Europe of Nations – Illusions and Realities

Anyone who follows the debates on the future of Europe or the current issues of European policy can easily get the false impression that the Europe of Nations concept or the federalist position aiming for a United States of Europe is a realistic alternative that we face, and that one of these will be the dominant direction of European integration. This is far from being the case, however. In fact, these are the two extremes of the continuum of diverse positions, two vocal minorities, and neither has a realistic chance in the foreseeable future to determine the future of Europe, alone and exclusively.

The vast majority of the participants in the debate take a status quo-plus or status quo-minus position, in that they propose a correction of the current level of integration, either a step forward in the federal direction or a step backwards in the direction of intergovernmentalism. But these are not radical changes, they do not upset the complex system of integration protected by the Treaties, they are merely a slight shift in an evolutionary or even devolutionary direction. Changing the Treaties is a complicated, cumbersome process, requiring the full consensus of Member States and the European Parliament, and in the case of radical changes, many countries’ constitutions require an always risky referendum for their approval. Therefore, major leaps and radical changes in the integration process are unlikely to take place in the foreseeable future (apart from unforeseen cataclysms). In other words, there is a greater chance of this integration breaking up rather than the sovereignist or federalist concept in its ideal-typical form being implemented.

The question rightly arises: does it make sense to deal with concepts that have very little chance of being implemented? The answer is that it does make sense, because both positions are a kind of point of reference, in European jargon finalité politique, that is, the political end, or guidance against which actors measure their own ambitions.

Although none of these concepts will be realised in their pure form, there is a direction in which the process moves, sometimes more slowly, sometimes more quickly, sometimes with detours, towards a federal end goal fading in the distant future. The Europe of Nations proponents would like to reverse this process and drive it back at least to the initial state of the Treaty of Rome.

---

2 Senior fellow, Kodolányi University, Department of International Relations and History, e-mail: hunemblju@gmail.com
Charles de Gaulle and his Europe of Nations

Although it is generally accepted that the father of the Europe of Nations integration concept is Charles de Gaulle, former French President, this is a misleading assumption. The term itself is indeed derived from him, although he did not use it consistently. He used the phrase in this form at a notable press conference, labelled historic, on 15 May 1962, where he declared that “there cannot be any Europe other than that of the [nation] states, apart from in myths, fiction and parades”. In this speech, he rejected supranational experiments and called them nonsense like the Esperanto and Volapük languages. This speech caused quite an outcry and the next day five MRP-party federalist ministers resigned from their posts.3

He used the term Europe of Nations interchangeably with “Europe of the Homeslands” (l’Europe des patries), also known as “Europe of the Nation States”. In his case, this does not indicate any conceptual confusion, but follows directly from the prevailing French understanding of the nation.

According to the French position, which is still valid today, the nation is essentially a public law category, constituted by citizenship, and therefore every French citizen is part of the French nation, regardless of his or her ethnic or cultural background or personal identity. Hungarian literature of the last century called this concept a political nation.

There is no doubt that de Gaulle, then in opposition, was not at all comfortable with the federalism of the founding fathers, and also fiercely criticised the Treaty of Rome (had he been President of France in 1957, he would probably have produced a much less ambitious treaty), defended member state sovereignty and encouraged intergovernmental cooperation even in European integration. He disapproved of qualified majority voting and, with his infamous “empty chair policy”, was even willing to go so far as to endanger the whole integration process in order to prevent a majority vote. It didn’t take much for this to happen. He finally succeeded in forcing through the so-called Luxembourg compromise in 1966, which continued to give each Member State the right of veto on major matters of national interest. The Commission’s honest-to-goodness federalist President, the German Hallstein, found this hard to tolerate and resigned from his high post shortly afterwards.

It would be inappropriate to conclude from this that de Gaulle was a Eurosceptic who opposed European cooperation. He was very much in favour of cooperation on his own terms, but he imagined that it should be based on intergovernmental cooperation, with French dominance, and on the enforcement of French economic interests. He also feared French dominance when the United Kingdom joined, which he rejected twice (in 1963 and 1967) because he believed that the British would be the Trojan horses for the Americans within the community. He was also apprehensive of supranationalism partly because he believed that it would also make US dominance a determining factor. Moravcsik’s excellent analysis reveals that de Gaulle’s European policy was essentially motivated by his homeland’s economic interests, with geopolitical goals being secondary.

3 Anceau s.a.
and ideological elements having almost no role in it. National selfishness and self-interest played an important role in his politics, and he was rather successful in enforcing them. The principles and rules of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) were designed to provide the most benefits to French farmers. The others even called the CAP the French rebate.

At the same time, he had a major European initiative: In 1961 he requested Ambassador Christian Fouchet to draw up a draft for a European Political Union, the so-called Fouchet Plan. The essence of this plan would have been close foreign and security policy cooperation, of course on a strictly intergovernmental basis. The plan eventually failed due to open Dutch and covert German resistance.

With de Gaulle’s departure in 1969, the rigid opposition of French politics to a federalist approach to integration was tempered, and with Mitterrand–Delors, France became a champion of deeper integration and supra-nationalist transformation.

**State nation versus culture nation**

The French concept of the nation, as opposed to the German and Italian conceptions, was called the concept of national state by Friedrich Meinecke, a German historian and a leading representative of the intellectual history school. In his main work Meinecke argued that there are basically two different conceptions regarding the definition of nation in Europe. This distinction is still valid today. The French approach, which has been adopted by many others, conceives of the nation as a public law “community of wills” (Willensgemeinschaft), based on citizenship, while the German and Italian concept of the nation is culturally determined. The German historian argued that the nation in the German understanding is a cultural community, which encompasses a community of people speaking the same language, sharing a common cultural tradition, and undertaking a sense of belonging, regardless of nationality or borders. According to him, the reason for the two different perceptions lies in their different historical development. Since in the case of German and Italian unity or other Central and Eastern European peoples, independent statehood and independence came later, the framework for defining national belonging was not the state but a shared culture. In Central and Eastern Europe, this concept became dominant, and Hungary has consistently advocated it since the Treaty of Trianon, although in the multi-ethnic successor states that emerged after the peace treaties closing the First World War, the emergence of a nation state concept was also perceivable.

János Martonyi, former Hungarian Foreign Minister, points out in an important paper that: “Hungarian history evolved in a less fortunate manner than that of France, our nation is forced to live in several states, for us the concepts of nation and state are not identical, the borders of the two do not coincide, and absolute sovereignty based on

---

4 Moravcsik 1998.
5 Teasdale 2016.
6 Meinecke 1908.
a homogeneous nation state cannot be the solution for the Hungarian nation as a whole. This clear position is the undisputed foundation of Hungarian national strategy.

The 19th century notion of sovereignty is closely linked to the concept of a Europe of Nations. In this era, sovereignty was understood as the unlimited freedom of disposal over the whole of a given territory and all its citizens, only a country that exercises sovereignty over the whole population of a given territory, alone and without restriction, and that is internationally recognised to do so may be considered as sovereign. In contrast, the modern conception of sovereignty is based on the assumption that fundamental changes have taken place in the international environment in the last century, and not only nation state actors exist these days, but also global and regional supranational organisations, which, to a varying degree, represent constraints on the traditional, so-called unfettered exercise of sovereignty. The modern conception has therefore introduced shared or jointly exercised sovereignty, meaning that individual states no longer exercise some of their sovereignty exclusively, but jointly with others. They cede part of their sovereignty in the classical sense to joint decision-making, but in return they also gain a say in the sovereign decisions of others or in a larger cooperation. This is what many international organisations and forms of cooperation are based on, but it is most clearly the case for the operation of the European Union. This follows from the principle that Community law prevails over national law in many areas, and that EU regulations are directly applicable, without internal approval or promulgation, throughout the EU.

**Europe of Nations, today**

It is not an easy task for anyone who wants to reconstruct the meaning of the concept of Europe of Nations today. There are almost as many versions as there are actors claiming and proudly proclaiming it. Of course there are common points, but there is no single, consensually agreed canon.

Several groups in the European Parliament already sought to link the name “Europe of Nations” to itself. These were political enterprises of very diverse composition and had less and less in common with the Gaullist tradition of the Europe of Nations. First, in 1994, Philippe de Villiers, former Minister of State for Culture in Chirac’s cabinet, who had been a member of the Gaullist RP (Republican Party), founded his own party, the Movement for France (MPF), which was leaning to the right of Gaullism and tended towards Euroscepticism, and as a member of the MPF, created the Europe of Nations Group in the European Parliament in 1994. Although he also moved away from the original Gaullist concept (and since navigated himself and his party to the extreme right), he was still the closest to it. This group was quite short-lived and only lasted two years between 1994 and 1996.

The UEN (Union for Europe of the Nations) Group, which was in the European Parliament from 1999 to 2009, proved to be longer-lived, although its content changed significantly. The group was initially dominated by the Gaullist RPF and the Italian AN (National Alliance) led by Fini, but after the 2004 elections, the AN was joined by the

---

7 Martonyi 2021a: 32.
Polish PiS and the Italian Lega Norda, and by then, there was no French party representing even a fragment of Gaullist tradition in the group.

After the 2009 elections, the former UEN parties found themselves in a difficult situation, as some of their parties did not perform well and others aligned themselves with other formations (for example, the Polish PiS joined the European Conservatives and Reformists), so the radical right parties had to reorganise themselves under a new name: EFD (Europe of Freedom and Democracy). In this group, the UKIP party was the strongest force and the group was co-chaired by the vociferous Nigel Farage.

Between 2014 and 2019, the name Europe of Nations resurfaced like a subterranean river, with the Union of Nations of Europe and Freedom (UNEF) being created after the 2014 EP elections. They have already moved very far away from the Gaullist tradition, the group represents a distinctly right-wing platform and the dominant parties in the group are the French Front National (Marine Le Pen’s party), the Dutch PVV (Gert Wilders’ party) and the Italian Lega (Salvini’s party). There is also a seat for the Austrian FPÖ and temporarily, until the British exit, for UKIP.

In 2019, the group took on a new name, which can be seen as the successor to UNEF: the currently existing group is called Identity and Democracy (ID). Today, this group is the most prominent representative of the right-wing “Europe of Nations” concept, although the views of some members of the ECR group and the currently independent Fidesz MEPs are also close to this.

By the mid-2010s, almost all the parties in these groups painted the exit programme on their flags (Fidesz being the clear exception). The most consistent and, let us add, successful party in this was UKIP, led by Nigel Farage, which finally achieved their goal in the June 2016 referendum, with a narrow majority of Britons voting to leave. The enthusiasm surrounding this success quickly spread to the other parties. In 2016, Harald Wilmsky, Austrian FPÖ MEP, spoke about the necessity of Öxit (Austria’s exit); in a tweet congratulating Farage, Salvini wrote: “Now it’s our turn.” In 2017, Marine Le Pen stated in the presidential candidates’ debate that: “End the EU!”

The pro-exit position of these parties is completely at odds with de Gaulle’s conception of the Europe of Nations, who, while disagreeing with the supranational direction and majority voting, was very much in favour of European cooperation, and would have extended it to a particularly sensitive area, namely to foreign and security policy.

**Stepping back instead of exit**

We have seen that the most enthusiastic parties, using the Europe of Nations as an attractive slogan, were all in favour of leaving the EU during the Brexit conjuncture, or at least seriously considered this option. Undoubtedly, this position has been most consistently and successfully (from its own point of view) taken by Farage’s UKIP party. Following a brief sobering up after the Brexit binge, and faced with the plethora of problems posed by the exit and perceiving the doubts of the public, when approaching the 2019 EP elections, these parties had already fine-tuned their positions. They abandoned
exit as their primary goal and instead campaigned on a programme of radical reform of the EU that is even harder to achieve than exit.

The main parties are calling for radical internal reforms in the EU, namely to move back to a model of purely intergovernmental cooperation. Many of the parties represented in the European Parliament identify to some extent with this programme, but it is currently represented in its purest form by the Identity and Democracy group, whose three most prominent parties are the Salvini-led Italian Lega, the German AfD and the French National Rally (RN) led by Le Pen.

In its 2019 election manifesto, the AfD called for the abolition of the European Parliament, Germany’s exit from the Eurozone, limiting integration to economic cooperation and returning most Community competences to the nation states.\(^9\)

Marine Le Pen’s programme was not so detailed, but her slogan was for the UNE, i.e. Union dés Nations Européennes, which presupposed the restoration of full sovereignty and, in her vision, the EU would continue to function only as an economic area and customs union. The Austrian FPÖ saw the need for a radical reduction in the size of the European Parliament and a radical curtailment of its powers. They wanted to do the same with the European Commission. And they called for the introduction of strict unanimity in decision-making.\(^10\)

Although the emphasis of each party is different, there are clearly identifiable common points. None of the parties has concealed the fact that they would either radically reduce or abolish purely Community institutions such as the Commission and the Parliament, with a narrow Council secretariat performing their minimal administrative tasks, the decision-making powers of the European Court of Justice would be limited, decisions would be left exclusively to the Council for intergovernmental cooperation, where qualified majority voting would be restricted, and the FPÖ would abolish them altogether. This would remove all the achievements of the European integration process, and transform the current Union into a loose, economic cooperation organisation. This would effectively put the integration process back to square one, and it would once again face the problems that it has already overcome after half a century of exhausting struggle to take its current form.

In June 2022, the parties of the Identity and Democracy group reached the point where they formulated a common European platform of these parties in a declaration. The Antwerp Declaration\(^11\) rejects all the conclusions of the conference on the future of Europe, dealing separately with the rejection of qualified majority voting (QMV) and the conditionality mechanism. In a separate paragraph, it opposes the plan to create a common European army. It strongly criticises the current immigration policy, which it considers permissive, and calls for strict surveillance of European borders to protect European citizens. Finally, it calls for returning Community competences back to the Member States.

---

\(^9\) Pausch 2019: 5.
\(^11\) Antwerp Summit 2022.
Shortly after the Antwerp Declaration, in July 2022, the Hungarian Parliament also adopted a resolution on the Hungarian position on the future of the European Union. This is almost word for word the same as Viktor Orbán's position a year earlier. Both the Prime Minister's speech and the Resolution of the National Assembly endorse the Europe of Nations concept and explain in detail what they mean by it.

The National Assembly (OGY) resolution calls for the deletion of the objective of “ever closer union” from the Treaty, while at the same time expecting the Treaty to enshrine the importance of Europe’s Christian roots. It demands a radical review of the EU’s competences based on the principle of subsidiarity. A separate point calls for the creation of a common European army. It considers it important to make support for families a Treaty objective. All peoples must be guaranteed the freedom to choose who they want to live with. It would abolish the European Parliament in its present form and replace it with an Assembly of delegates from national parliaments. It demands the right of veto for national parliaments in the EU legislative process, as well as the right to table legislative initiatives for national parliaments. It also calls for the Treaty to provide protection for autochthonous minorities and for the European Union to support these communities.

The Hungarian government’s position is much more detailed and elaborate than the common platform of the Identity and Democracy parties. There are many points of convergence between the Antwerp Declaration and the Hungarian resolution, but there are also very significant differences and even radically contradictory points between the two conceptions of a Europe of Nations. The surprising difference between the two documents is that the Hungarian resolution rejects neither the extension of majority voting (although we know from other sources that the Hungarian government is strongly opposed to this), nor the conditionality procedure, although currently Hungary is the only victim of the latter. There is one important point on which the two platforms are radically opposed, namely the creation of a common European army. The Hungarian government calls for this, but the Antwerp Declaration is strongly against it. Another important point of the Hungarian resolution is the support for autochthonous nationalities, which is completely absent from the Identity and Democracy parties’ declaration. It was not a coincidence, but more on that later.

A quick analysis of these two documents also shows that there are serious differences of opinion between the two Europe of Nations concepts on important issues, which could make it difficult for the Hungarian government to cooperate with other European sovereignist parties.

12 Parliament 2022.
The internal contradictions of the Europe of Nations concept

The internal contradictions of the concept are well summarised in Boglárka Koller’s comprehensive paper on this issue. The problems start with the fact that, in Europe, there is no universally accepted concept of nation. In the context of Meinecke, we have already touched on the fact that, due to different historical development and its cultural influences, the nation and the nation state have a very different meaning in the early civilised Western countries than in the less developed Southern or Central and Eastern European regions.

According to the French concept of the nation state, which was adopted by many in the West, the citizens of individual Member States constitute a nation, and hence the Member State governments fully represent the “nation”, understood as a political community. Member States are referred to in Anglo-Saxon terminology as nation states, regardless of the nationality composition of the state.

This is radically at odds with the Hungarian government’s view, based on our national strategy interests. According to the concept of the nation, which is key to Hungarian national strategy, country borders in Europe do not necessarily coincide with national borders, and it is rare to find a nation state that can be called ethnically homogeneous (where autochthonous minorities are not present, in most cases there are communities with immigrant backgrounds). It follows that, according to the culture-nationalist conception, individual national governments represent citizens rather than the nation, and does not necessarily represent even them impartially. So when the representatives of the Europe of Nations talk about regaining the sovereignty of nations, they do not really talk about the sovereignty of nations in the cultural sense, but of the governments of individual member states, which is far from the same as the sovereignty of nations in the ethnic sense.

National strategy concerns

From a Hungarian perspective, the most serious concern about the Europe of Nations concept is of a national strategy nature, and it is no coincidence that the protection of autochthonous nationalities is emphasised in the Hungarian government’s position. However, no other sovereignist party shares this view. It is for this reason that one can state that, from the point of view of national strategy, the political rise of the “Europe of Nations” concept represented by the ID parties is particularly disadvantageous for us. I have already drawn attention to this issue in an earlier paper.

The basic premise of the political grouping that painted the concept of the Europe of Nations on its flag is that Member States must be capable of representing the interests of all citizens of that country without bias. Unfortunately, this assumption is contradicted

---

15 Szent-Iványi 2021: 45.
in practice on a daily basis. Indeed, individual governments do not necessarily represent communities of citizens of different nationalities impartially, nor are they able to represent the nation as a whole even in the case where some of the members of that nation – as citizens of another country – are not subject to their jurisdiction.

This seems to be supported by the numerous independence and devolution movements from Catalonia, through the Basque Country, to Scotland. Protest movements, referendums and demonstrations provide rather clear evidence of the extent to which nationalities in a given country feel that the central government also represents their interests. We do not have to go that far to find a convincing refutation of the premise of the nationalist conception that national governments also act in the interests of autochthonous nationalities without bias or partiality. This is reinforced by decades-long desire of Hungarians in Transylvania for autonomy, but there is also a sense of something lacking among Hungarians in Slovakia, not to mention the situation of Hungarians in Transcarpathia and their relationship with the central government. This conflict has nothing to do with the current war, the curtailment of minority rights began much earlier.

It was this sense of lack that launched the initiative called MinoritySafePack, and for similar reasons a petition was launched for the autonomy initiative of the Szekler National Council. It is no coincidence that in both cases, well over a million European citizens have signed the petitions, hoping that the European Union may be the defender of autochthonous nationalities’ interests vis-à-vis Member State governments. It is another matter that their trust in the EU so far, unfortunately, has remained unjustified and the Commission was also dismissive of both initiatives. At the same time, FUEN, the umbrella organisation of Europe’s autochthonous nationalities, always turns to the European Union for help and redress in disputes. A so-called Minority Intergroup on the situation of autochthonous nationalities has continuously worked in the European Parliament for a long time, and the current intergroup is composed of 42 MEPs from 18 countries. Without overrating the importance of this body, it can be concluded that this permanent body of representatives also constantly deals with discrimination against the nationalities of certain European “nation states”. The very existence and functioning of the Intergroup proves that a significant part of nation states are not performing well in this area.

The EU’s current legal order still has relatively few minority protection instruments, but the recognition of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities in Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty is a step forward and the European Parliament regularly deals with the grievances of autochthonous nationalities. For nationalities, the EU is the hope and the hoped counterweight against discrimination and violations in the Member States. We have every right to be dissatisfied with the way it currently works, but if we dismantle what we have, the situation will not be better, but clearly worse for nationalities, for many European nations. The classic model of a Europe of Nations is based on a concept of nation states that does not in fact recognise the right of nationalities to freely choose their identity and exercise the rights necessary to commit to that identity. So for us
who value the rights of Hungarian communities living beyond our borders, this is surely a wrong way and a further erosion of our modest existing opportunities.

A further danger of the traditional Europe of Nations concept is that it represents an earlier conception of sovereignty that is based on a total rejection of interference in domestic affairs. In other words, if this model were to become dominant in Europe, which of course is unlikely, not only would the European Union’s hoped-for role in guaranteeing fundamental rights be eliminated, but governments would also be less able to act on behalf of their communities living in other countries.

**An alternative model for a Europe of Nations**

Today it is almost completely forgotten, but there was also a highly utopian, alternative, federalist model of a Europe of Nations, although not under this name. Interestingly, not only the Gaullist concept of centralisation of the Europe of Nations is linked to France, but also its complete opposite, namely to Guy Héraud, a renowned law professor, minority expert and politician. Héraud was a prominent exponent of the minority issues, who came to the matter through his study of the problems of the French-speaking nationality in the Vallé d’Aoste (Valle d’Aosta in Italian). According to the traditional French concept of the nation, they are not French but French-speaking Italians, just as the Walloons are French-speaking Belgians and the inhabitants of French-speaking Switzerland are French-speaking Swiss and not French. In the course of his studies, Héraud discovered that there are many similar communities in Europe, whose problems can be hardly solved by the so-called nation states. Therefore, as a solution, he proposed in his best-known work that Europe is to be divided into ethnically homogeneous regions, or cantons, as far as practicable. He considered himself as a representative of “ethno-national federalism”. According to Héraud’s proposal, there are two important levels in public administration: regional and European levels. He intended to allow a small room for manoeuvre to nation states.

Héraud argued that if we really want all the national communities of Europe to see Europe as their home guaranteeing their rights, where a broad autonomy of national communities rather than that of governments applies, and that frameworks are set by national borders rather than by state borders, this is only conceivable in a completely new, utopian federal framework. In this imaginary federal Europe, the nation states are replaced by European “cantons” with wide-ranging autonomy, the borders of which follow ethnic rather than current national borders. Where homogeneous ethnic cantons can no longer be created because of mixed population (and let’s face it, this is quite common in Europe), the minority living there would be guaranteed the free choice and exercise of national identity, on the basis of personal autonomy. In this diverse, multi-ethnicity Europe no more majority nations and minorities would exist, but a large number of autonomous territories of equal status and their free association. In this imaginary Europe of nations, subsidiarity is the guiding principle and the primary task of central
government, if at all, is to keep watch over compliance with the rules of equality and cooperation. Héraud’s idea was framed by the federalist revolution he envisaged.19

This utopia was backed up by regionalism, which gained momentum in the wake of the Second World War. All this was rooted in the Vichy government’s administrative reform, which regionalised the previously rigid, centralised French administrative system. In a similar way, regionalism was stimulated by the creation of the Land of Baden-Württemberg in 1952, which also took place on the basis of the principles of regionalism. A prominent theoretician of this tendency was Robert Lafont, who was also a friend of Héraud and who wrote a powerful book20 on the revolution of regionalism. The trend of regionalism received a new impetus in the 1980s and 1990s, partly through the inclusion of the subsidiarity principle in the Treaty and partly as a response to globalisation.

It is indeed true that Héraud’s model represents an equal Europe of nations, understood in cultural-ethnic terms, and not of national governments. In this idealised model, there are no discriminated nationalities, only European citizens, equal in terms of rights and dignity.

We do not need to go back to the distant past and France to find similar contemporary ideas close to Héraud’s position, because we can find them here, in Hungary. János Martonyi is an advocate of this, and summarised his position clearly and unequivocally as follows: “The combination and co-enforcement of the cultural notion of the nation and grassroots federalism would thus constitute the ‘Community of Communities’, also known as the ‘supranational Europe of nations’, dreamed of for 25 years.” This could lead to a resolution of the contradiction between a “Europe of Nations” and a “supranational Europe”, and “ultimately to an agreement between sovereignists and federalists (which does not seem to be very likely currently)”.21 Martonyi also believes that “the future of European integration will be determined to a large extent by the success or failure of the link between the cultural notion of the nation and grassroots historical federalism”.

This is perfectly in line with the ideas of Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the European unity process, as explained in 1943: “There will be no peace in Europe if the States are reconstituted on the basis of national sovereignty [...] The countries of Europe are too small to guarantee their peoples the necessary prosperity and social development. The European states must constitute themselves into a federation.”23 This was the intention Monnet emphasised in his much quoted speech in Washington, D.C., in 1952 at the Press Club there: “Our times demand that we unite Europeans and overcome their division. We are not making a coalition of states, but uniting people.”

In the last seventy years we have not come much closer to the realisation of federalist

---

19 Héraud 1969.
20 Lafont 1967.
21 Martonyi 2021b: 193.
22 Martonyi 2021a: 36.
23 Monnet 1943. “During a meeting of this committee on 5 August 1943, Monnet declared: “There will be no peace in Europe, if the states are reconstituted on the basis of national sovereignty [...] The countries of Europe are too small to guarantee their peoples the necessary prosperity and social development. The European states must constitute themselves into a federation...”
24 “Notre époqu exige que nous unissions les Européens et que nous ne les maintenions pas séparés. Nous ne coalisons pas des États, nous unissons des hommes.” Monnet 1952.
plans, although this would certainly be an opportunity for an alternative Europe of Nations model. It is a utopian alternative to the current concept of a Europe of Nations. The chances of its realisation are as slim as those of the Europe of Nations concept, but in theory it would serve the interests of Europe’s cultural-ethnic national communities much better than Member State governments, elected by the majority nations.

Is there any reality to this alternative? None at the moment. The trend is exactly the opposite. Hope can only be found in the fact that when the founders of the Pan-European Movement, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi and his associates, announced the process of European unity between the two world wars, it seemed at the time an equally unrealistic and untimely dream. A few decades later, it did become something, and the process of European unity was set off. Right now it is stagnating, but it should continue to be moved forward rather than turn back.

References

ANCEAU, Eric [s. a.]: De Gaulle and Europe. Digital Encyclopedia of European History, [s. a.].
GÁL, Kinga (2020): The EP’s Minority Intergroup has been Reestablished. Online: https://galkinga.hu/en/the-eps-minority-intergroup-has-been-re-established/


