

Rethinking Global Citizenship and Sustainability

Eight Working Hypotheses

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Introduction

As the UNESCO Chair in Global Learning and Global Citizenship Education at UCLA and as an Honorary Fellow of the Comparative and International Education Society (CIES), it is a pleasure to present here some of the working hypotheses and arguments on global citizenship and sustainability that I have presented in books on the subject (Torres, 1998; 2017).²

These hypotheses, once they have been tested through logical and empirical analysis, may eventually become a theory. For the Frankfurt Schools theorists, one criterion for a critical theory is that it be *explanatory*, *practical*, and *normative*. For Horkheimer, a theory is also *critical* to the extent it seeks human emancipation, “to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them” (Horkheimer, 1982, p. 244).

As background for those who are unfamiliar with my work, my theoretical research focuses on: the relationship between education, culture and power; the interrelationships of economic, political and cultural spheres; and the multiple and contradictory dynamics of power that make the field of education one of continual conflict and struggle. My work, if

1 Presentation to the panel of Honorary Fellows of CIES, 2019 Annual CIES Conference, San Francisco, April 17, 2019.

2 The books were translated into several languages. The *Theoretical and Empirical Foundations of Critical Global Citizenship Education* was translated into Portuguese in 2023 and into Chinese in 2025 (with a new preface for this edition).

it can be summarised in a sentence, studies the relationships between education and power at multiple levels of interaction.

The concepts of Global Citizenship Education and Sustainability are intimately related to the narrative constructed by the *Millennium Development Goals* (United Nations, 2000), the *Global Education First Initiative* of UN Secretary General Ban-Ki-moon (United Nations, 2012) and the *Sustainable Development Goals* (SDG) (United Nations, 2015), the latter representing synthesis of and improvement on the two previous documents. As I see it, the SDG represents the first global utopia of the 21st century.

First working hypothesis

There is an elective affinity between global citizenship and sustainability.

Weber uses the notion of elective affinity in *The Protestant Ethic* but it appears also in several of his other writings, mainly those concerning sociology of religion. Michael Löwy identifies *elective affinity* as a process through which two cultural forms (religious, intellectual, political or economic) that have certain analogies, intimate kinships or meaning affinities can enter into a relationship of reciprocal attraction and influence, mutual selection, active convergence and mutual reinforcement (Löwy, 1989). For the SDG 4.7 this argument is central in defending the constellation of both concepts as being intimately related, and the convenience of facilitating the implementation of one also fully implements the other.

Second working hypothesis

*This hypothesis, following a political sociology of education, emphasises that without a democratic state we cannot have democratic education, bearing in mind the importance of democracy in the construction of citizenship.*³

The *Global Education First Initiative* (GEFI) emerged in 2012 as the first ever Educational Initiative of a UN Secretary to link access (education for all), quality of education and global citizenship as the lynchpins that provide legitimacy to the enterprise as a whole. It emerged as a UN narrative confronting the perceived acceleration in the fragmentation of multilateralism, in the changes that were produced by the different weaves of globalisation, and the increasing risk (the risk society theory) that was amplified by the new war technologies with possible catastrophic implications for the planet. The SDG may have been attempting – but perhaps so far has failed – to highlight the crisis in the post-war societies confronting the tensions between Growth and Sustainability. In particular, fossil-fuel oriented economic growth and the limits of sustainability for the planet, as well as the destabilisation of ecosystems.

It is imperative to relate democratic education to multiculturalism and citizenship in the digital culture era given hybrid cultures coexisting in the contexts of multiple globalisations. In terms of the politics of culture and education, there is an urgent need to unpack and criticise the principles of neoliberalism's *new common sense* in education (Morrow &

3 I highlighted the various models of democracy, including socialist democracy, in my book (Torres, 1990).

Torres, 2013; Torres, 2011).⁴ At his untimely death, Freire had been trying to articulate his criticism of liberal multiculturalism with his caustic critique of neoliberalism – what he called the “new evil of the world today” (Torres, 2014)⁵ – and a promise of ecopedagogy (Misiaszek & Torres, 2019).

Third working hypothesis

Education is not only about human capital formation.

An education for emancipation may be based on the post-colonial ethics of emancipation. Without this kind of education, it would be very difficult to construct an education in global citizenship linked to a model of sustainability. Hence the work of Paulo Freire and many other critical scholars in education is emblematic here. Freire’s postcolonial positions were based on his consideration of education as an ethics of love. Enrique Dussel discussed the concept of emancipation as part of a non-Eurocentric liberation ethics, viewing the ‘other’ as oppressed, where the “majority of the humanity finds itself sunk into ‘poverty’, unhappiness, suffering, domination, and/or exclusion” (Meca & Prévos, 1997). It is in this context that Dussel turns to Freire’s concept of conscientisation as a description of the processes within which liberation ethics unfold not only in the consciousness of the oppressed, but also in those who have shared experiences with the dominated and/or excluded. Freedom, democracy and critical participation are key ideas that initially constituted the core of Freire’s pedagogy of love and education as a post-colonial ethic.

Fourth working hypothesis

We cannot have democratic education until we recognise the need to account for the DNA of globalisation; and that the crucial issue of these unsettling times is diversity.

Within the context of globalisation, we shall learn how to cross the lines of diversity. In order to account for diversity, many theories, methodologies and practices have been developed, one of the most prominent of which, albeit not the only one, is multiculturalism; a process that is now confronting a serial crisis of identity, praxis and relevance. We shall then construct a model of global citizenship multicultural education based on a concept of social justice education if we want to protect the planet, our Mother Earth, or *la Pachamama* and protect people’s lives as well (Tarozzi & Torres, 2016).⁶

⁴ The work of Morrow and Torres was translated into Chinese, second edition, into Japanese in 2015 and into Spanish in 2016.

⁵ This book received the American Association for Adult and Continuing Education (AAACE) Cyril O. Houle Award for Outstanding Literature in Adult Education in 2015. Translation into Chinese by Pro-Ed Publishing Company, Taipei, Taiwan, 2017, p. xxv.

⁶ Translated into Chinese by the Centre for Global Citizenship Education, National Chiao Tung University (2019) Hsinchu, Taiwan (with a new preface for this edition).

Fifth working hypothesis

Reclaiming citizenship is a requirement for reclaiming sustainability.

This hypothesis focuses on the current situation in the USA. Allow me to provide a bit of context: there was a debate in the United States about whether or not the 2020 Census should include a question on the citizenship of the respondents. The Trump administration was the driving force behind this question, which was rejected by civic organisations, the democratic party, demographers, etc. It was claimed, with good reason, that such a question would cause an undercount of the population. The most commonly discussed consequences of an undercount would have been its effect on congressional districts and federal funding, which would have affected federal programmes, such as Medicaid, Section 8 Housing, and school lunch programmes.

Adam Serwer, a staff writer at *The Atlantic*, in a book entitled *The Cruelty Is the Point. The Past, Present, and Future of Trump's America* writes that President Trump and his supporters find community by rejoicing in the suffering of those they hate and fear. Concluding the book with the assertion that “once malice is embraced as a virtue, it is impossible to contain” (Serwer, 2021).

California, where I live, is a very liberal state in the Union, and there are many sanctuary cities that protect immigrants. There are many ‘dreamers’ and undocumented students in our schools and universities who are at risk when one considers the racist position of the Trump administration with regard to immigration. There is no question that many documented immigrants – were there to have been a citizenship question in the census – would have been concerned. Even more so given that this question had not been piloted properly because it was introduced late in the planning of the census. In short, this question would have resulted in underestimating a population of more than 24 million people.

As an example of the problem, at UCLA there is a very progressive, social justice-oriented teacher education programme that works to bring more people of colour into higher education, creating better educational and economic opportunities. Yet, many on that programme refuse to use the term *citizenship* because it is seen as exclusionary and creates a risk that people who are not legally in the country may not find either our UCLA programmes or the teachers in the classrooms welcoming to people of colour. They use alternative terms like *civic engagement*, which is one of the outcomes of proper citizenship practices.

My perspective is different: we need to reclaim the concept of citizenship but unpack these ideas in other ways than simply through status and role. I have written extensively that citizenship is about civic minimums and civic virtues, and requires an understanding of rights and responsibilities. One of the main responsibilities, and it is implemented in our programmes, is to look at citizenship as civic engagement. I could not agree more with this need for advocacy of civic engagement, but my working hypothesis postulates that we need to reclaim the notion of citizenship within the context of global and local politics and not leave it to be appropriated by conservative groups, the Alt-right, populist authoritarian politics or the politics of racial division and hatred in this country. Without reclaiming the concept of citizenship at a local level, we cannot progress towards global citizenship at a global level, and we will miss an incredible opportunity to link citizenship with multiculturalism, social justice education and sustainable development.

Sixth working hypothesis

The crises of late modern societies can be understood as crises of desynchronisation.

Following the work of the Jena Group on Social Theory,⁷ we shall consider the tensions and contradictions in the construction of global citizenship and sustainability. Late modernity is based on the principle of acceleration. According to acceleration theory, the essential characteristic of modern societies is that they are only capable of stabilising themselves dynamically; that is, they are structurally dependent on growth, acceleration and increases in innovation in order to reproduce the *status quo* as far as their socioeconomic structures and basic institutions are concerned (Rosa, 2010; 2019). Arising from this reality is a progressive 'logic of escalation', a logic that causes the promise of cultural progress so closely associated with this complex of increase and escalation to become progressively irrelevant when considering the structural mechanisms of compulsion. Given that time as such cannot be stretched or extended, only compressed, the mechanisms of increase and escalation function as compulsions to accelerate to an ever-increasing degree.

This becomes problematic only (and particularly) where the processes of desynchronisation between faster and slower elements of society are revealed. Desynchronisation rests on the observation that not all social strata or spheres are equally fit for acceleration; that is, are capable of it or willing to be accelerated, so that frictions and tensions emerge at certain intersections of accelerating and acceleration-resistant or resistive areas. From this perspective, the crises of late modern societies can be understood as crises of desynchronisation:

(1) The ecological crisis appears as desynchronisation between natural cycles and the socially produced pace of commodity consumption: natural resources reproduce more slowly than they are consumed by industry, while the emissions of toxic substances occur too quickly for natural decomposition to compensate.

(2) The crisis of democracy, which can be seen particularly (but not only) in the early industrialised countries and manifests itself in lower overall voter turnout, the growth in protest voting and new extra-parliamentary oppositional movements, can be read as the result of de-synchronisation between the time it takes for democratic will formation and decision-making on one side, and for market-generated pressure to cause political decisions quickly on the other.

(3) One explanatory factor for the global financial and economic crisis that has been unfolding since 2008 can be found in the fact that the velocities of the financial and commodity markets – or more precisely, of financial market transactions that can be conducted in a digital form in fractions of a second – and the production and consumption of goods in the 'real economy' have diverged dramatically.

(4) Finally, the psychological crisis of developed societies that finds expression in the widespread diagnoses of burnout and depression, as well as the visible increase in symptoms

⁷ The *Structural Change of Property* series by S. van Dyk, T. Reitz and H. Rosa emerged from the Collaborative Research Centre 294, "Structural Change of Property", funded by the German Research Foundation. It brings together outstanding academic work on the history, present and future of property from an interdisciplinary perspective. It assumes that the institution of private property is coming under increasing pressure in the face of intensified distribution conflicts, new digital productive forces and the crises of social and ecological reproduction and is confronted with alternatives. See, for example, Dörre (2024).

of anxiety and stress, can be interpreted as a consequence of the desynchronisation of the mind's 'own time' (*Eigenzeit*) and the speed of social processes. In all these cases we thus seem to be dealing with a temporally specific overburdening of the slower systems.

Growth, competition and acceleration, moreover, are conceptually and empirically connected to such a degree that the latter cannot be decoupled from either of the former. Additionally, slowness does not seem to be an end as such to us either: neither are acceleration intrinsically 'bad' nor deceleration in itself 'good'; from no conceivable perspective, can deceleration be established as a normative criterion. Therefore, deceleration as a goal is neither possible nor desirable.

Seventh working hypothesis

If Social Justice Education is the solution, what is the problem? The problem is the construction of subjectivities under capitalism, or two moral imaginaries (or models of subjectivity, or regimes of justification), one based on the Staatsvolk (national citizens) another on the Marktsvolk (market citizens).

The work of Wolfgang Streeck is central in providing a rational argument for the construction of subjectivities under capitalism as a central problem for education, including national and global citizenship and sustainability (Streeck, 2020; 2024). There is a widespread sense today that capitalism is in critical condition, more so than at any time since the end of the Second World War. Looking back, the crash of 2008 was only the latest in a long sequence of political and economic disorders that began with the end of post-war prosperity in the mid-1970s. Successive crises have proved to be increasingly severe, spreading more widely and rapidly through an ever more interconnected global economy. Global inflation in the 1970s was followed by rising public debt in the 1980s, and fiscal consolidation in the 1990s was accompanied by a steep increase in private-sector indebtedness.

Crisis symptoms are many, but prominent among them are three long-term trends. The first is a persistent decline in the rate of economic growth, recently aggravated by the events of 2008. The second, which is associated with the first, is an equally persistent rise in overall indebtedness in leading capitalist states, where governments, private households and non-financial as well as financial firms have, over forty years, continued to pile up financial obligations. Third, economic inequality, in terms of both income and wealth, has been on the ascent for several decades now, alongside rising debt and declining growth (Streeck, 2014). Streeck tells us that the aftershocks in Europe are tearing the continent apart (Mason, 2015). This affects the way subjectivity is constructed in capitalism. Alienation is the result of a damaged subjectivity.

While the question is: how has human subjectivity changed with capitalism? It is less about how our *understanding* of 'subjectivity' has changed under capitalism (e.g. that the subject object paradigm became one with Hegel and Fichte) but rather how capitalism has reshaped subjectivity, and how it has created the possessive individualism that dominates markets and politics.

Eighth hypothesis

Global Citizenship Education is an intervention in search of a theory. But given the push from diverse forces at the local level, a comprehensive holistic theory of GCE may not be possible or even desirable. The alternative is to create a metatheory of citizenship education and sustainability.

We have been working on a metatheory that I have called the *global commons*, which attempts to address the interrelation between systems dynamic self-stabilisation and the legitimisation principles of modern societies. Global commons are defined by three basic propositions. The first is that our planet is our only home, and we have to protect it through global citizenship and sustainable development education, moving from diagnosis and denunciation into action and policy implementation.

The second is that global commons are predicated on the idea that global peace is an intangible cultural good of humanity with immaterial value. Global peace is a treasure of humanity.

The third is that global commons are predicated on the need to find ways that people who are all equal can manage to live together democratically in an increasingly diverse world, seeking to fulfil their individual and cultural interests, and achieving their inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

To summarise all these working hypotheses, let us recall the words of Karl Marx in the *Grundrisse. Foundations of a Critique of Political Economy*:

“The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse. It appears in the process of thinking, therefore, as a process of concentration, as a result, not as a point of departure, even though it is the point of departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for observation [*Anschauung*] and conception (Marx, 1973).”

Following a reading of Marx, Hartmut Rosa’s recent work on a theory of resonance indicates the way in which we should understand the complexities of our late modernity. Let us assume that resonance and alienation are basic categories for a theory on the relationship with the world, which is exactly what these hypotheses on global citizenship education and sustainability would like to achieve: preservation of the natural world, and change from the social relationships of domination.

For my part, considering all these complexities, I can only quote the lyrics of Milton Nascimento, “Now my life just fits in the palm of my passion” (Nascimento et al., 1978).

2025 Postscript: The Second Trump Administration

This postscript seeks to show the validity of what was argued in the first part of this article written back in 2019, and how it reflects the ways that its original content can be reprised or modified for this second administration. Which measures from the second Trump administration deal with diversity and migration? And how do the intertwining of politics and influence trading affect civic engagement and expressions in the USA?

Six years have elapsed since I wrote – but did not publish – the first part of this article commemorating my election as an Honorary Fellow of the CIES at one of its meetings in San Francisco. Many of the hypotheses I advanced in 2019 included observations on the first Trump administration and its relationship with globalisation.

Globalisation is the product of the emergence of a global economy, an expansion of transnational linkages between economic units creating new forms of collective decision making, development of intergovernmental and quasi-supranational institutions, an intensification of transnational communications and the creation of new regional and military orders. There is no question that the discussion on globalisation has occupied social sciences and particularly political economy over the last four decades, intimately connected with the growing presence of neoliberalism in the world (Torres, 2009).⁸

Arguably, the second Trump administration has implemented a strategy of disorganisation of the global system articulated around the multiple layers of globalisation via an adjudication of a neomercantilist perspective resurrecting theories that dominated Western European economic thought from the 16th to the 18th centuries.

This model was partially implemented in Trump's first administration, but with a focus mostly on China. It could never evolve in full swing because of what the press termed 'adult people' in the administration who prevented Trump from fully embracing it – members of his cabinet that included people from the armed forces and the Republican party and, in particular, from the world of business.

This time, what is at stake is the disorganisation of the global economy articulated after the Second World War through the leadership of the USA as the dominant power. This critique of neoliberal globalisation as being responsible for the economic decline of the USA is, for neoconservatives, also a way to explain the economic, technological and militarily gains China has made over the past two decades.

Another trend in this second administration, which expands on the experience of the first administration, is the goal of capturing and deporting *without due process* one million undocumented immigrants in the first year. This war against immigrants was implemented to a lesser degree during the first administration; and there are serious doubts that it can be achieved. In part because of the magnitude of the goal, and partly because these actions have already been confronted by the judicial system, escalating the confrontation between the judicial and executive branches. The judiciary is perhaps the last institutional guardrail left to protect democracy in the United States. Congress doesn't seem able or willing to intervene just now.⁹

The implementation of the highest tariffs since 1909 were sharply criticised because of the unpredictability of Trump and his 'Liberation Day' levy of tariffs on 60 countries around the world (Picchi, 2025) that resulted in the dollar losing 10% of its value since Inauguration Day. Yet, more importantly, U.S. bonds, long term global securities and the strongest refuge for capital in times of crises, have also behaved erratically. After the announcement of the

⁸ I discuss the educational impact of the multiple layers of globalisation in my book.

⁹ Thomas Friedman, a strong defender of globalisation, in an opinion article in *The New York Times* argued that Trump 'Just Bet the Farm', suggesting that the failure of his strategy will be costly for the USA. A case in point is what the press and academics consider contempt by the administration to a Judge (Cohen et al., 2025).

new tariffs, at one point on Friday 11 April 2025, the rate on the 30-year bond approached 5%, up from 4.4% one week earlier.

Higher yields would raise borrowing costs across the economy. That prompted the Trump administration to pause the tariffs on all countries apart from China for 90 days. The problem is, however, that nobody knows what is going to happen after this pause ends. For the moment, however, one of the most important U.S. industrial companies, Boeing, one of the two dominant global companies building airplanes, will find itself at the mercy of the Chinese response because the Government of China has instructed its airlines not to accept jets from Boeing.

What is new in this second administration – besides Trump already being a lame duck President who cannot be re-elected – is the attack on higher education via criticism of the models of equity, equality and inclusion. The government accuses universities of tolerating antisemitism and being too liberal. Trump has sent many private universities letters detailing changes that are expected against a threat of penalties – from making their endowments taxable to losing funding from government resources.

Curiously enough, one thing that the USA exports more than any other country is produced by the U.S. higher education ‘industry’. Catherine Rampell shows that education-related travel (together with all cost that foreign students incur in the United States, including tuition and living expenses) is \$56 billion, more than any other key export of the USA, including, for instance natural gas, soybeans and corn (Rampell, 2025).

Professor Márton Demeter puts the importance of international academic exchanges in the right light:

“As Chase-Dunn argues (1999), the interconnected societal fields like economy, culture, politics, communication should be analyzed from a global perspective, and the global academy is not an exception. Following Wallerstein (2004) we assume that knowledge production is not separate from overall world-system dynamics but rather it is an essential part of the system’s operation. Galtung (1980) even assumes that the means of knowledge production like popular culture and education serve to maintain the hegemony of the center by spreading its values and ideologies. Moreover, academic publishing itself gains from the political and economic hegemony of the Anglo-American center” (Demeter, 2019, p. 115).

Surely this argument about the decadence of U.S. cultural hegemony, which should be highlighted in the self-limitation of achieving its world cultural hegemony, will be remembered as one of the outcomes of Trump’s anti-woke administration.¹⁰

Another important factor in why the Trump strategy of bringing manufacturing back to the USA through reindustrialisation will not succeed is because most of the affected

10 ‘Woke’ is originally an African American Vernacular English (AAVE) term that means being alert or aware, especially of social and political injustices like racism and inequality. It suggests a conscious understanding of one’s role and its influence on others and the surrounding social climate. While originally used to encourage awareness and action, the term has become controversial and is now used by some as a derogatory label for those who are considered overly sensitive or politically liberal, especially in matters of social justice.

industries, such as the so-called *magnificent seven* and others, will be unable to move all their production to the United States before the Trump administration ends in 2028.¹¹

Jointly, with tariffs as a new geopolitical weapon, there is the promise Trump made to end the war between Russia and Ukraine in no time at all. In the midst of a new wave of Russian bombardment in Ukraine, the agreement for the 'just and lasting peace' demanded by the countries of the European Union is not happening. Russia is reluctant about the truce that the United States is seeking, and the Nordic countries have reacted to the threat of Russian expansionism with a rearmament plan, as has Brussels (Boccio, 2025). On 4 March 2025, European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen proposed an investment of €800 billion for the creation of a programme called 'ReArm Europe', a strategic defence initiative aimed at bolstering the European Union's military capabilities (European Commission, 2025). In response to geopolitical threats from the war in Ukraine and uncertainty about U.S. military support with the return of Donald Trump to the White House.

These events are partially a result of the animosity Trump felt towards NATO during his first presidency. In this new administration, despite having reassured us that he would produce global peace, and end the war in Europe and the Israeli violence in Gaza, nothing of the sort has materialised. It is likely that his animosity towards NATO may result in the USA withdrawing from membership of NATO. Yet many people are wondering why the new budget that Republicans have set up for their new administration contains one billion dollars more for the armed forces than the amounts traditionally allocated to defence. There is also a question of why the sources of 'soft power' for the USA, which have been very handy for U.S. public diplomacy in the past, have been decimated under this administration (Packer, 2025).¹²

In conclusion, the new Trump administration not only exemplifies the decline in U.S. growth, but will probably accelerate this process overall. Meanwhile, the second trend of persistent rise in overall indebtedness continues. With an external debt of 36.21 trillion, and a Gross Domestic Product of 27.72 trillion, arithmetic tells us that unless the USA manages to reduce its debt to a reasonable limit, it will become the most serious economic liability even for the most economically powerful country.

Yet, the current Trump administration is seeking again to extent Trump Tax Cuts. By 2054 tax cut extensions will add 37 trillion to U.S. Debt (Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, 2025). Economic inequality, both at the level of income and wealth in the USA increases:

11 The 'Magnificent Seven' stocks are a group of high-performing and influential companies in the U.S. stock market: Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta Platforms, Microsoft, NVIDIA and Tesla.

12 This article is a strong critique of Trump's disregard for the 'soft power' of the United States, represented among other institutions when on 20 January, within hours of his inauguration, President Trump signed an executive order that froze foreign aid, and USAID was instructed to stop nearly all work. Established through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was the principal U.S. agency responsible for extending development assistance to countries around the world.

“Household incomes have grown only modestly in this century, and household wealth has not returned to its pre-recession level. Economic inequality, whether measured through the gaps in income or wealth between richer and poorer households, continues to widen” (Horowitz et al., 2020).

While it is too early in this new administration to estimate its possible policy outcomes, it is evident that the crisis of desynchronisation continues unabated, and that the ecological crisis will increase with an administration that wears denialism as a badge of honour and makes the death of expertise a consummated practice in the White House. At the time of writing, we are confronted with the possibility of a constitutional crisis, reverberating strongly among the crises of U.S. democracy; furthermore, the varying velocity of market transactions cannot be predicted, nor there is a clear horizon for political predictability or the impact of tariffs, with the exception of the assumption that if the practice continues as it is, there will be stagflation in the USA and the most serious crises in the world economy (Schonberger, 2025).¹³

Given these conditions, it is expected that the psychological crises that university professors will witness in their classes, among themselves and the students, will continue to deepen, and more events connected with burnout and depression, as well as feelings of despair, anxiety, hopelessness and intense emotional distress in most segments of the population will be the common sense expression of the alienation of our daily lives.

The utopian model we advanced in 2019 is that the potency of global citizenship education and sustainability could accentuate the importance of the Sustainable Development Goals. They could become tools for achieving a better, more predictable and sustainable world.

With the orientation of the second Trump administration, it will be very difficult to reconcile those goals until this government is either defeated or naturally expires. The best option is the mid-term election for a show of discomfort and anger about the policies implemented by the MAGA social movement that controls the White House.

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¹³ Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell issued a warning about the impact of tariffs on inflation in a speech in Chicago on 16 April 2025, arguing that President Trump's tariffs will generate “higher inflation and slower growth”.

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