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War Amongst the People

Háború a nép között

Abstrakt

The purpose of this research paper is to provide better understanding on the challenges that a modern state faces in the current security environment namely in the war amongst the people. War amongst the people is both a graphic description of modern warlike situations, and also a conceptual framework, where civilian population are the targets as much as they are the opposing force.

Key words: War, people, irregular, unconventional

Absztrakt

Ez a kutatás azzal a céllal készült, hogy felvázolja azokat a kihívásokat, amelyekkel egy modern állam kerülhet szembe a jelenlegi biztonsági környezetben, nevezetesen a háborúban a nép között. A háború a nép között egyaránt földrajzi leírása és egy hadelméleti fogalmi kerete a modern háborús jellegű helyzeteknek, ahol civil lakosság lehet akár az elérendő cél, de az ellenség is.

Kulcsszavak: Háború, nép, irreguláris, hagyományostól eltérő

War no longer exists, according to General Rupert Smith[2], war as battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs:

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such war no longer exists. Since the Iron Curtain went down armoured formations have either supported the application of air power and artillery or their units and tanks have been committed to provide support to heavily protected infantry vehicles in urban operations. This does not mean a great fight with large groups of forces and weapon systems is no longer possible, but it does reinforce that it may not be an industrial one in either intent or prosecution. Some scholars of military studies have already acknowledged this reality and became advocates of rapidly deployable and light forces. However, this largely refers to the circumstances of modern battle, but within the same outdated concept of war while the entire concept of war has changed. The current shift in paradigm began with the introduction of nuclear weapons and the point in which it became dominant was at the end of the Cold War. This made the industrial war practically impossible as a deciding event, but most of the armed forces continued to be developed within the old paradigm of industrial war until the ending of the Cold War. War amongst the people – as he calls the new paradigm – is both a graphic description of modern warlike situations, and also a conceptual framework. It does not reflect the fact that there is no scheduled battlefield upon which armies engage, nor are there necessary armies, definitely on all sides. In this new paradigm the people became the battlefield. Military engagements take place in the presence of civilians, against civilians or in the sake of defending them. Therefore, civilian population are the targets as much as they are the opposing force.[3]

The most important element of a state needs to be the ability to carry out actions or policies within its respective territorial boundaries independently from external actors or internal rivals. In short it is called sovereignty. If a state cannot defend its own territory from outside actors and / or faces powerful opponents (criminal organizations, rebel groups / movements, etc.) within them, the risk of its rules and policies being undermined could increase to an unacceptable level. Thus, a modern (sovereign nation) state has to represent a set of institutions that seeks to wield the majority of force within this territory. Establishing order and deterring challenges from inside and out may provide security for its subjects by limiting the danger of external attack and / or internal crime and disorder. In some ways state became a kind of protective organization demanding money in return for security and order. Of course in reality the modern or sovereign state is far more complex. It is made up of numerous institutions that are engaged in the process of turning political ideas into policy (laws and regulations, health and labour, property rights or environment) utilizing ministries, agencies with their ever growing numbers of departments and offices in order to provide a balance between individual freedom and collective needs.[4] Thus, the general

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[2] General Rupert Smith is the author *of* The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, a treatise on modern warfare that he sees more like an interpretation of his some forty years of military service rather than an academic monograph.

[3] Smith, Rupert: The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, First Vintage Books Edition, 2008, pp. 3–6.

[4] O'Neil, Patric H.: Essentials of comparative politics, 3rd ed., New York, 2009, pp. 22–23.

assumption is that people do not rebel in those states that can maintain their legitimacy. Then why people rebel?

The purpose of this research paper is to provide a better understanding of the challeng-es that a modern state faces in the current security environment, namely in the war amongst the people. The methodology used is basically qualitative (literature review) and empirical (the author served as the first ever foreign active duty army officer as Fulbright Visiting Scholar). The literature reviewed here is mainly in use to educate officer candi-dates; however, given the emerging threat environment with innovative state and non-state actors willing to confront a modern state across a spectrum of sustained activities it is vital to provide a clear picture for stewards of public service as well in order to best use the tools of good governance[5]. Without a more agile employment of the whole-of-government re-sources and a holistic approach of the national security the modern state will not be able to counter such threats and seize, retain or exploit the strategic initiative.

PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH

According to Davies men do not usually rebel in impoverished societies because of a sim-ple reason. When people are preoccupied with their physical survival, the community-sense and consensus on joint political actions decreases and, thus also the likelihood for revolutions to occur. Prosperity raises expectations, and depression frustrates people. The main factor is rather the fear that ground gained over a time period will be quickly lost. Davies found evidence for this when studying three revolutions using John Stuart Mill's *method of difference*. The evidence from the Dorr Rebellion, the Russian Revolution, and the Egyptian Revolution, together with other civil disturbances provided the cases from which he created the famous J-curve theory (shown at figure 1). What he claimed to be important was the gap between the expectation and what people actually get. As a result, revolutions may occur after a period of good times, followed by a sudden decline of for-tunes.[6]

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[5] Bager, Gusztav; Besenyei, Monika; Csath, Magdolna; Fejes, Zsuzsanna; Kadar, Krisztian; Kis, Nor-bert: Good State and Governance Report, National University of Public Service, 2015, p. 1.
[6] Davies, James C.: Toward a Theory of Revolution, American Sociological Review, Vol.27, No.1, p. 5–8.

Figure 1. Need for satisfaction and revolt[7]

STATE-CENTRED APPROACH

State-centred theoretical approaches of revolutions compromise some of the most powerful analytical tools that are currently available to analyse political revolutions in order to find the key puzzle that are distinctive to their studies. State-centred analysis, like any theoretical tool, has its limitations, but it is exceptionally valuable for understanding revolutions. This follows from the fact that revolutions themselves are unusually state-centred phenomena. The failure of proponents and most of the critics alike has been results of a great deal of confusion to distinguish among four versions of such analysis: (1) the state-autonomy, (2) state-capacity; (3) political-opportunity; and (4) state-constructionist approaches. Furthermore there are geopolitical, transnational and domestic dimensions of these approaches as well, because the existence of individual states can only be understood within an international context.[8]

The *state-autonomy* perspective emphasizes the variable autonomy of state officials from the dominant social class, civil society, or other states. According to this perspective politician, bureaucrats, and even military officers may develop identities, interests, ideologies, or lines of actions that are generally different from those of organized groups in civil society or the officials of other states. State officials may not be usefully conceptualized as

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[7] Ibid. p. 8.
[8] Goodwin, Jeff: The State Centered Perspective on Revolutions, In Chewing Sand: A Process for Understanding Counterinsurgency Operations, ed. Spies, James, Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2008. pp. 15-16.

representatives of different interest groups, the popular will, or foreign stakeholders. There-fore, the interests of these state officials in accumulating resources through taxes and / or mobilizing the masses of the citizens for supporting their political agenda, may conflict with the interests of powerful social groups, not to mention powerful foreign states. Overt con-flicts between state officials, on the one hand, and economic elites, mobilized groups, and foreign officials, on the other, are typically adduced as evidence for this perspective.[9]

The *state-capacity approach* emphasizes the actual material and organizational capaci-ty of state officials in order to implement their political agenda successfully, even in the face of opposition from powerful actors in civil society or from other states. This perspective focuses on variations of states' fiscal resources, military power, and organizational reach or in other words the penetration into civil society. This infrastructural power of states refers, more specifically, to the institutional capacity of a central state to penetrate its territories and logistically implement decisions. While this second approach is typically utilized along-side the state-autonomy perspective, the two are analytically distinct. State officials may have very different aims than economic elites or other states and yet lack the capacity to actually implement their preferred policies. State autonomy does not necessarily imply state capacity, or vice versa.[10]

A third state-centred approach emphasizes how the apparent tolerance or responsive-ness of states or politics influences the ability of mobilized social groups to act collectively and / or to influence state policies. More specifically, political opportunities have been deemed necessary for people to act collectively or to shape the agenda of state officials. In this *political opportunity perspective*, the state must either lack the means (infrastructural) or simply be unwilling to suppress such groups violently. It is also useful if these groups can find powerful allies within a divided state or polity. And geopolitics becomes important here again. Some social groups may form alliances with, and receive significant resources from foreign states. International wars and imperial overextension have often produced political crises that have created unprecedented opportunities for political mobilization as well. In this case, one may call it *transnational political opportunities*.[11]

Last but not least, the *state-constructionist perspective* approach, which emphasizes how states shape the very identities, goals, strategies, social ties, ideas, and even emo-tions of actors in civil society. It also examines the ways in which states help to construct or constitute various social forces and institutions that are most of the time falsely conceptual-ized as wholly exterior to states. In reality the focus here – as against a political-opportunity approach – is not so much on whether a state or polity provides opportunities for *already existing* networks to act as like-minded people. Rather, it emphasizes how the actions of foreign as well as domestic players help to make cognitively plausible and morally justifia-ble certain types of collective grievances, emotions, identities, ideologies, associational

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[9] Ibid. p. 16.
[10] Ibid. 16–17.
[11] Ibid. p. 17.

ties, and actions in the first place. A major thesis of the state cantered approach; however, is that states largely construct the revolutionary movements that challenge and sometimes overthrow them. Of course, this construction is never accomplished by states alone. Nor is state constructionism intended to slight the agency of revolutionaries themselves. The point is simply that revolutionaries cannot create revolutionary movements, let alone revolutions, into existence. Rather, revolutionaries have been most successful when they have confronted states, and populations ruled in certain ways by those states, that exhibit certain determinate features and characteristic practices.[12]

The fundamental weakness of such analysis of revolutionary movements is that it does not theorize the non-state or non-political sources such as: (1) *associational networks* including class formations and the civil society more generally; (2) *material resources*, and (3) *collective beliefs, assumptions, and emotions.* This is a significant problem given the potentially crucial connection between social networks, resources, and culture, on the one hand, and collective action on the other. For example, the role of social networks and interpersonal ties in mobilization processes has been powerfully addressed in recent years by social movement theory. Due to its various theoretical shortcomings, a state-centred perspective alone will not completely explain, neither accurately predicts the emergence or character of collective action, including the revolutionary movements. These very shortcomings point the way toward a more powerful synthetic perspective on revolutions and collective action.[13]

SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

In order to highlight the roles of social ties, resource mobilization, and culture in addition to state structures and practices scholars of revolutions may use another powerful tool of analysis, the *Social Movement Theory*. Set in motion by the turbulence of the 1960s and fuelled by numerous movements of the last quarter of the twentieth century, the study of social movements and revolutions has clearly emerged. Despite Bell's prophecy, the *end of ideology* has not come yet. Rather, social movements and revolutions have become the common feature of the political landscape of the previous and current century. With the growing number of works on the subject, historians, sociologist and political scientist may represent different theoretical traditions, but they agree on three fundamental factors: (1) *the political opportunities;* (2) *the mobilizing structures*; and (3) *the framing process.*[14]

Scholars are divided between two major explanations of the emergence of social movements. However, more recent findings tend to see the differences in the political

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[12] Ibid. pp. 17–18.
[13] Ibid. pp. 26–31.
[14] McAdam, D., McCarthy, J., Zald, M.: Introduction: Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes – toward a synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements. In D. McAdam, J. McCarthy, M. Zald (Eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 1–2.

characteristics of the nation states in which they are embedded. Thus, the particular social movement or revolution is shaped by the broader set of political constrains and opportunities unique to the national context. This creates direct linkage with state-centred approach of analysing the same subject. According to McAdam four dimensions of political opportunity structures need to be considered in analysis. First dimension is the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system. Conducting such analyses will provide a clear picture of the possibility to change the existing status quo by peaceful means. Second dimension is the stability of the broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity. The result of this study will help to better understand linkage between the leader and his repressive apparatus (military and law enforcement organizations). Third dimension is the presence of elite allies and finally the last dimension is the state's capacity and prosperity for repression. Analysing the capacity for repression will show the ability of the respective state to use force, while prosperity for repression will provide an understanding on how the leaders will to use force. Furthermore, changes in the political opportunity structure may render the system vulnerable to challenge.[15]

When political opportunity is presented, social movements (such as reform movements) may be created in response to it and will be consistent with the changes that provided the opportunity for them. For this movement to survive, insurgents must be able to create a more enduring organization in order to sustain the collective action. Thus, it needs such formal and informal collective vehicles through which people can be mobilized and engaged. Usually this means the creation of some sort of formal social movement organization. When created the primary goal of this formal organization remains to survive; therefore, it is necessary to further shape the broader political environment, which influence the overall pace and outcome of the process in favour for it. However, at this point most of the movements are lacking sufficient power to confront directly and defeat ruling party or other emerging movements. Further development of the movement depends on the ability to devise innovative and disruptive tactics that gain local success over opponents. Empirical studies show evidence that groups, which are willing to use violence against their opponents tend to be more successful. Using such *disruptive tactics* may balance the lack of political resources that opponents using proper channels may have. Thus, the ability to generate disruption of public order will increase the movement's power to bargaining. At the beginning of the lifecycle of the movement disruptive tactics may work well, but too much radicalization can be counterproductive. The existence of extremist groups even in moderate social movement organizations is easily observable conducting different case studies. Utilizing this radical flank, known as the *radical flank effect,* the organization will benefit through operating in a wider tactical spectrum. To respond, the state has to divide focus and will more likely to engage with leaders and organizations who are perceived to be reliable negotiating partners. In such a situation, the existence of radicals can help legitimate the more moderate actors and their bargaining at the negotiation table. In this effort

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[15] Ibid. pp. 7–10.

to interact successfully with the broader political environment social movement organizations have to rely heavily on their goals. Encoded in these goals some organization may visualize threats while others see interest. This mix of likely opposition and support will place the respective movement in the hierarchy.[16]

The combination of political opportunities and mobilizing structures may afford social movement organizations a certain structural potential for action. Without cautiously framing this action they cannot maintain a sufficient collective action. The balanced mediation between opportunity, organization and action; however, may provide the shared meanings and definitions that people need to feel both aggrieved about some aspects of their lives and optimistic, that acting collectively they can address the problem. Conditioning these perceptions are known as *framing processes.* Movements continuous to depend on this shared understanding of people during the later stages of revolution as well, but collective settings within which this process takes place are very different. It come from the fact that it more likely to be shaped by conscious strategy later than at the beginning of the movement. Later when various factions and actors within the movement struggle to determine the most effective way to broadcast the message to the people, its more about the nuanced interaction of the movement with other organizations including state, than the environmental opportunity driven collective actions of earlier stage.[17] In other words, initial frames are a function of the mobilizing structures available, such as civil right or religious messaging, in order to achieve cognitive liberation of individuals. Initial efforts to frame the process must determine the most effective message that works in the respective society; therefore, they tend to be less strategically conscious, than in later stages. These initial efforts are more like reconnaissance by fire, when the enemy's position is unknown and using this procedure promises his reaction. Once projectiles start impacting close to his position, he might move or return fire, thus reveals his actual position.

To summarize, it is critical for stewards of public service to understand the roots why people rebel. The above mentioned three different approaches of the subject may provide a useful tool for analysing and understanding the phenomenon. Davies's J-curve theory provides description of the individual or micro level. The state-centred approach provides analysis for macro level, while social movement theory connects the two together through describing the organizational level of revolutions. Preventing crisis is always cheaper than responding to it and then to return to normality takes a lot of effort and burns unnecessary amount of resources. Maintaining the legitimacy of the state, including its bureaucracy is in the hands of the managers of the state, the public servants. The smooth operation of this complicated machine will ensure the support of the population and, minimize the political opportunity for challengers of the state. Failing to do so; however, may generate a crisis which creates multiply actors competing for power and control over the population.

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[16] Ibid. pp. 13–15.
[17] Ibid. pp. 16–17.

COUNTER-STATE

Internal crises of states, ranging from peaceful demonstration against the government or the regime itself to civil war through different version of civil disorder, are always complex and complicated phenomena. To understand the logic behind rebel behavior that shapes its governance is difficult too. The framework for understanding it, according to Mampilly, is to start from the general toward specific challenges that a non-state actor is facing in such an emerging environment. Understanding this broader environment, in particular the two central relationships: (1) *with the incumbent state;* and (2) *with the inhabitants of the respective territory;* that will determine the nature of the political arena, is fundamental. It has to be clear for everyone that the construction of any type of rebel governance system has been drawn directly from the model of the respective nation-state, but it is more useful to think about insurgent groups constructing such structure as an opportunity to examine the potential and limitations of a political-social order produced by a *counter-state.* This system means some sort of control of civilian populations by rebels as an alternate for non-state political authority. Most of the time, as sovereign states do, it prioritize security and emerges where the state is no longer able to function. Therefore, insurgent organizations, that develop governance systems as *counter-state sovereign*, operate in an interactive fashion with the incumbent state and other local and transnational non-state actors.[18]

Understanding how power, authority and legitimacy intersect on the question of governance by insurgents is also an essential task. When rebellions choose to liberate territory, but they having no intention to engage the inhabitants it is necessary for them to depopulate the territory of local communities. To do so, rebels often use violence or the threat to be violent in order to motivate them to flee. Many insurgent groups; however, view collaboration as a component of their strategy. Coercion may be seen as a tool for them to take control of territory, but once this control has been gained, an overreliance on such means may limit the ability to generate popular support for their political agenda. Therefore one of the biggest challenge for leaders of a rebellion is how to resist the brutal efficiency of coercive tools if they want to mobilize civilians. Failing to do so may create political opportunity for other state and non-state actors involved in the crisis. The legitimacy of other actors is deeply contingent on the behavior of the political regime and hence always be contested by alternative political entities. This relationship relies on a balanced combination of coercive and consented manner that over time can produce informal social construction that can legitimate the insurgent government and bolstering its position against the incumbent state. The key for rebel leaders is to make sure that the passive majority of the population does not turn on the insurgency as a result of their negative behavior or more attractive conditions that rival actors competing for power can offer. In short, reliance on brute force alone may be an essential precondition for insurgents to gain control over territory and population

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[18] Mampilly, Zachariah: Understanding Variation in Insurgent Governance Systems, In Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011. pp. 49–50.

as it has been discussed earlier (see: disruptive tactics). However, it is not sustainable strategy over the life of the conflict. Their governance effort cannot be merely rhetorical, either. It must produce public goods or face the possibility of civilian defection and / or resistance to their rule. Therefore, in this competition for civilian loyalty, insurgent governments must draw inspiration from the nation state in order to gain political authority through legitimacy. Successful insurgents do not rely on force alone, but also engage in different activities to generate some sort of degree of consent from local communities. The provision of governance and the establishment of this informal social structure will determine whether a group can derive support for its political authority through its legitimacy, is a key factor in shaping the nature of its challenge to state power.[19]

COUNTER-STATE SOVEREIGN GOVERNANCE AND THE STATE

Rebel leadership has to design how to engage in different areas with varying levels of commitment, choosing to allocate greater resources to strategically more important areas than to others. They must also navigate between their desire to foster more permanent structures that can demonstrate their control of the respective territory and; therefore, the population. They may trade position in order to gain time in the face of strategic shifts to ensure the survival of the cause itself. In this situation state may choose to use *hearts and minds* strategies in order to attract the population away from the insurgent authority. However, case studies show that in reality, states tend to engage with their citizens mostly through violence in these areas. The incumbent state has numerous tools to disrupt insurgent efforts which can be categorized as *direct* (mostly military means) and *indirect* such as restrictions on essential supplies or control on people and goods that can undermine the ability the insurgent political order to survive. It is critical for insurgent governments to recognize and acknowledge the interactive relationship with the incumbent state, because this reality has a direct impact on the methods of governance that rebel leaders may choose. They must respond to strategic shifts in the conflict dynamics produced by the nation state's behavior in order to preserve their governance system and maintain the counter-state sovereignty. Success in doing so is important for two reasons: (1) their competitive relationship with the incumbent state is the premier impulse that can motivate every aspects of their project; and (2) they can gain some kind of legitimacy cloning the nation state. Through this symbolic behavior they may claim juridical recognition within the international system.[20]

COUNTER-STATE SOVEREIGN BEHAVIOR

Public welfare provision beyond defending the population is not an immediate necessity for insurgent leadership. Indeed, the establishment of any sort of force which is capable of

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[19] Ibid. pp. 52–55.
[20] Ibid. pp. 58–61.

policing the citizen of counter-state is often the most important step to take. This follows from the logic of control and the importance of regulating the means of violence. Thus, establishing ways (methods) and means (resources: militia or police) of security structure provides rebels with the ability to demonstrate their relative power to the local and transnational community. It is also reinforced by Davies' J-curve theory. In crisis such as civil disorder or civil war, individual needs are centered on physical security; and therefore, the majority of the population will be working on to provide basic needs, rather than counter-rebel. Providing them with a vision of quick recovery from the shock of the crisis and being unsuccessful to complete it will increase the gap between their perceived needs and the reality and may change the situation as well as force them to join counter-revolutionary movements. The provision of other public welfare items such as healthcare and education become a secondary concern and most likely has been outsourced to transnational agents and international nongovernmental organizations. Doing so can provide the ability to the insurgent to stay focused on the struggle against the nation state and preserve essential resources. Allowing and denying access of transnational and / or international nongovernmental organizations to the territory they control also reinforce their bargaining for national and international recognition. The ability of a transnational non-state actor to impact and even replace governments in both state and rebel-controlled territories has become reality in the past century. Despite the reluctance of the international community to legitimate counter-state sovereigns, the overwhelming presence of international non-state actors in the respective territory directly serves to link them to the formal world system. This provides an excellent opportunity for rebels to engage with the international community in order for them to provide treatment of civilians. Insurgent leaders often rely on diaspora members to better perform in this arena, because members of ethnic diaspora have an essential material, emotional often familial bond with the land and people left behind. These individuals can provide financial, political supports and much needed expertise on a myriad of fields to the cause or can also essential support to the civilian population. They can also operate in private and humanitarian nongovernmental organization, international agencies, or even in foreign governments that can direct attention and material support to the chosen cause.[21]

COUNTER-STATE SOVEREIGN AND CIVILIANS

Civilians are never passive or invisible agents in revolutions. Their ways to respond to the counter-state control ranges from wholesale support to covert and overt collaboration with the incumbent state through limited / coerced participation, public and private protest, disengagement or refuge or even with the formation of local militias. Even in the most difficult circumstances civilians try to maintain their preferences and will have some sort of ability to interact with insurgent groups. Rebel leaders must; therefore, seriously consider different contingencies when developing their governance system in order to design it to be flexible.

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[21] Ibid. pp. 63–78.

The decision to either accept or refuse the counter-state authority has strategic importance for the rebellion and will shape the environment where the insurgent groups have to operate. [22]

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Special Operations Forces[23] have culminated and sustained an exclusive level of expertise in capabilities critical to engage transnational targets with discriminating precision in Special Warfare. Special Warfare includes Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency, just to name a few. These kind of operations are in theory discrete, precise, politically astute and scalable tools enabling politically sensitive missions over extended time mostly in hostile and denied environments utilizing the unique language and cultural expertise of special operations forces in order to influence human domain. More broadly these units have organizations and leaders with developed expertise at the strategic level in order to successfully engage the Joint Interagency Intergovernmental and Multinational environment and, thus, able to shape and influence the broader national and international security environment. Lower level operators are extremely well-trained and educated critical thinkers in order to understand the differences of new cultures and ways of thinking. They are masters of interpersonal and social networking skills, knowledge and understanding that allows them to infiltrate, hind and operate fluidly within non-Western; so to say, disharmonious societies. They clearly understand the impact and influence of the human behavior as well and; therefore, the consequences of different actions in other domains such as physical (air-cosmic, land and sea), information and human. They may also train and develop others in these skills to reach favorable perspectives, which in turn can positively influence partners, adversaries and relevant populations be it friendly, neutral or foe.[24] Acknowledging the nature of the emerging international environment including resurgent state adversaries, rising regional powers and non-state (both transnational and sub state) armed organizations seeking to dominate the political, military and ideological arenas of both peace and war, traditional way of projecting the power of the state may be misleading. Adding to the picture the further development of technology with special regard on information technology, competition for power is shifting slowly, but inevitably from the physical towards the information domain. Projecting power through this domain in order to shape and influence the human behavior is critical. Unconventional Warfare in order to support the objectives of the state does not need to be violent. Instead, the opposition itself moves non-linearly along a spectrum including elements of nonviolent

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[22] Ibid. pp. 67–72.

[23] The term, Special Operations Forces, is used to describe Army or Land, Air and Naval Forces' units with specialized training, equipment, organization and structure as well as command and control systems such as Special Forces (The Green Berets), Public Affairs (US) or Civil-Military Cooperation (NATO) as well as Psychological Operations units and so on.

[24] SOF Support to Political Warfare, USASOC, 2015. p. 30.

resistance, armed resistance, insurgency and revolution. First one may undermine a respective government's or regime's legitimacy, credibility as well as efficacy through a myriad of way such as disobedience, demonstrations, boycotts, or even establishing parallel institutions providing public goods and services as well as media. While insurgency may grow from this movement it is fundamentally different in character. Insurgency can be best described with the organized use of violence in order to seize, neutralize or change political control over a well-defined territory. Revolution may be the zenith of either resistance or insurgency or both. Historically, revolutions have been coups d'état, civil wars or wars against distant or foreign political overlords and; therefore, sought to alter political order of the state including socio-political and economic changes. Thus, all the three share commonalities but differ in many respect as well. However, they provide excellent avenues in combination with state sponsored whole-of-government and Joint Interagency Intergovernmental and Multinational enabled Unconventional Warfare campaigns[25] in order to counter and deter adversary aggression. These operations are ultimately population centric in nature, thus Unconventional Warfare campaigns require a holistic approach to the complex problem set and must comprehensively employ political, economic, military and psychological pressure.[26]

CONCLUSION

In the complex contemporary security environment modern (sovereign nation) states are alone to provide stability and prosperity for their citizens when challengers are many including transnational and internal rivals. Adversaries may use unconventional approaches to wage war, to balance or even neutralize the quantitative or qualitative superiority of the opposing force. In such kind of operations the main effort will be to influence the civil population of the targeted state, rather than engage in decisive battles. In order for modern states to survive it is critical to understand the dynamics of social movements and revolutionary movements. Establishing and maintaining order and deterring challengers from inside and out may provide security for its subjects by limiting the danger of external attack and / or internal crime and disorder. Turning political ideas into policy requires numerous institutions that are engaged in the process of utilizing ministries, agencies with their ever growing numbers of departments and offices in order to provide a balance between individual freedom and collective needs. Thus, the general assumption remains that people do not rebel in those states that can maintain their legitimacy. Detailed knowledge of the theories and practices of social movements and revolutionary movements may provide ade-

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[25] Generally speaking unconventional warfare campaigns are activities to enable resistance or insurgency in order to coerce, disrupt or overthrow governments, but in this context the author use a more broad approach including Counter Unconventional Warfare Campaign which means operations or activities conducted by special operations forces against the growing number of adversarial state and/ or non-state sponsored agents and groups utilizing means of Unconventional Warfare as well.
[26] SOF Support to Political Warfare, USASOC, 2015. pp. 18-20.

quate answers for public servants to address crisis situations in order to prevent the occurrence (reduce system weakness) or influence (create crisis to exploit, seize or retain initiative) political opportunity. It is also critical to understand the ways (methods) and means (resources) as well as the associated risks of the formal and informal structures (or lack of these, thereof) which can mobilize or counter-mobilize the population should an insurgency occur. With the ever growing importance of the media presence of the lifecycle of the state governance the message that has been broadcasted through becomes decisive. Understanding that the gap between the rhetoric and the real face of governance that may create rebellion, is critical. Good governance must produce public goods or face the possibility of civilian defection and / or resistance to the state authority. Therefore, in this competition for civilian loyalty, state governments must gain political authority through legitimacy. Successful insurgents do not rely on force alone but also engage in different activities to generate some sort of degree of consent from local communities. The provision of governance and the establishment of formal and informal social structures will determine whether a state can derive support for its political authority through its legitimacy; and thus, it is a key factor in shaping the nature of preventing the loss or restoring the power of the state in war amongst the people.

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