely circulated, why does the encounter with community policing in practice so often prove to be elusive? A key point to make here is that successful and recognisable community policing can only occur in a democratic space. To be clear, community policing can only be established and maintained in a constitutional environment inhabited by democratic government. Why is this distinction so important? Simply put, countries with no democracy, no rule of law, no fundamental rights and freedoms, are unable to provide a system of policing that could remotely resemble community policing. It is an observable fact that in countries where autocratic regimes hold power there are, present in the streets and other public spaces large numbers of men and women wearing uniforms with the word police written on them, but in truth these state officials are not engaged in policing. They are there to suppress dissent, to deny people their human rights and to use physical force to protect an undemocratic and unaccountable regime. That is not policing. That is why community policing *can* be successfully introduced and embedded in countries such as Armenia, neighbouring Georgia and Ukraine. But not in countries such as Azerbaijan, Iran or Syria where even a basic level of democracy and respect for human rights, simply does not exist. Democratic policing, which might include a community policing approach to win public trust, cannot occur in a vacuum, indeed it cannot exist at all unless it can be located in a broader constitutional landscape. To be successful and enduring, a community policing programme will rely on a number of vital and complimentary factors being present. These should ideally include, political oversight but not direct control, an independent judiciary, a free and independent press, strong civil society, public scrutiny and accountability, the rule of law and commitments to human rights and an independent body to investigate complaints of police malpractice. It is searingly obvious that none of these vital facets of an open society are likely to be present in a dictatorial or autocratic regime. What is also clear is that many of these essential and contributing factors may be weak, under-developed and fragile in emerging democracies.

6.4. *Barriers to progress in implementing Community Policing in Armenia*

In 2014, the DCAF researchers visited key sights and interviewed key stakeholders including members of the police and civil society organisations. A number of issues began to emerge. Firstly, the fact that the changes brought about by the introduction of community policing plus the potential benefits accruing from such changes had simply not been adequately communicated to the public and/or quite possibly members of the police. Problematic issues highlighted by Williams were clearly in evidence. Namely, hierarchical structures based upon the military (a legacy from Soviet times), persisted with members of Armenian NGOs commenting that police officers still rigidly followed instructions given by superiors. The significance of this harks back to the work done by Mackenzie and Henry, and Coquilhat where the importance of delegating decision making to local level as well as down the chain of command was essential to making community policing work. On a visit to one of the community police centres in Yerevan the problems became all too obvious to the DCAF delegation. The centre consisted of a room with a desk and two chairs. On the desk sat a large bound book into which members of the public were meant to come and record particular crime-related issues or concerns. The book appeared to be devoid of entries. Outside stood an Armenian police officer. Dressed in uniform that clearly harked back to the Soviet/Russian times he stood with arms folded presenting a glowering and even rather threatening appearance. For community policing to succeed and for the implementation of community policing to garner public support, some fundamental behavioural changes have to be instigated amongst the officers involved. This can be achieved through training of course, but more importantly must be driven by police leaders, both senior and junior. Officers must be encouraged to adopt a more engaging approach, where they seek out opportunities to speak to local citizens and enter into conversation with them. Uniforms should be changed and updated to signal the reforms taking place in the organisation, specifically a move away from quasi-military practices and structures. On occasion, more radical action is needed. In informal conversations with both OSCE officials and Armenian police officers it became apparent that one of the barriers to reform lays in the presence of senior police officers of long service who simply did not support or see the need for change. In ideal circumstances such individuals could be retired early and paid off with enhanced pensions thereby making space for a younger, dynamic and more reform minded cohort of leaders. However, such a move costs money and requires strong political commitment and direction. Neither of these things were present at the time.

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Ferenc Horváth¹

“From Top to Toe”: Choosing the Appropriate Training Method

Education is an investment in the future. An investment is only good if it pays off, and education is only effective if the resources used to result in the necessary increase in knowledge and competence. It is easy to make the mistake of investing less energy than necessary in choosing the appropriate training methods, which ultimately fails to have the desired impact. It is especially important in professions where theoretical knowledge must be converted into practice, such as in national security activity. The present study proposes a method to help adult education providers assess the depth of training methods that need to be deployed to achieve a given type of training outcome to avoid wasting money and energy on training. The essence of the idea is that a form of training can only be truly successful if it works through all the physical and psychological processes that are relevant to the actual manifestation of the knowledge, skills and competencies to be acquired. In this paper, I will review which nervous system levels may be involved in information processing and which training methods can be used to involve them in the learning process.

Keywords: *training methodology, competence development, situational learning, learning*

1. Introduction

There are often conflicting demands relating to adult learning in a corporate environment. It must be fast, it has to educate large numbers of people through the training in a short time, it must allow wasted working time to be kept reduced, and to do the job applying as few instructors and as few resources as possible, but at the same time it must have a profound impact, and the trainees must be able to put the knowledge they have acquired into practice immediately. We all feel that this

¹ PhD, Psychologist, e-mail: fhorvath25@gmail.com

is impossible. However, the demand from employers for training to be as resource-efficient as possible is legitimate.

My study is based on the hypothesis that adult education methods must affect all the neurological levels involved in the development of competence to be improved to have practical results. I will review in which neurological levels can occur a change of state that makes our adaptation to the environment more effective, i.e. it can be interpreted as learning. I will then outline the basics of my “Top to Toe” model, which helps to determine the depth at which changes in the nervous system need to be induced to achieve the desired state change and the training methods that should be used to achieve this.

A human newborn baby must be born with a relatively undeveloped brain, otherwise it would not be able to leave the birth canal naturally due to the size of the skull. Therefore, at birth, the child does not have a fully developed human nervous system, so it has to start learning and adapting with a different strategy than adults do. Developmental psychology and pedagogy have done much to explore the developmental process by which the child’s psyche unfolds into an adult psyche. In the present study, I am unable to take into account the ever-changing stages of this dynamic, complex educational process, so I limit my reasoning about the acquisition of knowledge and skills to the fully developed human nervous system and, accordingly, to adult education.

2. Neural levels and learning

Learning can be understood in biological terms as a change in the nervous system that makes us adapt more effectively to the challenges of the environment. Concerning the forms of learning, during the classical and operant conditioning neural connections, associations develop between certain stimuli and responses, reinforcing certain behaviours, and weakening others. Rewards and punishments increase or decrease the strength of these links. The importance of these in practical learning should not be underestimated; for less complex tasks consisting of simpler work sequences, this level of learning may be sufficient. However, for more complex task systems – and these are increasingly dominant in the world of work, as they are less automatable – typically a deeper level of adaptation is required. In the most advanced form of learning, in the case of complex learning, we form mental representations or schemas of phenomena and then use these to perform mental operations in our heads, so we can prepare in advance for contingencies that we have not yet directly experienced.² In my study, I analyse the latter level of learning.

According to the point of view of cognitive psychology, the human intellect is based on a series of information processing steps, during which input information from the environment becomes the object of internal mental operations that finally results in a reaction, a behavioural output.

² Atkinson et al.: *Introduction to Psychology*. 12th edition, Harcourt Press, 1996, Chapter 7.

We handle the information in our environment through processes of observation, perception, cognition, thinking and memory, but the accurate perception of reality is a fragile process, distorted by a number of cognitive and emotional-motivational phenomena.³ The basic source of the problem is that our attentional functioning and short-term working memory can only extract a limited number of stimuli from the whole of reality, and it is vital for our correct adaptation which facts we highlight and how we interpret them. To solve this problem, human information processing has evolved in a direction that is based on mental operations with internal representations, so-called cognitive schemas, that are formed in our nervous system during the experience.

Our schemas define the whole information processing procedure. Instead of the "seeing is believing" principle, the reality is often "I see it if I believe it". It is difficult to perceive information for which we have no schemas. In Bruner and Postman's 1949 experiment,⁴ the subjects were flashed French cards and asked to name the exact card they saw. However, some tricky versions were hidden among the cards: red spades and black hearts. At low exposure times, the subjects did not notice the trick and classified the fictitious cards into one of the known categories. Increasing the exposure time, however, made the participants increasingly confused and they noticed that something was wrong. Further increases in time they exposed the deception, and eventually the subjects were able to verbalise what they saw and, knowing that new cards existed, successfully detected them even with reduced exposure times. We can see, therefore, that even at the level of perception, it is difficult to capture information of which we do not have the appropriate schema.

Schemas are dynamic elements; they can be changed and also can affect each other. We try to organise our internal map of the world to a coherent unity.⁵ If we succeed, it might give us a convenient feeling of security, but on the other hand, sometimes we have to sacrifice reality on the altar of the sense of this coherence. As a series of scientific experiments prove, our schemas determine the entire information processing procedure. At the very beginning of this process, our attention is strongly affected by our schemas. They determine which part of the whirl of information is filtered out or selected for further processing. We perceive information that is in concordance with our knowledge rather than those that are in contradiction with our internal representations, so our attention is selective; we try to maintain the coherence of our schemas. Our existing schemas organise and sometimes distort our memory functions. If we cannot recall the details of an event that happened earlier, we build up our afterimage using associating mental models that were formed in connection with similar situations in the past. This psychological phenomenon is called the 'constructive memory'. That is why a false or outworn cognitive scheme can restrict or even distort our thinking for a long time, and obstructs adequate handling of reality.

³ Summary in József Forgács: *A társas érintkezés pszichológiája*. Budapest, Kairosz, 1996.

⁴ Quoted by László Mérő: *Észjárások. A racionális gondolkodás korlátai és a mesterséges intelligencia*. Budapest, Tericum, 1997.

⁵ Atkinson et al.: op. cit. Chapter 7.

The success of our accommodation to the world is determined by the appropriateness of our mental schemes, cognitive maps, internal models and representations of reality that – through correct information processing – finally lead to adaptive behavioural output. Generally we can state that the more numerous and complex schemes an individual has in connection with a given topic (for example a science or profession), the more successful he or she can be in it.⁶ This is why it is also important in adult education to work with as many and as precise professional schemata as possible to support the processing of information.

At the 'beginner level', when we start to learn some sciences, and technicalities, we know only a few dozen simple professional schemes. We try to handle problems based on our habitual civil solutions, but most of the problems remain unperceived due to the lack of adequate knowledge. On the 'advanced level' possessing a few hundred of professional schemes with conscious concentration we can apply methods developed by others to specific problems, but sometimes they interfere with our amateur schemes; therefore, the result can be an incoherent or illogical solution. Further years of diligent study can lead to the 'candidate level' of particular sciences. This level is approximately equivalent to the MSc level of higher education which means a few thousands of partly compound professional schemes. At this level following the logic of the profession, using professional jargon adequately, autonomous problem solving becomes possible, we own a conscious knowledge; we can explain our decisions step by step and we are able to argue for it.

To the next grade, the 'master level' way is not that straight. To reach this level talent, devotion and at least ten years of practice are required. A 'Master' has ten thousand complex professional schemes. A person educated at this high level (minimum PhD Degree) approaches professional problems in a different manner than those with minor levels of knowledge. Knowing the internal nature and logic and the underlying principles of professional challenges, a kind of synthesis and specialisation of this knowledge appears. Professional thinking is often based on analogues, and an intuitive form of decision-making starts to dominate. The Master can anticipate possible steps, outcomes and consequences several moves earlier, and recognises the possibilities of errors or corrections. Conscious deduction or explanation appears only after the solution; during work timesaving, heuristic decision-making strategies prevail. Conscious processes of information collecting and mental testing of the possible methods in preparation stage are followed by an incubation period and finally in the so-called illumination stage suddenly unique, creative solutions would appear as a result of the combination of possessed professional schemes.⁷ At this level, there is already a high degree of problem sensitivity, so these people have efficient sensors to detect important possible developmental directions, not seen by others. They are able not only to react to problems indicated by the organisation, but also to proactively raise new needs.

⁶ László Mérő: *Észjárások – Remix. A racionális gondolkodás ereje és korlátai*. Budapest, Tericum, 2008. 151–166.

⁷ Péter Scharle: A kognitív pszichológia sémafogalma és a többciklusú felsőoktatási képzés szintjei. *Magyar Tudomány*, 49 (111), no. 7 (2004). 743–753.

Adult learning must therefore help to ensure that those who are trained can acquire as many and as realistic schemas as possible. How does this process take place, how are schemas formed, what neural levels are involved and what determines whether they accurately represent reality?

The answer is that there are two ways to get new patterns: either we create them, or we get them. Some of the internal representations in our nervous system are originated from personal experiences, but plenty of them stem from our social environment and we simply adopt them without real personal involvement.⁸ At this point I must refer back to the false expectations regarding training mentioned in the introduction. Why do not we always take the easy road and adopt ready-made templates? Because it makes a quality difference whether we *learn* from someone else or whether we *develop* the knowledge ourselves. Therefore, acquiring knowledge at a theoretical course, cannot entirely substitute practical, experience-based learning, direct forms of internal representation making.

In andragogy the dominant form of education is theoretical, based on lectures and notes. The transmission of knowledge is carried out in a descriptive, elementary, explicit and declarative way. The students learn the operational framework of the subject, and acquire a semantic memory of knowledge in the form of a statement, but do not yet know how to behave in a given situation. A more profound experience is provided with a form of learning that goes further and also uses episodic memory, where the context of learning is part of the procedure, so this knowledge is more personal. An example of this is a training session where the participants themselves collect and share knowledge through an experience of togetherness. Beyond this, there is also a non-declarative, non-conscious, complex, implicit, fully practical form of the learning process, called procedural learning, which is experiential and skill-based.⁹ How much more does this add, and how does it contribute to a deeper and more accurate understanding of the environment?

The declarative, descriptive knowledge of overt norms and socially shared schemas can be received via verbal communication, encoded in linguistic symbols. We use our own existing mental representations to decode them, and we try to incorporate them into our own personalities. There is no personal, direct experience associated with these schemas; the thought units are stored in our cerebral cortex, wrapped in digital codes, in linguistic symbols.

According to Benjamin Whorf's linguistic relativity concept,¹⁰ the language itself basically determines how we process information, in what dimensions we perceive reality, and what categories we use while thinking.

Since our left hemisphere that mainly underlies our conscious operations uses a verbal code system, the structure and elaboration of the language we use (for example the differentiation of possible tenses) during our socialisation confine the possibilities of mapping reality. Learning the jargon of a job, and the differentiation of linguistic codes within a profession is an important aspect of occupational development. By

⁸ Forgács: op. cit. Chapter 7.

⁹ Atkinson et al.: op. cit. Chapter 8.

¹⁰ John B. Carroll (ed.): *Language, Thought, and Reality. Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf*. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1956.

acquiring the official terminology of any science, the communication that is based on the mutual knowledge of the parties becomes economic, concise and strict. Through the function of internal speech, the learning of jargon makes thinking, learning, recalling and problem solving more effective and differentiated.

The disadvantage of these indirect impressions is that they are not connected with either visceral or sensational experiences, so the final map of reality within our minds reflects only personal connotations conditioned to these specific words not direct impressions about the object itself. According to the researches of Osgood on semantic differential scales,¹¹ personal shades of meaning of each expression can be surprisingly heterogeneous. For example the word 'dog' can mobilise different elements of knowledge, and might induce various feelings, emotions, motivations and reactions in every individual since our personal experiences conditioned to this series of letters are obviously different. The knowledge transmitted via symbols that we get from our social environment can be a well-based and useful pack of information, but a biased belief, stereotype and prejudice, too. In these cases we accept the representations of the communicator believing that they are exact and right, so this process is based on a kind of faith or trust. A much deeper neurological involvement of the trainees is triggered when the mental representations are based on direct, personal experience, and complex impressions of analogous information deriving from a variety of sensory modalities.

In pursuance of the generally appreciated works of the Swiss psychologist, Jean Piaget, the cognitive development of the individual is basically determined by sensorimotor experiences. During their interactions with the world, children begin to map the consequences and experiences of their own actions in the form of cognitive schemes. This procedure is called interiorisation. These schemes are dynamically changing elements of cognition. If it is possible, we match the new experience to our existing schemes (assimilation), if not, we have to alter our existing knowledge to reality and change our schemes (accommodation). The cognitive achievements of children start to grow spectacularly when they become able to execute mental operations based on their existing schemes. During our cognitive development, mental processes are getting more and more independent from any physical simulation and by the age of 12–14, in the stage of 'formal mental operations' an abstract, systematic-logical way of thinking becomes possible.¹²

However, even a fully developed human brain does not mean that rationality and consciousness have taken over the organisation of human behaviour and learning.

According to Paul D. MacLean's Triune Brain Theory,¹³ our brains evolved as a three-part unit (see Figure 1). These interdependent brain levels are organically linked and through their integrated functioning and coordinated work, determine

¹¹ Charles E. Osgood et al.: *Cross-Cultural Universals of Affective Meaning*. Urbana, IL, University of Illinois Press, 1975.

¹² Atkinson et al.: op. cit. Chapter 3.

¹³ Paul D. MacLean: Man and His Animal Brains. *Modern Medicine*, 32 (1964). 95–106; Paul D. MacLean: Alternative Neural Pathways to Violence. In Larry Ng (ed.): *Alternatives to Violence*. New York, Time-Life Books, 1968, 24–34.

the uniquely complex spiritual functioning of humans, the animalistic depths and divine heights that Homo Sapiens is capable of experiencing.¹⁴




Figure 1: Triune Brain Theory

Source: www.seekpng.com/ima/u2q8u2w7e6w7a9q8/

The most ancient area is thought to be the region around the brainstem (R-complex), which controls the bound, stereotyped, species-specific responses and basic autonomic functions responsible for individual and species survival, as well as the level of alertness that underpins our consciousness. These include the so-called 4F instincts of Feeding, Fighting, Fleeing and Reproduction.¹⁵ Important regulatory functions such as stress, aggression, territoriality, power struggles, and so ritual posturing, pretence, deception and other non-verbal communication traits are associated with this. An important principle at this level is the maintenance of routine, following pre-established examples and social conformity. At the level of concrete examples, this is where the roots of xenophobia, paranoia, revenge, war, military formalism, hierarchy, symbols, etc. can be found. As this is the most stable and vulnerable region of our brain, it is the default system in the event of a disruption in the functioning of the other two systems (e.g. stress, poisoning, injury, illness), to ensure our survival.

The reptilian brain is surrounded by the paleomammalian brain, which includes the limbic system (hippocampus, amygdala and other subcortical nuclei) and the fibres

¹⁴ Jaak Panksepp: *Affective Neuroscience. The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions*. Oxford – New York, Oxford University Press, 1998.

¹⁵ The creator of the 4F model himself replaced the F word this way.

connecting the two hemispheres of the brainstem. The integration of sensations from inside the body and stimuli from the outside world, and the mediation between the reptilian brain and the function of the neo-mammalian brain takes place through the transitory neural pathways. This is the area where the ability to perceive reality/truth, identity and the range of emotions – which allow for more flexible adaptation than reflexes – are rooted, because according to the two-factor theory of emotions, the emotion experienced is nothing more than the cognitive interpretation of visceral sensations and the general level of arousal they generate.¹⁶ It plays an important role in the development of attachment, which is of vital importance for the care of offspring, in nurturing, in vocal communication, which expands the possibilities for contact, and in play, which helps to acquire behavioural patterns.

The neomammalian brain or human brain evolved at the latest, which is the outermost layer of our brain. Through the thalamic structures and the functioning of the neo-cortex, the possibilities for our interaction with the outside world are expanded. Through complex stimulus analysis, precise, variable and learnable movement patterns, advanced learning and memory functions, and abstract, rational thinking, we are able to expand our spatial and temporal perspective and become capable of tool use, planning, creativity, introspection and awareness. The development of Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas in the temporal lobe,¹⁷ which represent the motorial and semantic aspects of speech, was an important factor in the evolutionary success of the Homo Sapiens. This cortical functioning is experienced as consciousness: verbalisation brings stimuli experienced and processed at lower levels of the nervous system into the conscious sphere. The neocortex is fully developed by the early twenties,¹⁸ so the way information is processed in childhood and adolescence is quite different.

So Thus, this human-specific region is the key to our conscious, rational functioning, but it cannot provide effective adaptation by itself; in practice, it is the complex interaction of the brain and the lower levels of the nervous system that has made Homo Sapiens the most adaptive creature on Earth, and we cannot avoid this pattern in learning.

According to Antonio R. Damasio, paradoxically, rational human thinking can be perfected by integrating emotional aspects and bodily sensations. In his work “Descartes’ Error”,¹⁹ based on the experiences of his career as a clinical researcher, he argues that rationality is inconceivable without the integration of emotional components that are constantly mediated by the nervous system, and that the concept of dualistic, separated body and soul is therefore fundamentally wrong: spiritual qualities can only emerge through the integration of bodily experience. In his concept, the function of emotions is to inform the regions of the brain that are responsible for rational decisions about visceral feelings in connection with the situations one has to cope with through the signals of the peripheral nervous system, so they actually contribute to the final reaction with a preliminary classification.

¹⁶ Stanley Schachter – Jerome Singer: *Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determinants of Emotional State*. *Psychological Review*, 69, no. 5 (1962). 379–399.

¹⁷ Atkinson et al.: op. cit. Chapter 2.

¹⁸ Beverly McMillan: *Illustrated Atlas of the Human Body*, Sydney, Weldon Owen Pty Ltd, 2008.

¹⁹ Antonio R. Damasio: *Descartes’ Error*. New York, Avon Books, 1994. 12–17.

This 'visceral reaction' can contain either inherent components or can be an imprint of previous experiences; leastwise it is an important part of the internal representations of situations, since it has a fundamental orientating role. The fastest judgement about a particular situation is determined by our so-called 'primary emotions' that help us to decide whether we should approach or leave, whether the situation will be useful or harmful for us. This fast, automatised orientation serves our survival. 'Secondary emotional reactions' in which rational analysis of the situation already takes part are based on them, but these would not be launched without the primary process. It helps to connect sensations from the periphery to the visual, auditory, and kinesthetic association regions of the cerebral cortex, to our memory stores. As a result, we are able to perceive and interpret the stimuli we receive, and this is where a rational evaluation of the situation occurs, which, as we have seen, requires the primary processes to take place.²⁰ Perception, matching with our existing cognitive schemata and identification based on interpretation can therefore only take place afterward.

According to it, the entire body is involved in forming internal representations of situations: "...the body, as represented in the brain, may constitute the indispensable frame of reference for the neural processes that we experience as the mind..."²¹ As we can see, not only the incredibly complex human brain, but eventually the entire body takes part in the information processing. So we know not only with our brains, but – in accordance with Jean Piaget's theory – our entire being has taken part in cognition through practical, sensorimotor experiences.

To understand what is happening in practice, let us look at a concrete example that, because of its complexity, involves the whole nervous system and uses the same information processing channels as any other subject in our mental functioning. Joshua Greene, in connection with Damasio's theory, distinguished two interdependent processes in our moral judgements: a fast, automatic process and a slow, controlled one. Greene likens them to the automatic and manual modes of a camera.²² The automatic mode, as measured, is based on the functioning of the brain's ventral-medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), it is emotion-based, fast and efficient but not flexible; it is survival-based. The manual mode involves increased activity of the dorsal-lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), allows rational analysis, which can override instinctive judgement, and leads to "cold-headed", purely utilitarian moral judgements. The frequent dilemmas between our utilitarian and deontological moral, are mainly the results of our attempts to reconcile, often hopelessly, our two information processing systems, which operate at different speeds but in parallel.

Experience from the study of brain-injured patients shows that in front-temporal and ventral-medial prefrontal lesions, patients make almost purely utilitarian, rational decisions, which in many cases is alien to the social environment, does not help their integration, adaptation and impairs their moral judgement. Normally, the integration of emotions and rationality takes place in the frontal lobe, without which our adaptation to the outside world is impaired. The PFC is in fact the associative cortex of social

²⁰ Damasio: op. cit. 149–169.

²¹ Damasio: op. cit. 17.

²² Joshua D. Greene et al.: The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment. *Neuron*, 44, no. 2 (2004). 389–400.

behaviour, mapping the taxonomy of all sanctioned actions. If this fails, “moral agnosia” develops, and the patient is unable to adapt adequately to social situations.

Damasio’s famous case study²³ is of the unfortunate mining engineer Phineas Gage, whose accidental destruction of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) by an iron rod left the originally successful, sensitive-hearted and characterful man with a personality change, impaired ability to plan for the future, unable to behave according to previously learned social rules, to choose alternatives for survival. In his case, the VMPFC, through malfunctioning, was unable to process information about amygdala stimulus-reinforcements, so the learning processes that underpin adaptation were inadequate or not utilised at the cortical level. Normally, the VMPFC integrates both the bottom-up and top-down information required for deontological decisions involving a duty to the community. Utilitarian decisions do not require this kind of integration; the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) alone performs purely rational reasoning and arrives at utilitarian decisions.

In an experiment at the University of Iowa,²⁴ healthy people and people with brain damage in different brain areas were used to studying the relationship between decision-making and risk-taking. The subjects were allowed to draw cards from four decks of cards while their emotional reactions were measured by the Galvanic Skin Response (GSR) on their fingertips. With two decks, the majority of cards resulted in a \$50 payoff, while a few cards resulted in losses between \$50 and \$200. In the other two decks, there were winning cards of \$100 and serious losing cards of up to \$1,000. The experiment showed that healthy people and those with other brain injuries showed avoidance behaviour towards dangerous decks after 40–50 draws, and around the 80th draw, they were able to express consciously what was wrong with them. At the GBR level, however, they showed the first emotional reactions to the two dangerous decks long before they appeared at the behavioural level, around the 10th draw. Patients with lesions in the incriminated regions of the frontal lobe were also able to conceptualise and represent the problem at the rational level, but there was no change at the behavioural level, they were still as likely to reach for the dangerous decks as at the beginning of the experiment.

Based on the results of this famous “card experiment”, Damasio formulated his hypothesis about somatic markers (bodily signalling emotions).²⁵ According to it, emotions stem from sensations that are generated by whole-body involvement. These sensations are transmitted to cortical areas that make rational decisions through the coordinated action of the amygdala and the VMPFC, part of the orbit medial prefrontal cortex (OMPFC). This provides vital information that helps to make the most survival-oriented decisions. Some of the somatic markers organise directly experienced sensations into a pre-warning emotion (body loop), while there are also cognitive representations of emotions that can be triggered by cognitive signals without a direct encounter with the stimulus (as-if body loop). Whole-body

²³ Damasio: op. cit. 23–53.

²⁴ Summary by László Mériő: *Az érzelmek logikája*. Budapest, Tericum, 2010. –146–148.

²⁵ Antonio R. Damasio et al.: Somatic Markers and the Guidance of Behavior: Theory and Preliminary Testing. In Harvey S. Levin – Howard M. Eisenberg – Arthur L. Benton (eds.): *Frontal Lobe Function and Dysfunction*. Oxford – New York, Oxford University Press, 1991. 217–229.

experience determines the somatic markers that emerge in relation to a situation, so the quality of the experience will influence subsequent behaviour.

To summarise, it is possible to learn schemas purely by involving the brain areas involved in rational thinking through the exposure of stimuli packaged in verbal codes (lecture), but there is also a different kind of learning (e.g. situational exercises, on-the-job) that involves the whole body, even the last cells, in the creation of internal representations. In the latter case, the internal change of state occurs on an unconscious, visceral level, so that the new knowledge is integrated much more deeply. As a result, for example, the retrieval of new knowledge is stable even when stress levels are elevated, as opposed to theoretical knowledge based on stress-sensitive neocerebellar functioning.

3. Recommendations for the top to toe method

The name of the method I propose refers to the fact that when choosing a training methodology, it is necessary to decide at which level or levels we want to achieve a change in the nervous system. The roof represents the most advanced areas of our brain, the abstract memory store with verbal encoding, and the base represents the visceral level of somatic markers. In what follows, I will illustrate with selected examples the combinations to consider when aligning training methods with the desired outcomes. I will not attempt to give a complete, precisely structured recommendation within the scope of this paper, but perhaps this is enough to convey the basic idea.

When choosing the training and related assessment method for the appropriate change of state, it is first necessary to determine at which level of the whole nervous system the new knowledge to be acquired should cover the practical manifestation. If it is enough that the new knowledge is stored in the memory bank (e.g. literacy), it may be sufficient to store it in the form of a lecture or a book, packaged in verbal codes, and then test it in the form of a written test or oral question. In such cases, it is worth practising not only the process of memorisation but also the recalling. If the aim is to synthesise and analyse these stored elements of knowledge in order to create new combinations, it is worth using training and assessment methods that offer the opportunity to do so (e.g. small lectures, essays, discussion groups, etc.). If the aim is to use the stored knowledge elements to solve concrete practical problems (e.g. medical diagnostic work) or to apply them in a practical situation (e.g. doing a company's accounts based on tax law), then success can be achieved through a more realistic case study analysis or a simulated task situation.

There are also cases where theoretical knowledge is not relevant because it is a purely practical skill (e.g. cycling, swimming). In these cases, development can be advanced at a purely physical level, with guided exercises, the success of which will be rooted in muscle memory; in this case, studying the history of the velocipede or the geometry of the bicycle's frame at a cortical level will not bring you any closer to the result. In other cases, however, such as integrity development, theoretical knowledge needs to be applied in emotionally saturated practical situations, in harmony with the beliefs of the individual as they are formed in the course of education. In such

cases, the whole person with body and soul must be involved in the development process, so that the visceral alarm function can be based during the training, and can help to react well when a similar situation begins to rise in real life.

Once the training objective has been identified, the tasks to be carried out to achieve it need to be developed. The more practical the training method is, the more energy-consuming the process is. The key to success is personalisation and realism, for example, it is worth dramatising critical job situations identified in job analyses, which is a time-consuming exercise. The number of participants is also limited in practical training, as it is not possible to involve participants in the practice and its discussion in sufficient depth for more than 10–12 students. The small number of trainees in a group means that the organisation can educate only a low number of colleagues with a given number of classrooms and trainers. This is further complicated by the fact that it is much more time-consuming to experience the exercises individually, and to interactively analyse and discuss them together than to give a one-way communication-based lecture in a large classroom.

4. Conclusions

In my study, I tried to illustrate the importance of a trivial but often overlooked factor in education. The basic idea of the “Top to Bottom Model” is that the training methods chosen in adult education should not be adapted to the existing possibilities, but to the depth of the neural levels involved in the practical manifestation of the skills, abilities and knowledge to be acquired as a result of the training.

A common error of approach on the part of employers is to see training as an obligation to be met rather than an investment in the future. Hence, in the name of efficiency, the organisation tries to train as many employees as possible in as little time and as cheaply as possible. However, this energy is almost entirely wasted, as it will not achieve the desired results.

The solution is for the employer to create the infrastructure and personnel conditions to ensure that the choice of training methods needed to achieve the desired increase in competence remains a purely professional matter.

The choice of the appropriate training methodology depends on many factors, of which the one I have suggested is only one possibility, but perhaps the most fundamental. In my study, I have described in detail the possible physical and psychological processes through which changes in the nervous system occur during training, which result in a more effective adaptation of participants to new situations. We have seen that learning does not stop in the brain, but can involve the whole body in its own way.

With further research, it may be worth exploring in detail exactly what the basic types of adult learning can be, and these can be combined with a guide to what training methods can most effectively serve development at the different levels of the nervous system. It may also be useful to develop the same methodology for the different stages of child development, so that pedagogy can make use of these findings, too.

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Imre Dobák¹ 

10 Years of Hungarian National Security Higher Education (2012–2022)

This study examines the place and role of Hungarian national security higher education coordinated by the Institute of National Security of the University of Public Service. Compared to the models seen on the international stage, the study describes the Hungarian university (UPS) form of national security training, the peculiarities that have developed as a result of the last ten years, and the framework of higher education in this special field.

Keywords: national security, training, university

1. Introduction

Nowadays, the scientific knowledge appearing in the university sphere is becoming more and more important. This is true for the training provided by universities, as well as for the university cooperated research. The acquisition of new knowledge is also important for the national security services of each country, which developed training and other scientific cooperation with the universities. These scientific connections are not new, and we can find many examples in the 20th century, during the operation of the secret services of both the Western and Eastern Blocs. However, the convergence that can be seen nowadays is becoming increasingly important as universities become the key centres of scientific and technological knowledge, highlighting the importance of higher education and the potential of scientific R&D and international cooperation. It can be seen that national security structures cannot ignore the training and research “opportunities” provided by their universities and scientific environment, and these collaborative interfaces can play catalytic role.

With the importance of national security thinking on the international level, national security training and knowledge tailored to the special needs of the sector have gained ground. Nowadays, the ever-changing security environment everywhere requires the work of professionals who understand and deal with new types of

¹ PhD, Associate Professor, University of Public Service, Institute of National Security, e-mail: dobak.imre@uni-nke.hu

challenges and threats.² Accordingly, special forms of training have been developed, which take into account the special aspects of the national security sector and adapt to the framework of traditional higher education. The examples of university training on the international level also confirm this, so various courses can be seen in higher education that serve the education needs of the secret services.

All of this is the result of continuous development, although in the first half of the 20th century special training institutions, intelligence and counterintelligence professional courses and “spy schools” have already been operating in order to prepare the staff of the secret services. The change had occurred in the second half of the 20th century, when the higher education of secret services was given an independent framework in many countries including Hungary.

2. International training models³

There were many examples of training links between intelligence services and universities in the 20th century, in both Western and Eastern countries. The extremely closed military and internal higher education frameworks of the state security trainings can be highlighted in this period. Later, adapting to the dynamically evolving higher education environment of the 21st century, the educational relationships have also changed.

Concerning the international examples, it can be seen that specific relationship systems and institutional cooperation models have been developed to provide training. Based on the open publications and sites of international forms of higher education in national security, the present study defines the following categories:

- “Closed” institutional forms (e.g. national intelligence academies) established by the national security services of the respective states, which also teach the traditional knowledge of national security. (The “closed” indicator means that these institutions are not open for the non-members of the security sphere and organisations.)
- Accredited university education forms that are supported by the national security services of the given states and appear as part of law enforcement or military higher education.
- Open access university courses in topics related to national security and intelligence studies, with the partial support from national security services.

Concerning the international examples, several countries can also be mentioned.

1. Based on the international publication, the “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy (MVNIA), accredited in Romanian higher education and operated by the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), is well-known,

² Csaba Vida: A tudományos képzés rendszere a nemzetbiztonság területén. *Nemzetbiztonsági Szemle*, 2, Special Issue 1 (2014). 40.

³ Imre Dobák: A nemzetbiztonság felsőoktatási képzéseinek külföldi modelljei. In Gyula Gaál – Zoltán Hautzinger (eds.): *A hadtudománytól a rendészettudományig – Társadalmi kihívások a nemzeti összetartozás évében*. Pécs, Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság Határőr Szakosztály Pécsi Szakcsoport, 2020. 154–156.

where, among other things, the national security staff and employees are trained.⁴ As defined on the official websites of the Academy: “While education in fields supporting intelligence activities – technical, logistics or administrative – can be ensured by other training units, the role of selecting and training future intelligence analysts and case officers goes exclusively to the Academy.”⁵ The MVNIA is a military higher education institution with a special status, involved in a number of scientific research and educational programs. Institutional development dates back more than twenty years, where 3 level higher educational framework (the Bologna System) was implemented in 2007. Accordingly, the MVNIA has Bachelor’s, Master’s and PhD degree programs.

2. In case of the Russian Federation, the Academy of the Federal Security Service (FSB) can be highlighted. According to the website of the institution, the FSB Academy celebrated its 100th anniversary in 2021, while the current institutional framework was established in 1992. Nowadays, as a multidisciplinary education and science centre, it also provides training and retraining for professionals in several federal security services.⁶ In addition to Russian practice, several states in the Central Asian region (e.g. Kazakhstan, Mongolia) also have an independent academic institutional form to national security education.⁷
3. Another institutional example is in Germany, where the Akademie für Verfassungsschutz (AfV) was established in 1955, which, however acts as a place for further training (not a place of higher education).⁸ (The Schule für Verfassungsschutz [SfV] was renamed to the “Akademie für Verfassungsschutz” [AfV] in 2014, parallel with the changes in the external environment.⁹) The institution affiliated with the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) effectively supports the training needs of many organisations, especially the national security sphere. Their training profile consists of preparatory, initial and in-service training courses, seminars and courses on specific issues.
4. In case of the United States, the FBI Academy which was established in the last century, has become known as a law enforcement training centre. The Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis (U.S.), which provides training for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) intelligence analysts is also noteworthy. It operates as part of the “CIA University” (CIAU) which basically holds different courses but does not issue degrees. It was founded

⁴ Csongor H. Gogolák: A romániai titkosszolgálatokról (II.). *Népújság*, 13 December 2016.

⁵ See <https://animv.ro/en/despre-noi/>

⁶ See www.academy.fsb.ru/i_hist_8.html

⁷ János Béres (ed.): *Külföldi nemzetbiztonsági szolgálatok*. Budapest, Zrínyi Kiadó, 2018.

⁸ See www.verfassungsschutz.de/DE/karriere/arbeiten-beim-verfassungsschutz/lebenslanges-lernen/lebenslanges-lernen_node.html

⁹ Warg Günter: Wo wird man Dienstleister für die Demokratie? – Die Aus- und Fortbildungseinrichtungen für Mitarbeiter der Verfassungsschutzbehörden in Deutschland. *Nemzetbiztonsági Szemle*, 2, no. 3 (2014). 5.

in 2002 after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.¹⁰ Students in the institution can also take courses at other universities, but they are also provided full-time and part-time language training opportunities.

5. A similar U.S. institution is the National Intelligence University (NIU) higher education institution in the field of national security and intelligence in the United States Intelligence Community. The institution, founded by the Department of Defense, initially served the military intelligence agencies, but now is open to the non-military intelligence agencies as well. As Campbell articulates in his study: “The NIU operating as a “front office” for the full spectrum of community education and training programs is focused on the establishment of standards and policy.”¹¹ The “closed” form of enrolment is typical, and open only to those working in the national security sector with an appropriate security clearance. The institution accredited in higher education offers training in several Bachelor’s (BA) and Master’s (MA) courses in the fields of intelligence. The faculty members of NIU have extensive professional experience and scientific knowledge in topics relevant to the intelligence community.¹² “The NIU is governed by the NIU Council, in collaboration with the Distributed Learning Advisory Board and the IC Analyst Training and Educational Council.”¹³

After the turn of the millennium, in addition to the training and education institutions supported and maintained by the national security services, civilian universities also recognised the opportunities for teaching in the fields of security policy and approached the national security sector with their courses. In this regard, we can see a wide range of higher education courses dealing with the analysis and evaluation of the security policy environment. These postgraduate programs accredited in higher education already provided knowledge used by the business sector (e.g. business intelligence). These include the postgraduate training elements of security studies, which are already more closely related to national security in their topics.

Looking at current European university training opportunities, under the search term “national security” we can see training programs that focus on complex areas of security and counterterrorism activities. Intelligence-type training can be found along the notion of “(national security) intelligence”, where the portfolio is much more narrow.

3. The Hungarian practice

Forms of the national security higher education can be considered special in Hungary, as well. The closed nature of the sphere and the need for cooperation between

¹⁰ Stephen H. Campbell: A Survey of the U.S. Market for Intelligence Education. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 24, no. 2 (2011). 319.

¹¹ Campbell (2011): op. cit. 311.

¹² National Intelligence University: 2017–2018 *Catalog*.

¹³ Campbell (2011): op. cit. 313.

the education institutions and the national security sector are among the reasons. Looking back to the period of regime change in 1990, the state security trainings have been abolished, and later steps were taken to launch the new structure of higher education in national security. These milestones of both the pre-1990 and subsequent decades have already been reviewed in lots of studies. Nevertheless, it is worth outlining the main turning points in this area as well:

1. In 1990, the former training structure in both the internal security (state security) and military fields was abolished.¹⁴
2. According to the publications, after the change of regime in Hungary, it took many years for starting the higher education accredited national security training and education. An important turning point was 2004, when the National Security Department at the Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University created the first education to the national security sphere. It basically served the training needs of the military national security field. These programs (Bachelor's) have started in 2005, and later the Master's program started as well.
3. The next turning point was 2012, when the Institute of National Security was established at the National University of Public Service and the main goal was to revise the training structure.¹⁵ The modification work was completed by the end of the year, so from 2013, both the military national security and the civilian national security specialisation began the Bachelor's and Master's courses at the Faculty of Military Sciences and Officer Training of the University.¹⁶
4. After the complex training and organisational development processes, as part of the national security program the counterterrorism Bachelor's and Master's specialisation also started in 2015.
5. In the same year, in addition to the operation of military national security training, the development of an independent civilian national security course was started along new professional development goals.
6. In 2017–2018, after the necessary preparatory processes, the Faculty of Law Enforcement also announced the Bachelor's and Master's courses in civilian national security.

Nowadays, the higher education in national security is provided by the University of Public Service, where the Institute of National Security (INS) as a framework has been ensuring the training environment since 2012. The INS organises the current national security education programs with the coordination and cooperation of three university departments (Military National Security, Civilian National Security

¹⁴ József Boda: Az állambiztonsági és nemzetbiztonsági képzés története. In Orsolya Ilona Jámor – Máté Gábor Lénárt – Gábor G. Tarján (eds.): *A rendőrákadémiától az egyetemig: Rendészettörténeti tanulmányok*. Budapest, Rendőrség Tudományos Tanácsa, 2019. 362.

¹⁵ József Boda: A nemzetbiztonsági képzés helyzete Magyarországon. *Belügyi Szemle*, 66, no. 2 (2018). 9.

¹⁶ Boda (2019): op. cit. 366.

and Counterterrorism).¹⁷ The applications for training have been steady and stable for years, which are also reflected in the statistics.

4. The structure of the education and training

4.1. *Civilian National Security Bachelor's and Master's Degree Programs (according to the Training and Output Requirements)*

Degree obtained in the Civilian National Security Bachelor's Degree Program and the qualification in the diploma:

- title of the Bachelor's Degree Program: Civilian National Security Studies
- level of degree: Bachelor (baccalaureus – BA)
- qualification: Civilian National Security Expert

The training objective of the Civilian National Security Bachelor Degree Program and the professional competencies: “The aim of the training is to educate civilian national security experts for the national security services and other agencies authorised to gather secret information and to use disguised tools, who have up-to-date general and specific scientific, theoretical and practical knowledge on professional, professional-technical, legal, criminological, psychological, information technological, security policy aspects and foreign language.”¹⁸

Degree obtained in the Civilian National Security Master's Degree Program and the qualification in the diploma:

- title of the Master's Degree Program: Civilian National Security Studies
- level of degree: Master (magister – MA)
- qualification: Senior Expert in Civilian National Security

The training objective of the Civilian National Security Master Degree Program and the professional competencies: “The aim of the training is to educate national security specialists who are able to perform leadership and expert tasks in the administrative, military, law enforcement, scientific sectors, and to evaluate, analyse and solve national security problems on the basis of their professional knowledge. They are prepared to understand the functioning of political institutions, security processes, public policies and their interdependencies and interactions in the context of global security policy, and to support the preparation of government responses.”¹⁹

As for the civilian national security university training area, applicants for the specialisation are limited to those people who work for the national security services,

¹⁷ Imre Dobák: A nemzetbiztonsági felsőoktatás aktuális kérdései. *Hadtudományi Szemle*, 11, no. 1 (2018). 157–172.

¹⁸ Government Decree No. 222/2019 (IX.25.) on the register of qualifications in the field of science of public governance and the training and graduation requirements of the program.

¹⁹ Government Decree No. 222/2019.

as well as for the secret information collection authorised services, and who are supported by the supervisor or leader with the right to enrol, and who has a valid security clearance.²⁰

4.2. Military National Security Bachelor's and Master's Degree Programs (according to the Training and Output Requirements)

Degree obtained in the National Security Bachelor's Degree Program and the qualification in the diploma:

- title of the Bachelor's Degree Program: National Security Studies
- level of degree: Bachelor (baccalaureus – BA)
- qualification: National Security Expert

The training objective of the National Security Bachelor Degree Program and the professional competencies: “The aim of the training is to train national security experts for special-purpose national security services and other clients who are able to effectively fulfil the requirements and tasks belonging to their jobs in the organisations of the national security field using their up-to-date theoretical and practical knowledge. They are suitable for the practical application of professional theory and methodology, for the development of professional culture.”²¹

Degree obtained in the National Security Master's Degree Program and the qualification in the diploma:

- title of the Master's Degree Program: National Security Studies
- level of degree: Master (magister – MA)
- qualification: National Security Expert

The training objective of the National Security Master Degree Program and the professional competencies: “The aim of the training is to train national security professionals who, using their modern social science and profession-specific knowledge, are able to effectively fulfil the requirements and tasks of their job in the national security organisations, develop professional theory and methodology, and pass on professional culture and values.”²²

As for the military national security area of training, applicants for the specialty are limited to those people who belong to the Military National Security Service or to non-commissioned officers and officers of the Hungarian Armed Forces who are supported by the leader with the right to enrol, and who have a valid security clearance.²³

²⁰ See www.felvi.hu/felveteli/egyetemek_foiskolak/!IntezmenyiOldalak/szervezet.php?szer_id=843&elj=22a

²¹ Government Decree No. 222/2019.

²² Government Decree No. 222/2019.

²³ See www.felvi.hu/felveteli/egyetemek_foiskolak/!IntezmenyiOldalak/szervezet.php?szer_id=844&elj=22a&oldal=2&fej=A

Regarding the duration and internal structure of the above national security university programs in Hungary at Ludovika–UPS:

- on the Bachelor’s (BA) courses, the training duration is 6 semesters, and the number of credits necessary for obtaining the BA’s degree: 180 credits
- on the Master’s (MA) courses the training duration is 4 semesters, and the number of credits necessary for obtaining the MA’s degree: 120 credits

The trainings take place in the form of correspondence, which, due to its specific nature, are to contribute to the higher education of the staff who are already in the system. Serving the training needs of different sectoral directions, the trainings are open not only to the national security services, but also to other security organisations. Compliance with these can be ensured by the specialisation dissimilarities in the programs and the differentiated knowledge.

At the same time, higher education in national security is closely linked to scientific research in the fields of national security. All this can be seen among other things, in the development of training materials, the continuation of the scientific research and the creation of the relevant publication. It is true that scientific research in the field of national security can be found in several Hungarian individual departments and scientific centres.²⁴ Overall, it can be said that the current framework of Hungarian national security training is in line with the Bologna process, and the University of Public Service has a valid accreditation for Hungarian national security training. As with all university education, the relevant Training and Output Requirements are available in open form.²⁵

5. Summary

In the dynamically changing security environment, the tasks of national security organisations are constantly modifying, and the organisations are increasingly improving the professional skills and knowledge of their employees. All of this also means special training requirements for the Institute of National Security at UPS. The Hungarian national security higher education framework, in addition to providing a concentrated, developing environment in accordance with the training needs of the relevant organisations, can also indirectly strengthen the social acceptance of the sphere. Its activities can help to strengthen a more credible image of the sphere as well as security awareness.

Out of the characteristics of higher education in national security, perhaps the most common aspect is the non-open form of training, which can effectively provide the teaching of some special professional skills. However, all of this can be interpreted as a constraint, for example on the issue of education development or the difficulty of getting involved in research. In order to compensate these difficulties and to meet

²⁴ Vida (2014): op. cit. 43.

²⁵ Imre Dobák: Polgári nemzetbiztonsági képzések a hazai felsőoktatásban. *Nemzetbiztonsági Szemle*, 5, no. 4 (2017). 42.

the requirements of higher education, research programs, external partnerships and thematic training elements that meet specific criteria have been given prominence in the case of independent institutional forms. A further feature is that, although forms of higher education in national security provide specialist qualifications and recognised degrees in civilian life, as well as accountability and quality through higher education accreditation, these courses must primarily meet the professional requirements of a limited “recruitment market”. The statement is supported by the fact that the independent intelligence and national security academies and training institutions are professionally connected to the national security organisations and the governing ministries.²⁶

In summary, the university trainings can play a key role in the development of the whole sector, the integration of new knowledge, and in keeping the staff of the sphere, as the combined individual efforts to ensure successful completion and training support by the organisations together create the possibility of professional career within the sector.

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²⁶ Dobák (2020): op. cit.

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Miklós Kund Regényi¹

A Good Practice – Situational Training in Civilian National Security Education

The article presents the meaning, sources and development of situational training. It discusses its place and role in civilian national security education and also describes its personal and material conditions, the tools and equipment used. It presents the related challenges and limitations and highlights the connections between experiential learning and situational training. The article points out the importance of knowledge transfer within a group as well as the importance of self-expression. It underlines the significant role of the fact-based planning and preparedness for unforeseen events and outlines a possible way of development of situational training in the form of reactive shooting.

Keywords: *situational awareness, three-dimensional knowledge, enduring skills, experiential learning, communication skills, stress tolerance, pain tolerance, reactive shooting, prevention and management of emergencies during operational collecting*

1. Introduction

Situational training has been a stable place in the training of law enforcement and national defence organisations – be it training at any level. This is also the case in civilian national security education. In this article, we summarise our practice, what do we mean by situational training in civilian national security education. We also highlight how to use and how to develop further this proven method. In this context, we interpret the meaning of situational training and present the two sources from which the situational training practice of civilian national security education is based. We also give the floor to discuss its place and role in the education summarising the experience gained from situational training. Nevertheless, we briefly present – as our own added value – a possible way to develop further the situational training.

¹ PhD, Assistant Lecturer, University of Public Service, Department of Civilian National Security, e-mail: regenyi.kund@uni-nke.hu

2. The meaning of situational training

By situational training we always mean group interaction, during which our students and some of our selected students take part in interactions with other students in the same group, or with specially requested spotters, also known as role players, and pre-recorded and projected scenes. During situational training, the exercise leader gives brief, usually deliberately contradictory, instructions to volunteer role-players who are unfamiliar with the instructions given to the other party. The aim is to build tension quickly during the scenes, creating a situation where students can show off and thereby develop their communication or other skills.

At this point we must say that the instructions are intentionally short and concise. It is a common misconception that students wait for detailed instructions or complain about the lack of it. We also realise that it is not a matter of creating film scenes and scenarios, but of practicing situations which are as realistic as possible, where, like in real life, we have to build on personality, experience, existing professional knowledge and also on knowledge acquired during education, to meet an assumed or real expectation.

As referred above, situational exercises are always guided by an exercise leader. His/her task is to select and create situations; to give a description of the situation; to select the role players; to indicate clearly the beginning and the end of the scene; and, where it is appropriate, to give the description of and compliance with security regulations. He/she also decides to replay the scenes in the same or changing way, such as by changing roles. It is his/her responsibility to capture the scenes. The exercise leader also plays an important role in evaluating the situational practice. During the evaluation, we aim to have the lessons learned by the participants where possible. To this end, everyone present can share their feelings, perceptions and experiences about the scenes. You can outline the lessons to be learned. The sequence: always the “viewers” start, the ones who have not been actively involved in the scene. This is followed by the participants and only then does the practice leader make a statement. It is very important that evaluation and feedback to each other is always positive. We do not have to look for faults in ourselves and others, we have to program ourselves for success, just like in real life. Participants should identify possible or appropriate solutions for this.

According to our experience, evaluation is a key element of situational training. It is clear from the above that the honesty of the participants is essential for this. Obviously, this cannot be forced. However, we strive to facilitate this as much as possible through a kind of mutual voluntary commitment that the scenes that have been spoken and possibly recorded will only be used within the group. Volunteering is also important for the success of the training method. It is important that ideally volunteers take part in the scenes, as strengthening self-confidence plays a key role in the training.

3. Sources and forerunners

Two sources and one forerunner of situational training used in civilian national security education can be identified. One source is the training method used in adult education. This is mainly group work, group evaluation;² we receive and use self-reflection and self-message. The practice of capturing scenes for analysis also comes from this source. The main aim is to raise verbal and non-verbal communication to a higher level. During the joint evaluation of the scenes, which can be supported by the recording of images and sound, as well as the playback of the recorded visual sound material, the sound, speech tempo, body language, gestures, space management and posture as communication components are the key elements. We want to achieve a high level of purposeful use, and the exercises are aimed at raising these complex skills to a higher level. This type of training is used in civilian national security training in HUMINT-related courses.³

The other source comes from so-called “Force on Force” training,⁴ in which we mimic legitimate defence, police action, or melee with tools that imitate the use and application of various firearms, and then evaluate the standard of execution. Among the simulation tools, we should mention the products of FX Simunition,⁵ which offers a range of patented simulation firearms in the most accurate way currently known, and mimics the effect of real live projectiles with sufficient efficiency within a few meters, but without permanent damage.

It is no accident that the company’s products have been patented: this effective system of training tools is only sold to law enforcement and defence organisations. We use these tools regularly in our training. It should be mentioned that the so-called paintball and airsoft⁶ tools are also widely used in tactical situational exercises. They have the advantage of being available on the civilian market without restriction, so that they can also be used for private security training outside the law enforcement agency. However, their viability lags far behind that of patented products, and so does their effectiveness in situational exercises. It is important to underline that the use of all the devices outlined above is only possible with the use of protective equipment.

In tactical situational exercises, our goal is for participants to experience what it is like to be threatened with violence and, if they have to respond to it in a legitimate way, also to use force. An important circumstance is that this experience is, fortunately, completely new to the vast majority of participants. It is also the goal of tactical training to get participants to feel the pain and learn to control it. This plays a key role in ensuring that, in a real fight, their minor damage during a real action does not result in incapacitation that would give the opponent an advantage and put the law enforcement or combat defence operator performing the action at an unprotected

² See also Stephen Petrina: *Advanced Teaching Methods for the Technology Classroom*. Hershey, IGI Global, 2006.

³ See e.g. courses ZNEHKNB1060 and HKNB23.

⁴ See Gabriel Suarez: *Force-on-Force Gunfight Training. The Interactive, Reality-Based Solution*. Boulder, Paladin Press, 2005.

⁵ See <https://simunition.com>

⁶ Both are widely used for recreational purposes and the devices (markers) can be considered toys, although often very realistic toys.

disadvantage. Pain is an ancient and powerful stimulus: with the said tools and the said procedure, it is very effective to engrave different, mainly tactical and action-tactical procedures, i.e. to record them in the memory of the participants. Experience shows that the skills engraved in this way are extremely durable.

In addition to the above, the method is highly suited to experiencing the stress associated with legitimate protection and the use of state-sanctioned legitimate violence. The trainees experience and learn about the changes in their own organisation in this regard. Here, primarily for the narrowing and peculiar nature of perception and the disappearance of rational judgment. As a next step, we also try to build the ability to tolerate and control stress and to act during stress by repeating the exercises.

For the first time in Hungary, József Végh and István Farkas integrated and developed the methods presented above. Over the years, they have created more than just a room, the so-called tactical house to practise and observe various situations at the FBI-run International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, Hungary and the International Education Center that hosts it; not only were a larger number of cameras and image capture systems acquired and used, but the method was supplemented as well. This was done primarily by measuring the physiological characteristics of stress and taking these results into account in the evaluation. An additional merit of these two professionals is that their work was also published,⁷ believing that the method is justified and necessary. They argued that if our goal is for law enforcement and defence operators to be able to act effectively in real, sharp situations, and not to develop the necessary skills first at the cost of personal loss or the escape of criminals, it is not enough to rely solely on legislation and textbooks-focussed theoretical education, but long-term, skill-level, activatable patterns of behaviour – using their terminology, three-dimensional knowledge – are needed. Of course, we also strive for this in civilian national security education.

In the civilian national security education, we perform complex situational exercises on the example of the International Training Center, but based on our own professional experience, in the framework of courses presenting the prevention and management emergencies during operational collection.⁸

4. The place and role of situational trainings in civilian national security education

The content of this section can be evaluated correctly if we take into account the participants of the civilian national security education, as well as the activities of the organisations that send them, and their legal background. In summary, it can be said that the Hungarian system of national security institutions is basically based on the British model, in which the national security services do not have investigative

⁷ See István Farkas – József Végh: A lélektaktikai képzés elvei, módszerei és gyakorlati tapasztalatai [Principles, Methods and Experiences of the So-Called Soul-Tactical Training]. *Magyar Rendészet*, 3, no. 3 (2003). 53–62.

⁸ See classes NPNBM18 and NPNBB01.

authority.⁹ At the same time, training should take into account the fact that there may be and are situations in which they are forced to take physical risks in addition to interactions with other people. Members of the services also took their oath in respect of this possibility.

In addition, the training is open to staff from all organisations entitled to secret reconnaissance, subject to other appropriate conditions. So there are those who have an obligation to use legitimate force. Thus, the use of situational trainings is justified and necessary, but it is also justified and natural that they do not occupy a central place in the curriculum.

It is also necessary to note that due to the small number of applications derived above, we also need to be aware of the limitations of the methodology. We also make the participants aware that the small number of situational trainings does not replace the detailed and longer-term trainings carried out at the ordering bodies as required. So, we do not make anyone an invincible superhero, but at the same time we draw a lot of attention to the possible physical danger and the need to prevent and avoid them – whether the participant in the training sees himself as either an operational worker or, we hope, a leader. Situational training also raises an internal need for professional intelligence reconnaissance and preparation in the midst of threats.

From another point of view, university and faculty leadership have repeated the rightful expectation to strive for experiential education. Well, situational training meets these aspects to the fullest and greatest extent possible. We can say that in addition to all this, it gives competence to the students participating in this kind of training. The skills acquired there are deeply fixed, whatever the type of training. It is also important, that the ability to self-reflect and self-communicate improves during the assessment. Parallel to this, even the level of verbal reflection improves. In line with general experience, it can also be said that the skills acquired during this kind of training are deeply anchored.

5. Summary of our experience with situational training

Turning to the experience, we must first state that the material and personal conditions for the application of the methodology are also given. In other words, there are several types of tactical houses available in the special education building handed over in 2017, and also an indoor shooting range not far from the complex. FX Simuntion tools and protective equipment are available, as well as an instructor who is trained in the application of the methods and has a Master's degree in pedagogy. What also refers to the experience, it can be said that students are very interested in participating in the exercises. If a difference can be made, it seems to add more value to participants in BSc level, and they prefer it very much indeed.

In some cases, the experience and intellectual control of the participants in the Master's degree seem to paradoxically prevent those from experiencing the scenes as real. Participants are sometimes concerned about being in school and participating

⁹ See Act CXXV of 1995 on National Security Services.

in a set scene rather than gathering quasi real-world experiences. In this context, it is also worth mentioning that they are more often and more adhering to the inherently correct thesis that national security activities are planned and that there should not be problems with proper planning and a high level of implementation. Of course, we also emphasise the importance of planning and prevention during our education, but we want to dispel the false illusion of “this cannot happen to us”. Also related to the nature of school training is the unpleasant circumstance that we have already alluded to, according to which role players are waiting for detailed instructions and are looking for the only correct solution. It is difficult to accept that this does not always exist.

The experiential nature of the trainings and the positive feelings related to it are constantly confirmed by our students. As role-players, we regularly ask students who take part in full-time law enforcement education,¹⁰ taking care of the security of the information, of course. The practice is a great experience for them too, and they say they benefit from it. It is also important to say that the cohesion of the group is strengthening and that knowledge transfer is well observed within the group.

It can be appreciated from experience that despite the repeated benefits of video and audio recordings, we are not used to them. The main reason for this is that we want to maintain the security of our students, who are employees of national security and law enforcement agencies. Another reason is that since the evaluation of the scenes takes place immediately after the exercise, it can be carried out at a high level due to the intensity of the fresh memories, even without the help of the recorded video material.

6. The reactive shooting

The so-called reactive shooting can be considered a further development of situational training as an innovative method. In doing so, the participant of the exercise will be screened on scenes with live actors who, when viewed, pose a threat that substantiates or does not substantiate the lawful use of weapons. The shots are fired with a live firearm. The results are evaluated either on the projected image itself, which is stopped by an automation, or in an improved version of the system, i.e. a computer using microphones to generate and display the hit points.

Last but not least the methodological development can be seen in the fact that we use a system developed by a Hungarian computer specialist.¹¹ We also take part in refining, recording and inventing the scenes. The advantage of this solution is that it is possible to simulate the real threat with a live firearm in a very economical way and the legal and professional response will be given or can be given to the action immediately. It should be noted that in the course of practice we do not seek to

¹⁰ Special thanks to our colleagues at the Institution for Law Enforcement Training and Education at the UPS Law Enforcement Faculty, especially to Pol. Cap. György Bánházi.

¹¹ Attila Belme, also an enthusiastic sport shooter and volunteer EMS first responder.

acquire a high level of use of weapons, but to practise a lawful reaction. It can also be said that our students especially appreciate these exercises.

7. Summary and outlook

Civilian national security education takes place in the context of an open university using the Bologna model, with all its advantages and contradictions. It follows that practical training cannot take up a much larger place in training than has been the case in the above-mentioned circumstances. However, due to the advantages presented above and the demonstrable competitive advantage over other training, its application should be maintained and developed.

Mention should also be made of the added value in the search for, design and application of scenes and in the application and development of reactive shooting tools. Together, this contributes to the quality of civilian national security education and our belief in a competitive advantage over other similar educations as well.

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László István Gál¹

Thoughts on the Purpose and Significance of Legal Education in Military National Security Training

Some level of legal education can be found in almost all Hungarian undergraduate and Master's degrees. In Hungarian national security education there is a complex system of legal subjects, at the centre of which is the subject of the three-semester national security law. The most important legal subjects in military national security training are basic legal knowledge, national security law I–II–III, security challenges and criminal law, and military law.

Keywords: national security education, basic legal knowledge, national security law, security challenges and criminal law, military law, Department of State Security, Institute of National Security

1. The purpose of teaching legal subjects in national security education

There are many definitions of the concept of law all the way back to Roman law. In short, the law can be defined in the most general sense as a set of rules of conduct, the establishment of which is always linked to public bodies, which is why they are generally binding in a given society and are ultimately enforced by public bodies. An ordered set of laws that exist in a given country at a given time is called the legal system of that state. Based on the grouping of the famous Roman jurist Ulpianus, the legal system can be divided into two major areas: public law and private law. The fundamental difference between the two areas is that in public law, in each case, the state exercising public power is at least one of the actors, i.e. the typical characteristic is subordination, while in private law there are legal entities in a subordinate relationship with each other. The legal system is also divided into rights. Legislation regulating the

¹ PhD, Professor, University of Public Service, Department of Military National Security, e-mail: gal.istvan.laszlo@uni-nke.hu

same type of social relations in the same way belongs to one branch of law. Examples of such rights are civil law, administrative law, constitutional law, criminal law, etc.²

Some level of legal education can be found in almost all Hungarian undergraduate and Master's degrees. In Hungarian national security education there is a complex system of legal subjects, at the centre of which is the subject of the three-semester national security law. As such, "national security law" does not exist in the Hungarian legal system as an independent right. This is an intersecting field of law, that is, the body of law that we are currently teaching in university and college training in national security in the 21st century. These rights belong to public law without exception. Administrative law provides the backbone of the material of national security law, but it also has serious areas of constitutional, criminal and international law. In addition to law in the field of national security, we teach a number of other legal subjects in both undergraduate and graduate courses, such as basic legal knowledge, constitutional law, the organisation and operation of public administration, law of war, and so on.

Legislation related to national security has appeared in Hungarian legal history relatively late. Their taxative enumeration would stretch the scope of this study. Therefore, we only point out that an article of Act III of 1921 is considered one of the precursors to the Convention on the Protection of the State and Social Order.³ If we want to go back even earlier in the Hungarian legal history, we can mention the service instructions issued in 1850, which legally established the Evidenzbüro, an organisation performing military and civilian response to the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy.⁴

All the legal predecessors of the Hungarian national security organisation system taught the most important provisions of the legislation necessary for the work, within the framework of various courses, and the teaching of national security (then still state security) legal norms in Hungarian higher education began half a century ago. The "forerunner" of the current Hungarian national security training started its operation with the establishment of the Police College in September 1971 under Statutory Decree No. 39 of 1970. The most important task of the Department of State Security, established at that time, was to ensure the protection of the socialist social and economic system. "The task of the Department of State Security has been to provide advanced training for State Security Operations officers who can be employed in any job as a response officer. The theoretical work was mainly based on the experience of the Police Officer Academy, which taught the principles, tools and methods of state security work, while the Foreign Language College taught the methods of counterintelligence and used the knowledge of a specialist group on the

² István László Gál (ed.): *Nemzetbiztonsági szakági jogi alapismeretek* [Basic Knowledge of National Security Law]. Budapest, Nemzeti Közszerzői Egyetem Közigazgatási Továbbképzési Intézet, 2018. 7.

³ See Pál Agyal: *A magyar büntetőjog kézikönyve 4. Az állami és társadalmi rend hatályosabb védelméről szóló 1921. III. t.-c.* [Handbook of Hungarian Criminal Law 4. Act III of 1921 on the More Effective Protection of State and Social Order]. Budapest, Athenaeum Irodalmi és Nyomdai Rt. Kiadása, 1928.

⁴ Péter Jagadics et al.: *A magyar katonai elhárítás története 1918–2018* [The History of Hungarian Military Counterintelligence 1918–2018]. Budapest, Metropolis Media Group Kft., 2018. 16.

study of the enemy.”⁵ In addition to teaching professional subjects, the Department of State Security also taught special legal knowledge, and even the staff of the department participated in the opinion of the legal guidelines for state security work and the draft legislation.⁶

In 1990, the Department of State Security at the RTF (the former police academy of Hungary) was abolished, graduating students were issued with an advanced state examination, and first- and second-year students were transferred to the field of crime. After that, for a few years, national security training disappeared from the range of Hungarian higher education, and it continued within the framework of courses. In Hungarian military higher education, we have been teaching national security at college level since 2005 and at university level since 2009, during which I have been participating in the teaching of legal subjects since 2010. “Also with regard to national security training – although the elaboration work started earlier and a number of special training initiatives appeared – the establishment of an independent course, which mainly serves the training needs of the military in the field of national security, could only take place at the Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University. The next significant step was the establishment of the Institute of National Security in 2012, providing an opportunity for a focused appearance of military and civilian national security training.”⁷

The teaching of legal subjects has been practically unchanged since 2012, adapting to the constant changes in the legislation. The special role of legal education in the basic training of military national security is also underlined by the fact that the only exam during the six semesters is the legal exam, which consists of three subjects (four subjects in total): law in national security I–II, military law and constitutional law. “Employees working in the field of national security need special knowledge and professional qualifications (competencies) that can be easily separated from other areas and occupations. As it is not possible to obtain the necessary knowledge about the labour market, and it is not possible to acquire this special expertise before entering the career due to understandable security reasons, the services must ensure the training and professional preparation of the employees.”⁸ Due to the special nature of the training, almost all subjects contain some form of legal knowledge, as the entire sphere of national security has been built up under strict legal regulations within the framework of the rule of law since 1990. The most important legal subjects in military national security training are basic legal knowledge, national security law I–II–III, security challenges and criminal law, and military law.

⁵ Béla Révész: Az állambiztonsági szervek politológiai kutatásainak kérdéséhez [The Question of Political Science Research on State Security Agencies] *Acta Universitatis Szegediensis: Acta Juridica et Politica*, 66, no. 17 (2004). 29.

⁶ Révész (2004): op. cit. 37–38.

⁷ György Fialka et al.: Az állambiztonsági felsőoktatás rendszerváltozás előtti kerete és annak lezárása [The Framework of State Security Higher Education before the System Change and Its Closure]. *Nemzetbiztonsági Szemle*, 8, no. 3 (2020). 42.

⁸ István Héjja: A katonai nemzetbiztonsági képzések helyzete (1990–2012) [The Situation of Military National Security Training (1990–2012)]. *Nemzetbiztonsági Szemle*, 2, Special Issue 1 (2014). 16–17.

2. Basics of law

The leaders of the states, the shapers of political decisions can make effective and reasonable decisions only if they are well-informed, rely on credible and reliable information, know the relevant circumstances influencing their decisions, the aspirations of others and forecast the consequences of their planned actions.⁹ The aim of the Basic Law course is to acquaint the students of the national security training with the basic institutions of the Hungarian legal system, the hierarchy of legal sources, the methods of legal formation, the concept and stages of the application of law. The acquisition of basic knowledge of the state, the forms of state, the concept of the political system, and political parties will facilitate the successful completion of subsequent studies.

3. National security law

As we have already pointed out, the law of the field of national security is not a separate law, but rather consists of the legislation of an overlapping field of law, i.e. several fields of law. In my opinion, the Hungarian national security law is the totality of the legal regulations that form the legal framework for the structure and operation of the Hungarian national security services and the legal environment for the day-to-day performance of the tasks of the national security services. Thus, it is primarily the rules of administrative law, constitutional law, criminal law, criminal procedural law and international law that constitute this area of public law (which is therefore not an independent branch of law). It was necessary to arbitrarily designate the topics taught, which could be included in the subject matter within the number of hours provided by the training.

Within the framework of the subject national security law I of the Legal Knowledge in the field of National Security, we teach the most important provisions of Act CXXV of 1995 (Nbtv.), including the first five years after the change of regime, when Act X of 1990 regulated this area. In the sphere of national security, the date of the “regime change” can be dated 5 January 1990, when the Danubegate scandal on the destruction of documents of state security bodies broke out. One of the consequences of the scandal was the transformation of the entire Hungarian state security structure. As a result of the events, state security agencies were reorganised in a short period of time to bring their operations in line with the new constitutional requirements.¹⁰ Partly as a result of the Danubegate scandal, the National Assembly enacted Act X of 1990 on the Temporary Application of Special Secret Service Tools and Methods after the regime change, thus authorising the national security services to use such tools and methods. The government also adopted Decree 26/1990 (II.14.) on the temporary regulation of the performance of national security tasks. This regulation

⁹ Jenő Izsa: *Nemzetbiztonsági alapismeretek A titkosszolgálatok működése* [Basic Knowledge of National Security. The Functioning of Secret Services]. Budapest, ZMNE, 2009. 24.

¹⁰ See Géza Finszter – József Pajcsics: Az állambiztonsági tevékenység alkotmányos szabályozása [The Constitutional Regulation of State Security Activities]. *Magyar Jog*, 37, no. 1 (1990). 31–41.

defined in sufficient detail the organisational structure of the new national security services and the tasks of each national security service. It also stipulated that the services could not exercise official authority.¹¹

The subject matter is in line with the structure of the Act on National Security Services, adopted in 1995 and still in force:

- the organisation and status of national security services
- tasks of national security services
- management and direction of national security services
- parliamentary scrutiny of national security services
- personnel of national security services
- operating principles of national security services
- measures to be taken by national security services
- data management of national security services
- secret collection of information under the Nbtv.
- national security protection and control

Within the framework of this subject, students learn the most important provisions of Act CLV of 2009 on the protection of classified data. The growing importance and value of information is the main reason why intelligence organisations operate in all developed states. Even the states allied with our country often do not want to share certain information with us.¹² At the same time, the Hungarian state has secrets to protect, and of course we want to keep secret the methods and sources¹³ by which we obtain such information. These are primarily protected by the national security services dealing with counterintelligence (in Hungary, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Military National Security Service), and one of the means of protection is through Hungarian criminal law, misuse of classified information and various types of espionage.

It is also essential for the smooth operation of state bodies and other bodies performing public tasks that certain data related to their operation should not be disclosed or made known to unauthorised persons. These data may be of different significance and should be taken into account when providing criminal protection.¹⁴ The cross-border information economy has become an indispensable part of modern politics today, and the dynamics triggered by cross-border information processes have redefined security in a radical, sometimes inconvenient way.¹⁵ For this reason,

¹¹ József Boda: A Nemzetbiztonsági Szakszolgálat helye és szerepe a rendvédelemben [The Place and Role of the Special Service for National Security in Law Enforcement]. In Gyula Gaál – Zoltán Hautzinger (eds.): *Tanulmányok „A biztonság rendszertudományi dimenziói – változások és hatások” című tudományos konferenciáról* [Studies from the Scientific Conference Entitled “Dimensions of Security in Law Enforcement – Changes and Effects”]. Pécs, Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság Határőr Szakosztály Pécsi Szakcsoport, 2012. 120.

¹² Mark M. Lowenthal: *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*. Washington, D.C., CQ Press, 2012.

¹³ Protecting resources is also a basic requirement for intelligence and response. Not only a legal and professional requirement, but also an ethical one: “One element of an intelligence ethic is the protection of resources against external and internal threats. In practical terms, this means protecting the resource not only from the enemy, but even within our own organization” (Shlomo Shpiro: *Speak No Evil. Intelligence Ethics in Israel*. In Jan Goldman (ed.): *Ethics of Spying*. Lanham–Toronto–Plymouth, the Scarecrow Press, 2010. 62).

¹⁴ József Földvári: *Büntetőjog. Különös rész* [Criminal Law. Special Part]. Budapest, Tankönyvkiadó, 1978. 143.

¹⁵ Henry Farrell – Abraham L. Newman: *Of Privacy and Power*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2019.

it is justified to examine the possibilities and limitations¹⁶ of criminal law protection and the connection of facts protecting the same or similar legal subject matter as criminal offenses related to classified data to the protection of the secrets of the Hungarian state.¹⁷

The subject entitled National Security Law II is also part of the undergraduate curriculum. Within the framework of this subject, we will teach the knowledge of criminal law and criminal procedure that may be useful for the performance of the duties of the Military National Security Service. The tasks of the national security services include the detection of certain high-profile, usually serious crimes, but they may also have access to relevant information in connection with other crimes. In addition, there are crimes that can be committed by the personnel of national security services if they are unfamiliar with criminal law provisions. Until the investigation is ordered, the reconnaissance can only be carried out successfully if the personnel of the services carry out their work with basic knowledge of criminal law and criminal procedure. However, an investigation is not ordered in all cases. In such a case, it may be possible to recruit a person who is reasonably suspected of having committed a criminal offense on a charge basis within the limitation period. In addition, it is possible to conclude an agreement with the perpetrator, provided that the national security interest in the case is higher than the state's criminal and social interest in punishing the perpetrator, in full compliance with the relevant legal provisions.

The detection of criminal offenses is generally dealt by the legal staff of the services, but all staff must be aware of the most important criminal law provisions. It is necessary to know at a basic level the provisions of the General Part of the Penal Code, and the nature of the offences covered by the Special Part, the detection of which falls within the competence of the given national security service.¹⁸

National Security Law III is taught in the Master's program. Special topics include legislation on military equipment and dual-use items, specific accounting provisions in the field of national security, certain fundamental rights restricted in the course of professional service, the protection of personal data and the disclosure of data of public interest, and major constitutional court decisions affecting the operation of national security services. As this subject is part of the Master's program, we already assume the basic professional and legal knowledge (primarily the knowledge of the Nbtv. and the Mavtv.) on which the curriculum is based.

¹⁶ Over the past decade and a half, more and more Western authors have criticised the current rules on state secrets in light of the balance between constitutional rights and branches of power. According to a couple of authors, the current U.S. regulations, for example, weaken the balance of power and also harm the public interest (William G. Weaver – Robert M. Pallitto: State Secrets and Executive Power. *Political Science Quarterly*, 120, no. 1 (2005). 85–112). It is also criticised that the role of the judiciary in controlling and restricting secrecy has been greatly weakened (Meredith Fuchs: Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy. *Administrative Law Review*, 58, no. 1 (2006). 131–176). Nowadays, therefore, researchers dealing with the topic also intensively deal with the problem of the legitimacy and scope of state secrets (See Loch K. Johnson (ed.): *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010. 657–672).

¹⁷ István László Gál: *A magyar állam titkainak büntetőjogi védelme* [Protection of Hungarian State Secrets under Criminal Law]. Budapest, Ludovika Egyetemi Kiadó, 2021. 14–15.

¹⁸ Gál (2018): op. cit. 58.

4. Security challenges and criminal responses

The aim of this special law course is to present the students' responses to the security challenges of the 21st century through the legal regulations of both Hungary and some key foreign countries. The effectiveness of criminal law regulation also depends to a large extent on other legislation and the current situation of the socio-economic environment, so the examination of the topic requires a complex approach. Topics include money laundering as a global economic security challenge, terrorist financing, the international arms trade, trade in military and dual-use goods, artificial intelligence and criminal law, blockchain technologies and cryptocurrencies as criminal challenges, and epidemic crises, as well as legislation and possible criminal responses to the migration crisis.

5. Military law

The teaching of the subject of military law also plays a key role in the basic training of military national security. This study is also part of the legal examination. The subject of the course is the following:

- application of international law and armed violence: *ius ad bellum* and *ius in bello*
- principles of international military law
- history of international military law, the development of the military law system (defining events, causes, conventions)
- the scope of international law of war, international and non-international armed conflicts and the consequence in terms of applicable rules
- What does it mean to be a warrior (combatant) who is eligible for this status?
- identification of military targets
- applicable combat equipment and methods of warfare
- protection of the civilian population during warfare
- specially protected persons and objects
- prisoners of war
- International Committee of the Red Cross and its tasks
- prosecution of cases of violation of the law of war before Hungarian judicial forums
- prosecution of international criminal judiciary for violations of the law of war

The importance of military law knowledge has also been highlighted by the recent South Slavic crisis and the current Russian–Ukrainian conflict (war). As their acquisition is a basic requirement within legal knowledge, we teach military law in basic training.

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Csaba Vida¹

The Education of Military Intelligence Analysis in Hungary

The author presents the education of military intelligence analysis in the last four decades, which he divided into three periods. These periods well illustrate the stages of development of intelligence analysis in Hungary. The result of this development process is the current education of military intelligence analysis, as the three periods are built on each other. Nowadays, the education of intelligence analysis takes place at the Institute of National Security of the National University of Public Service. This education-based program was approved in 2012 and later accredited. This program already presents the intelligence analysis in a complex way, and it is not just about analysing information and making reports, but about the complex problem-solving activities. The development of the current education began in 2009, but it is still going on because it needs to constantly adapt to the current development of theory and practice of intelligence analysis. The study presents the main elements of the education of intelligence analysis, as well as provides a future perspective on the direction in which the theory of intelligence analysis work needs to develop.

Keywords: national security, intelligence, intelligence analysis, education, theory of intelligence analysis

1. Introduction

The education of military intelligence has a long history in Hungary, but ten years ago, in 2012, a new area began, when the Institute of National Security was established at the same time as the National University of Public Service. With the new institute, there has also been a paradigm shift in the education of intelligence studies. Previously separated military and civilian intelligence training has been merged into one organisation, which provided new opportunities for further development on both sides. An opportunity was provided for the two sides (military and civilian) to learn from each other and later jointly develop intelligence studies, including the area

¹ PhD, Associate Professor, University of Public Service, Institute of Military National Security, e-mail: vida.csaba@uni-nke.hu

of intelligence analysis. Unfortunately, this was not always the case in the past. Nevertheless, since 2012, significant process has been made in the studies (and education) of intelligence, including intelligence analysis, during which the Institute has largely relied on previous results and knowledge.

Until 2012, military intelligence education had good and not so good periods. During the cold war period, there was general military reconnaissance training (military diplomacy), which is considered the forerunner of classical military intelligence education. From 1960, the Second Headquarters of the General Staff of the Hungarian People's Army (Magyar Néphadsereg Vezérkara 2. Csoportfőnöksége – MNVK 2. Csfség.), as the organisation of military intelligence closely cooperated with the Zrínyi Miklós Military Academy (Zrínyi Miklós Katonai Akadémia – ZMKA) in the education of members of the military intelligence. From the 1974–1975 academic year onwards, cooperation reached a new level, when the training of reconnaissance officers in the framework of the “D” faculty was based on 2 + 1 years for the first time and later 1 + 2 years. The specialised school, which was established on the basis of the Second Headquarters, had its own teaching staff, who taught the specialised (intelligence) subjects, while the professors of the ZMKA were involved in the general subject.² This education lasted for up to 23 academic years, because according to the 1993 Higher Education Act,³ the transformation of military higher education began, i.e. the transformation of the ZMKA into University. At that time, the Zrínyi Miklós University of National Defence (Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi Egyetem – ZMNE) was established. Education at the “D” faculty, i.e. the general military reconnaissance training program was no longer continued at the University.⁴ The first period of military intelligence education came to an end in 1997.

At the new University, the activities aimed at developing a specialisation in military intelligence began immediately. The main representatives of which were István Héjja and Jenő Izsa, who worked out the subjects on both sides of military intelligence, i.e. on the fields of intelligence and counterintelligence. The establishment of an independent Department of Military Intelligence was not possible, but the specialisation of military intelligence was established within the Department of Military Leadership at the Faculty of Military Sciences. The university-level general reconnaissance (military intelligence) education started at this Department, where intelligence experts were educated in five classes between 2002 and 2008. During this time continued efforts were made to establish an accredited education on BSc, MSc and PhD level. At the end of the 2000s, the above-mentioned colleagues succeeded in this endeavour, so in 2009 intelligence education could begin at the Military Intelligence Department of the Faculty of Military Sciences.⁵ The intelligence studies were generally offered only as correspondence education, as it served to train the personnel of the military intelligence services. In the meantime, there was a personnel change at the head of

² Gyula Nagy: A magyar katonai képzések története 1945–1990. *Nemzetbiztonsági Szemle*, 2, Special Issue 1 (2014). 58–67.

³ Act LXXX of 1993 on Higher Education.

⁴ István Héjja: A katonai nemzetbiztonsági képzések helyzete (1990–2012). *Nemzetbiztonsági Szemle*, 2, Special Issue 1 (2014). 10–24.

⁵ Héjja (2014): op. cit.

department, as Lajos Rácz took over the management of this education, where József Kis-Benedek played a key role. Lajos Rácz only held the office for a short time. A huge change took place again in 2012, when, among other things, the National University of Public Service was established on the foundations of the ZMNE. In parallel with the establishment of the National University of Public Service, the National Security Institute was founded, which is educating not only the members of the military intelligence services but also the civilian intelligences services.

The Department of Military Intelligence and the Department of Civilian Intelligence were created under the direct supervision of the Institute, which was later supplemented by the Department of Counterterrorism. In the last ten years, several changes have taken place, among others, the Department of Military Intelligence has been subordinated to the Faculty of Military Sciences and Officer Training, while other departments of the Institute continue their activities at the Faculty of Law Enforcement. This division did not help the development of the study of intelligence, as military and civilian education were again separated. In parallel, intelligence education split into a military and a civilian department, with the military intelligence education remaining at the intelligence department, while establishing a new department for the civilian intelligence education, i.e. the department of the civilian intelligence. However, there is only a shift in emphasis between the two, as in the case of civilian education, intelligence subjects are in a much smaller proportion than counterintelligence and law enforcement subjects.

So, military intelligence education has taken place since the establishment of the Institute of National Security, on the basis of the system that was developed over the last ten years, in which no significant change has taken place so far. In 2012, the modified plans of the Bachelor's and Master's degree programs in intelligence studies were modified, based on the training developed by István Héjja and Jenő Izsa at the end of the 2000s. After 2012, improvements were made only in relation to the given subjects. Thus, it can be stated that it has become necessary to update and develop different education programs (BSc and MSc), especially for different disciplines of intelligence gathering (further INTs). So it has become necessary not only to renew some subjects, but to develop new ones, especially for some INTs, such as Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) or Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT). Furthermore, the re-use of subjects such as the study of foreign armies is needed, especially for the military personnel. These old and new subjects are needed because intelligence education needs to be constantly renewed to keep up with the challenges of the age.

2. The field of the intelligence analysis

The education of intelligence analysis has always been part of military intelligence (previously general reconnaissance) education, but for a long time in the framework of information dissemination. So in this area, too, a kind of evolutionary process can be observed, during which three distinct periods can be outlined. All three periods are related to military intelligence, that is, to the intelligence analysis (previously information dissemination) operating within it and to some members of its staff.

The first period was during the “D” faculty, when a two-volume book was completed in the early 1980s, from which information dissemination activities were taught at the faculty. The title of the book written by Colonel János Kovács and Colonel Lajos Hajma is *Basics of the Dissemination Works I–II*,⁶ which was a school book (nowadays university textbook)⁷. Colonel Kovács later headed the MNVK 2 section as Major General, while he previously led the Information Service. The book, which is still a classified document, mainly dealt with the practical activities of information service. The documents were influenced by the theory of the former Soviet intelligence information activities. The original classification was top secret. In the field of education, until the abolition of the “D” faculty, i.e. until the mid-1990s, this was the basic literature of the intelligence information activities.

The second period began in 1996, when the Intelligence Analysis Directorate was established at the Military Intelligence Office of the Hungarian Republic (MK Katonai Felderítő Hivatal – MK KFH), where the theory of intelligence analysis work began. As early as the 1990s, the development of the transformation from information dissemination activities into intelligence analysis work began. The result of the theoretical research work was a book prepared by Colonel Lajos Rácz, published in 1999, entitled *Methodology of Analytical Work*.⁸ When he finished his book, Colonel Rácz worked at the Intelligence Analysis Directorate. It was later published at the Zrínyi Miklós University of National Defence as a university textbook. The education of intelligence analysis developed from this textbook, which determined the teaching of intelligence studies in the 2000s at the ZMNE, until 2009. The textbook was definitely a paradigm shift in the field because it laid the foundations for the Hungarian theory of intelligence analysis work. Rácz’s book was basically a theoretical and practical guide for those performing analyst work, in which there was a lot of useful advice. While, in addition to information theory, less emphasis was placed on the system and tasks of intelligence analysis. The advices were aimed at managing information gathering and reports, but in my opinion the most important and valuable part of this book is the idea of “added value”.⁹ Added value is a main result of intelligence analysis. From the book, students gained a basic understanding of the intelligence analysis work.

The third period began from 2009, when strategic intelligence (national security) education started to be modernised and put on a new footing to provide uniform education for members of military and civilian intelligence services. In the field of intelligence analysis, Csaba Vida started the modernisation and development, in which Lajos Rácz and József Kis-Benedek gave guidelines at the beginning. The development of the theory of intelligence analysis started with the subjects (field of research program) announced by Csaba Vida at the Doctoral School of Military Sciences, and then this experience was integrated into the education of intelligence studies, mainly the new subjects of intelligence analysis on both BSc and MSc levels.

⁶ *Tájékoztató munka alapjai I–II.*

⁷ This book can be found in the Central Military Archives of the Institute and Museum of Military History. The registration number is STKL-00542 and STKL-00582.

⁸ Lajos Rácz: *Az elemző-értékelő munka módszertana.* Budapest, MK KFH, 1999.

⁹ Rácz (1999): op. cit. 59.

The result of this research work was the development of revised education plans for 2012.¹⁰ The education of intelligence analysis has already continued at the Institute of National Security of the National University of Public Service.

From 2009, the central issue of the renewing of intelligence analysis education is to review and start the basic theoretical research of intelligence analysis, i.e. to systematise and place analysis work in the system of the strategic intelligence (national security). However, the research highlighted the need for basic research not only in the field of intelligence analysis, but also in the field of the strategic intelligence theories. One of the main findings was the fact that the basic research of strategic intelligence had to be carried out in parallel, one of the elements of which was the project at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in the framework of the Bolyai János Research Scholarship.¹¹ The basic research was aimed at defining the theory of strategic intelligence, the process of the intelligence cycle governing the strategic intelligence system, and the place and role of the strategic intelligence system in society (the security system of the state). Basic research had to be continued after the scholarship because many questions remained unsolved. These included defining the concept of the strategic intelligence theory. "Intelligence theories also include theories related to strategic intelligence, counterintelligence and intelligence analysis. Intelligence studies examine at an academic level the national security system, which means not only the activities but also its organisations (of intelligence services) as well as the knowledge that results from activities of the strategic intelligence. The aim of the strategic intelligence studies is to improve the operation and efficiency of the national security system, and examine and solve the problems that arise in the system in a theoretical way. The main function of the strategic intelligence is to protect the state's values and to promote its interests."¹² Within the strategic intelligence theories, it became necessary to renew scientific theories related to various INTs, which is ongoing, among others things, doctoral research has been launched at the Doctoral School of Military Sciences.

The theory of intelligence analysis is also located in this system, as the theory also provides the theoretical foundations, scientific-level processing and research of intelligence analysis that is part of the national security system, mainly strategic intelligence system. As part of the development of intelligence analysis theories, the result of research that began in 2009 were immediately integrated into the education of intelligence studies in subjects related to intelligence analysis. The results of the research have been published in various scientific publications, mostly in academic journal articles, which qualify as a mandatory and recommended literature in the education of intelligence analysis. Unfortunately, a separate textbook has not been made so far. The theory of intelligence analysis was also published in connection with the textbooks, notes, teaching aids related to the theory of strategic intelligence at the National University of Public Service, which mostly contain the theory represented by Csaba Vida, but also the research of Tamás Kenedli. The research of the intelligence

¹⁰ See <https://m2.mtmt.hu/gui2/?mode=browse¶ms=publication;2336180>; <https://m2.mtmt.hu/gui2/?mode=browse¶ms=publication;2336174>

¹¹ Bolyai János Kutatási Ösztöndíj.

¹² Csaba Vida: A nemzetbiztonsági elméletek alapjai. *Szakmai Szemle*, 20, no. 1 (2022). 17.

analysis work was carried out at the scientific level, for which purpose a PhD thesis was being written, during which several doctoral students launched their own research. So, including doctoral students, more and more studies are being published in various scientific journals.

A kind of analytical work has also appeared on the law enforcement side, which is limited to supporting criminal investigation work. These researches can be related to Szabolcs Mátyás, but he does not include the structural and non-structural methods that are used in the intelligence system to analyse the information. He does not use the knowledge of intelligence analysis for his theory. Intelligence analysis means much more in strategic intelligence (national security) theories than analysing information.

The research, which began in 2009, first identified the role of intelligence analysis in the strategic intelligence (national security) system, in which the intelligence cycle is a central player. The main task of strategic intelligence activity is informing decision-makers, which takes place within a cycle. Furthermore, the elements of the intelligence analysis have been expanded. The theory of intelligence analysis was no longer limited to the analysis and evaluation of information and the making of reports, but also to a much wider range of tasks, including the management of information gathering activities, including intelligence cycle, the operation of the information system, the database management and the support of intelligence operations. The six task systems of intelligence analysis cover the entire activity system, based on which it is a complex problem-solving process.

In case of intelligence analysis, the previous practical procedures and good advice have been replaced by the systematisation and application of structured and non-structured analytical methods and procedures. Structured methods range from formal logical thinking to complex methods, including analytical matrix. The procedures, among other things, provide an opportunity for such analytical work, which guarantee forecast and foresight for decision-makers. The development and systematisation of the intelligence analysis methods support the education of intelligence analysis. It is significantly increased and increasing the capabilities of intelligence analysts, thereby increasing the efficiency of the intelligence service, so the national security system.

The other elements of intelligence analysis support the effectiveness and success of intelligence activities. The analysts will only have the appropriate and necessary information if the information gathering activities of the data collection organisations are carried out effectively. It is not only in the interest of the data collection organisations to gather the necessary information, but rather of the intelligence analysts, as they can use it to produce reports for decision-makers. Effective management of the data collector organisations require knowledge of the capabilities of the various INTs, so an intelligence analysis approach to the INTs had to be part of the education. The success of intelligence analysis depends on the quality of the intelligence reports, therefore the basic element of its preparation is the accurate formal and content elements of the reports. It can be stated that an intelligence report must meet the requirements of a scientific work with one exception, i.e. without indicating the source. Without successful dissemination of reports, there is no effective intelligence analysis. U.S. President Truman also explained that “[World War II] taught

us the lesson – that we had to collect intelligence in a manner that would make the information available where it was needed and when it was wanted in an intelligent and understandable form. If it is not intelligent and understandable, it is useless”.¹³ Raw information was no longer enough. Thus, intelligence reports should be sent to those decision-makers, who need them for their decisions. So analysts also need to know the roles and responsibilities of users (decision-makers), because only then can an intelligence analysis process be successful. It can be seen that the education of the above elements of intelligence analysis contributes to the much more effective intelligence analysis of the intelligence services.

The teaching of the current theory of intelligence analysis work started on a trial basis at the Zrínyi Miklós University of National Defence in 2011. So in 2012, after processing experiences, it entered the new intelligence studies education at the National University of Public Service. At the University, this theory has been taught for ten years. Of course, it is under continuous development, so students get an ever deeper and wider system of knowledge about some of its elements. Based on the experience of teaching in the last ten years, it can be said that the knowledge gained by students has improved the intelligence analysis in the intelligence system, thus improving the support of the decisions of state political and military leaders.

The results of the intelligence analysis research carried out since 2009 have not yet been published together in a textbook, lecture note or monography, but the results can be reached in several studies published in various military scientific journals. Below are the studies written by Csaba Vida on the theory of intelligence analysis:

- Art or science? Thoughts on the intelligence analysis (*Felderítő Szemle*,¹⁴ 2012/3–4)
- Application of modern intelligence analysis in the national security system (*Hadtudomány*, 2013/1–2)
- Basics of intelligence analysis (*Felderítő Szemle*, 2013/3)
- Simple intelligence analysis methods I. Use of patterns in the analysis (*Felderítő Szemle*, 2014/2)
- Simple intelligence analysis methods II. Anomaly Analysis (*Felderítő Szemle*, 2015/1)
- Support of the intelligence operations by the Intelligence Analysis The sixth task of the Intelligence Analysis (*Felderítő Szemle*, 2015/4)
- Intelligence analysis (*National Security Review*, 2016/1)
- An intelligence analyst approach to the intelligence disciplines. How to use the analysts intelligence information (*Felderítő Szemle*, 2016/3)
- Product of the intelligence analysts – making of the intelligence reports (*Felderítő Szemle*, 2017/3–4)
- Intelligence analysis in the 21st century. New challenges require new methods. (*Válogatás a magyar katonai felderítés és hírszerzés történetéből*, 2018)
- Importance of the forecast in the intelligence (*Felderítő Szemle*, 2021/4)

¹³ Kristan J. Wheaton – Michael T. Beerbower: Towards a New Definition of Intelligence. *Stanford Law and Policy Review*, 17, no. 2 (2006). 322–323.

¹⁴ *Felderítő Szemle* [Reconnaissance Review], it is a military scientific magazine of the Military National Security Service.

3. Further development of intelligence analysis

Of course, the development of the theory and teaching of intelligence analysis has not been completed in the last ten years, as there are many areas that still need to be developed. One example of this is the study conducted at the end of 2021, which examines the possibility of forecasting for intelligence analysis. In addition, the development and research of structured and unstructured information analytical procedures will continue. As a result, more and more procedures are available to analysts to improve the quality of the products of analyst work. Furthermore, the emergence of new INTs, such as the acquisition of information from media intelligence (SOCMINT), and the use of new technologies, such as artificial intelligence, require further research. Thus, much work remains to be done over the next ten years to develop the theory of intelligence analysis and its education.

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György Zoltán Bács¹

National Security and Higher Education – Challenges, Risks and Threats

Globalisation raises the risk of unwanted leaks of information from higher education institutions and the use of the scientific results of one country for hostile purposes by another one. The national interests to be protected have their dynamics so national security has to also be in permanent development. Networking as a part of HUMINT has a growing importance among students and the teaching staff as well. The protective measures need urgent upgrading in order to prevent any possible risk on behalf of state and non-state actors. As the students are the most exposed to different radical ideas, the preventive measures have to be focused on them. It is also important to keep an eye on the laboratories accessible at the higher education institutions where electronic, technical and chemical tools and devices can be illegally elaborated for illicit purposes.

Keywords: networking, HUMINT, upgrading the protective measures

1. National security issues and globalisation

One of the most important side effects of globalisation is the growth of factors challenging the global economic, social, political and security status quo. On the one hand, it is the consequence of the boosted will of every country to make their interest prevail. On the other hand, it is also a consequence of the limited and shrinking space where these interests can be represented without affecting the interests of others. If one wants to deepen in this problem, she or he also has to consider the differences between the tools of the different countries they have access to make their interests respected. The differences are the imminent result of the disparity in the level of development of the countries. The higher is the level of development the more sophisticated and more expensive the tools can be. Some countries have

¹ PhD, Assistant Lecturer, University of Public Service, Department of Counterterrorism, e-mail: bacs.zoltan.gyorgy@uni-nke.hu

developed their own electronic and other technical devices for surveillance and gathering data and information while others have to spend significant amounts of money to procure less sophisticated devices, or to find the accessible (i.e. corruptible) human resources to satisfy the information requests.

Another side effect of globalisation in the field of national security is that oscillations in the status quo in any part of the world can provoke unforeseen processes anywhere, even in the most remoted parts. The phenomena provoking oscillations in the status quo, includes the same factors we usually mention as migration-generating ones and as factors leading to radicalisation.

Thus, the national security of every country is dynamic and its dynamism depends on the complex impact of factors concerning the local, bilateral, multilateral, sub-regional, regional, intercontinental and at least global levels of economic, social and political processes.

What does it have in common with higher education? To obtain information from abroad and from national sources as well, it is not always necessary to use expensive devices. It is rather cheaper to use interpersonal contacts, to meet interesting and important people and maintain contact with them for a long time. This is usually called networking. One of the best places for that purpose is any institution of higher education in any country. Of course, it is an important task to choose the institution where gathering information is not so complicated from the point of view of contacting students and staff members, lecturers, researchers and professors as a source of valuable information. The higher education institutions can be the experimental field for HUMINT at the level of the students and an important operational field at the level of the staff with a higher scientific ranking.

2. Higher education as a part of the national security response to current challenges

It is evident the challenges change all the time, therefore national security as a whole, in its complexity has to change. It is a process of permanent adaptation to the progressing circumstances. This adaptation is not an option, it is necessary and it equally refers to the fields of economic, social and defence policy, legislation and law enforcement. The adaptation in the social field includes all levels of education, beginning from kindergarten, preliminary or ground schools, secondary schools, colleges and all the institutions of higher education. There are several dozens of publications about the role of the scholar system in the preparation of the society to face new threats and perhaps a little one about the role of higher education as a theatre of operations. What does it mean? Without any doubt, the intelligence and counterintelligence services are active in all segments of the life of every given country also beyond their borders. Subsequently, operations of intelligence and counterintelligence might be carried out in higher education institutions, as well. The activities of these services include pointing out some potential contacts among the students and the academic staff. The higher education institutions give a big advantage to the national security

services once they can easily recruit people to use them for a while or for as long as possible as a source of information or even as collaborators or trusted persons in an academic institution. Being close or even participate immediately in the academic activities has other advantages, as well. Thus, the national security services have direct and mostly unlimited access to the academic materials; they can study the methods of training and academic requirements and also have access to the technical devices used in the process of training. This complex knowledge might be copied in countries with less opportunities and resources.

These goals can be achieved openly, and legally within the frameworks of inter-institutional bilateral or multilateral agreements. At the same time, none of the national security services, either the intelligence or the counterintelligence should leave this area unattended. The intelligence of the sending country can collect valuable data for different purposes through the students and the counterintelligence of the same sending country should prevent the intents of the hosting country's security services to approach the foreign nationals. On the other side, the intelligence of the hosting country has to follow the studies of the foreign students, whether they can have valuable information on the sending country's economic, political, defence, social and other issues. Sometimes, the foreign students can have high-ranking contacts back home through their families, potentially useful for building and developing relations between two countries.

Counterintelligence has multiple tasks.² First, it must take care of the pre-screening of the foreign students who want to study in the hosting country. This task is not so easy. There are licensed private recruiting enterprises whose business is to attract the maximum possible amount of students from abroad. Obviously, the profit of the recruiting companies has two sources: the payments of the recruited students for the admittance exams, and if they are admitted, the admitting academic institution pays a certain part of the tuition fee for every semester to the recruiting company once the student passes the semestral inscription. The requirements of documents are limited to the basic ones: documents about the finished secondary school, certification that the applicant does not have criminal records, medical certificate of vaccination and the absence of epidemiological threats. It could work almost perfectly in the case of countries where the emission of these documents is strongly controlled and the country has a highly reliable registration system. That is the problem. Usually, a large number of the potential students are from countries with serious problems of governability, high levels of corruption, presence of organised criminal groups and national and international terrorist organisations, etc. In addition to these there are other migration-generating factors, too. Thus, the counterintelligence of the hosting country hardly has the tools for preliminary background checking, for double-checking the validity of the presented documents. This is the point why counterintelligence must have active cooperation with the structural unit of every faculty dealing with the foreign students' issues directly, or through the vice dean

² See 1995. évi CXXV. törvény a nemzetbiztonsági szolgálatokról [Act CXXV of 1995 on National Security Services].

responsible for academic affairs. There is no need to underline that the contact persons have to be carefully chosen.

Another challenge is the appropriate protection of laboratories mostly where chemical, biological or even nuclear experiments take place. The protection should not be trusted to the security service of the academic institution but must be under strict control by the national institutions responsible for biological, chemical and nuclear technologies. The relevant protocols have to be observed and the measures in case of any emergency must be taught to the personnel and the students. The practical exercises should not be limited to the process of evacuation in case of fire but must include the tasks and the actions of every person in the given institution in any emergency.

3. State and non-state actors as a security risk

An emergency can occur even during the ordinary training program accidentally, without any hostile background. But, what if an emergency is provoked on purpose? What if we are targeted by a terrorist act?³ There are well-elaborated protocols in case a terrorist attack has already taken place. In order to prevent or to be better prepared, if such an incident happens, we have to analyse why we are a target for the terrorists? What do we have in higher education that attracts the attention of the terrorists? Anything applicable as a weapon or for preparing a weapon capable to harm a significant group of persons or destroy entirely or partially material valuables attracts the terrorists' attention. Once the higher education institution disposes of laboratories for different experiments, terrorists could use them for their own purposes. They could develop substances, devices and other parts for bombs, explosives and ignition mechanisms, remote controllers for electronic ignition or neutralisation of electronic protection like jammers, etc.

Access to electronics laboratories can make them easier to interfere with the local and outer networks, alter the databases, drain important and sensible data to uncontrolled data storage, hide and encrypt their communication, misuse the institution's resources for their own goals. The interference in the institution's network and through that in the national network of higher education system would give the chance to alter the database content whenever and wherever it is necessary for them. Are we prepared for this kind of hostile activity? Are our systems protected up-to-date? Are the protection systems revised, assessed and developed in due time?

Individuals or groups, following the violent way of terrorism, perpetrate usually the acts described above. They can be state actors and non-state actors, as well. As the experience of the last decades proves it, Hungary has not been a primary target for either terrorist groups or other non-state actors. The violent acts, which took place in Hungary, were not perpetrated as acts of classic foreign or national terrorism. These were just crimes using the method of terrorism. In its turn, the Hungarian foreign policy has been keeping the country far beyond the collision of

³ See Marie-Helen Maras: *A terrorizmus elmélete és gyakorlata*. Budapest, Antall József Tudásközpont, 2016.

different interests. This attitude has prevented the outbursts of conflicts with states supporting terrorism or with their proxies. According to the National Security Strategy of Hungary of 2020, our country has no hostilities with any country; therefore, it is hardly believable that any government would send groups specialised in subversive operations under the actual status quo.

4. Security risk at the institutions of higher education during the Ukrainian–Russian conflict time

The only feasible threat in our region is the armed conflict initiated by the Government of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Under the circumstances of this wide-scale military operation – a factual war – the institutions of higher education have to be prepared to face some unexpected phenomena. Young people can have different opinions regarding the events on the Ukrainian–Russian frontline and there is a chance that different groups of students may undertake some actions to express their opinion. These expressions can go beyond peaceful protest even within the perimeters of universities or other institutions. As soon as these acts become violent, it is already a risk for national security, which needs some measures to be taken urgently.⁴ The national security services have to elaborate the necessary protocols for such cases including the tightening control of the laboratories and workshops, and applying very strict rules for registering hazardous materials.

Another source of risk is that in a situation when the discrepancies between the opinions of different groups of students (and staff) can grow, these can lead to the spontaneous formation of groups. The vulnerability of the students is imminent. Any “self-proposed leader” might convert the community with united opinion into a community of joint actions. This seemingly lone influencer might be a well-prepared conspired manipulator, a “mole”, representing interests opposite to the national security interests of Hungary. This person might be a member of a national or international organised crime syndicate or a member of a proxy organisation, one of the existing Private Military Companies, or might be an operative officer of a special service of an unknown country. That is a clear threat.

5. Students’ groups and organisations as a possible hotbed for spreading unfriendly views

Any community unites people with different views. Among them, the differences may emerge based upon their family background, cultural affiliation, religion, ethnicity, and – of course – political platforms and affiliation. All these factors play an important

⁴ Concerning the problems of measures see Péter Nyeste – Ferenc Szendrei: *A bűnügyi hírszerzés kézikönyve*. Budapest, Dialóg Campus, 2019. 6.

role in building a real community of students, tolerant of each other, accepting and respecting the differences and trusting in the goodwill of each other. Under unfavourable conditions, the same factors can boost hostilities, intolerant behaviour, forming of groups or fractions with opposite views to each other. In extreme cases, nobody excludes clashes and violent actions. It is a permanent challenge that can escalate into a risk if the external conditions change. Internal critical situations in the social, political and economic fields of the home countries of the students or clashes on the borders – for example, between India and the People’s Republic of China, between India and Pakistan, or the civil war in the Middle East – can radicalise students very quickly. The same has happened recently as the Russian Government unilaterally started military operations against Ukraine. Once radicalised the students may not refrain from the active expression of their positions. When the first violent action takes place, the situation converts into a real threat that needs urgent measures from the national security structures. At what level are we prepared? Do we have the necessary sources of information and tools for a reaction? Is it possible to prevent radicalisation and escalation amongst the students? The answer is affirmative. The precondition of our successful activities in this field is the permanent contact and exchange of information with the competent leaders of the universities, colleges, and meaningful dialogue with the students using the appropriate conspirative technics. We should be able to respond to the questions, the answer to which the students cannot find alone. Thus, we can prevent the spreading of fake news, rumours, incompetent explanations of important problems or even the spreading of false information or misinterpretation on purpose. Through these conversations and students’ forums, we can have access to information, which can help us discover the source(s) and the mechanism of spreading information opposite to our interests, or even incompatible with our national security doctrine.

6. Recruiting amongst the students

During the last years, another task of the national security structures in institutions of higher education has obtained major importance. If we look at the age of persons involved in terrorist acts or supporting activities in the U.K., we see that between 2001 and 2021 51% of the people arrested for terrorist-related activities were under 30 years of age, and 4% under 18.⁵ It is also interesting that according to these statistics, 90% of the arrested were male and 10% were female.⁶ This proportion has remained throughout the twenty years long period. The conclusion is clear: young people are the most vulnerable and mostly exposed to intentional, purposeful manipulation. The reasons are also clear once young generations are gathered in a relatively small space they live a vivid social life, always communicating with each other even across borders. They are always hanging on the global networks, having an interest in the

⁵ Home Office: *Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: financial year ending March 2021*. Table A.10. 10 June 2021; see also Grahame Allen – Megan Harding: *Terrorism in Great Britain: The statistics*. *House of Commons Library*, 14 October 2021. 15.

⁶ Allen–Harding (2021): op. cit.

processes of the world surrounding them, consuming news without due criticism and appropriate knowledge to sort it. Due to the overwhelming information and the relative lack of experience and knowledge, these youngsters hardly notice the contradictory elements in different narratives, they can hardly filter the real news from the fake ones, the true information from the targeted manipulation. The phenomenon causing alert in case of facing contradictory information is called cognitive dissonance and it provokes criticism on behalf of the more experienced social groups. This is another example why the national security of the hosting country have a special responsibility to prevent the young people especially at the universities from being manipulated for hostile, terrorist or criminal purposes.

On the other side, these groups of youngsters are the ideal targets for recruiting for any service, domestic or adverse. It is clear that for any recruiting the knowing of the specific human and professional background at a high professional level before making the first contact is indispensable. The same knowledge, skills and practices become even more important when the task is to filter out the adverse recruiters or operatives among the students.

These tasks would be difficult to implement without regular and reliable contacts among the academic and administrative personnel of the higher education institution(s). Those members of the staff, who have an appropriate personal attitude and approach to the students as individuals gaining their trust, can be the most useful for the national security goals. Obviously, the old fashioned teaching attitude of playing the role of “Caesar of the Cathedra” instead of being a partner of the students up to a certain point, is counterproductive. Therefore, choosing the best approach to the student’s personality has vital importance to help them through a possible turning point of their lives.

7. Preventing infiltration into scientific structures

There is another latent problem with roots in higher education. There are many different studies on the stealthy penetration and integration of organised crime into the economic life of the United States in the 1930s. Another amount of studies and publications present how the organised crime syndicates approached and got close to the highest levels of power.

In recent years, we have also witnessed the change of paradigm of terrorism, how terrorist organisations have changed their “Modus Operandi” depending on the defensive capabilities of different countries – fallen or strong. In the fallen countries, with unsolvable problems of governance, the terrorist organisations and/or their local representatives maintain violent attacks as the main tool to gain power. On the other side, in the strong countries, where along the last decades despite numerous and extremely violent terrorist acts, did not achieve any other result than strengthening the national security services and the collaboration between them, terrorist organisations have taken a different way to achieve the same goals. Thwarting terrorism has become one of the common goals of the countries sharing democratic values. As terrorism develops its methods, we have to be aware of the

threat of these changes. One of the fields where terrorism may intend to penetrate and infiltrate as deeply as it can is scientific life, mostly in the applied sciences such as physics, electronics, cybernetics, microbiology, virology, chemistry and engineering. It is clear, that these are the most useful fields, where the results of the research and experiments can be immediately applied for building new destructive materials, substances, devices and organisms. The best access point to the scientific results is participation in the process of research. If a well-embedded covert terrorist has a long-term access to the results of scientific researches and even actively participates in these works, he/she and the organisation behind him/her will acquire more reliable and applicable results to be used for terrorist purposes. How can the terrorists get there? On the one hand, terrorist organisations – when their financial resources afforded it – hired scientists and built their own laboratories. Among the scientists serving terrorists there were graduates of many distinguished and high-ranked institutions. Some scientists were kidnapped by the terrorists just to do some jobs for them. Although the terrorist engineers succeeded to develop a large variety of devices at their not so well-equipped laboratories, scientific development in many fields has always been faster. The financial resources have become much smaller, so the cost-effectiveness of the research and the violent acts using explosives and combine the method with the participation of many smaller groups at the same time in different places became very low. Consequently, there are two conclusions. The first of them is that terrorist organisations have no chance to take power by violent terrorist acts, by force through intimidation of the people in the countries with strong governmental structure and democratic institutions. The second conclusion is that if terrorist organisations still want to seize power they must act slowly, penetrating unnoticed into the social, economic, political and executive structures.

The terrorists have to have a very low profile in society, must become modest and recognised members of the communities, must approach the most vulnerable social groups by helping them bringing assistance in their daily problems, and must gain their trust to be their representatives in the local governments and higher as soon as possible. In other terms: the terrorist can get into political power from inside the society, without violence, by the common will of the voters, following the example of the organised crime syndicates in the U. S. in the 1920s and 1930s. This is the essence of the new paradigm of terrorist organisations.

The second conclusion: to consolidate their influence in the field of education and science, terrorist organisations must infiltrate the main centres: the prestigious universities, colleges, scientific research centres and institutes, etc. The most secure way to long-term success is – besides financing targeted research through different foundations – the long-time participation in the institutional and scientific life through permanent students' groups, maintaining contacts with the old "buds", cooperation with partner institutions abroad, which may be under the influence of any terrorist organisation or group. The higher education centres usually have problems with their financial background. As soon as this problem approaches its solution from sources outside the centre, the outer influence will have growing importance. This might be a high risk or even a threat to national security and the protection of national interests in different fields.

8. Conclusions

The socio-economic development of every society depends not only on the subject taught at the educational centres, the teaching methods, or the scientific level and performance of the academic staff, but progress also depends on the conditions and circumstances the state administration can provide. The safe conditions to be guaranteed by the national security structures and other governmental bodies for the higher education institutions are vital. The importance of safety is constantly growing as the political and security challenges are in permanent change. Sometimes, even the key role-players in the training of the new generations of scientific researchers are not fully aware of their own roles and the threats they face. If this paper did not do anything else than draw the attention of some competent persons to some aspects of national security in higher education, it is worth the time and effort.

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